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Abstract
What constitutes a serious engagement of religion and spirituality in film remains a 
contentious topic in Western academia. The small body of literature dedicated to the 
study of religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema focuses largely on propaganda 
films exalting the Islamic Republic and its aspirations. My research examines ways 
in which other films participate and engage with Shi‘i expressions of Islam. I have 
explored official and popular discourses within Shi‘ism, and applied a philosophical 
framework to understand other engagements of film with religion. Moreover, I have 
situated the films I study within the larger socio-historical context of Iran and 
thereby located filmic discourses within a much longer-standing and continuing 
discourse on religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema.
I study the various debates by Iranian academics, clerics and critics on film’s 
compatibility or incongruity with religion and spirituality, and examine their 
relevance to the study of religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema. I examine films 
that debate contemporary official and formalistic religious discourses, drawing 
parallels between these films and the discourses of Iranian intellectuals, and thereby 
situating them within these wider debates. In order to demonstrate the more mystical 
approaches within Shi‘a Islam, I explore how Majidi’s films lend themselves to Sufi 
interpretations. I also analyse how Kiarostami’s films are poetic philosophies that 
invite viewers to rethink their existing ideas, thoughts and beliefs, be they rooted in 
scientific or theological approaches to religion. Finally, I demonstrate how cinema 
acts as a reservoir for popular, yet threatened traditions such as ta ‘ziyeh, which faces 
increased pressure from both intellectuals and clerics. As a medium that has received
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little serious attention in the analysis and understanding of Shi‘i religious 
expressions and articulations, my study situates film as a valid and important tool in 
understanding many of the current debates within Iran.
4
To the 14- year-old girl, Tahereh,
Who became my mother and whose silent sacrifices allowed me to speak today.
And to my 14-year-old girl, Pegah,
Whose patience beyond years eased the pain o f  deferring all the little and great
things we wanted to do.
5
Table o f  C ontents
Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................................................................7
Introduction................ ...................................................................................  9
Chapter 1: Approaches to the Study of Religion and Spirituality in Western Cinema..................................18
Chapter 2: Aims and Methods of Research............................................................................................................ 57
Chapter 3: Socio-Historical Background of the Iranian Context  .................................................................73
Chapter 4: Contemporary Iranian Discourses on Religion and Cinema........................................................114
Chapter 5: Filmic Discourses on the Role of the Clergy in Iran......................................... ............................. 156
Chapter 6: Sight, Sound and Sufism: Mystical Islam in Majidi’s Films......................................................... 191
Chapter 7: Thinking Films: Kiarostami, A Poetic Philosopher........................................................................ 220
Chapter 8: Cinema as a Reservoir for Cultural Memory...................................................................................252
Conclusions..................................................................................................................................................................294
Bibliography  .....    304
Filmography.............................................................................................................   315
6
Acknowledgements
This research was made possible through the generosity and unstinting support of 
The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London for which I am deeply grateful.
I would also like to thank my supervisors Professor Annabelle Srebemy and Dr. 
Gabriel vom Bruck and the Associate Dean, Dr Isolde Standish for seeing me 
through this. Professor Richard Tapper was my first supervisor but left SOAS after 
my first year of PhD studies. His constant support and advice has been invaluable. 
Professor Azim Nanji, the former Director of The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 
provided an enabling and encouraging environment, allowing its students to grow 
and pursue their ideas and dreams. For that, and for believing in me, I am truly 
grateful to him.
I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, Gholam Hassan Pak and Tahereh 
Radi, for always being there for me, during some of the most difficult times of my 
studies. I would also like to acknowledge my brothers, Ebrahim and Pejman, who 
were greatly inconvenienced by the absence o f my parents in Iran during these 
periods.
I would like to thank my daughter Pegah for her courage and patience throughout the 
last ten years, which began with two long years of separation. Her tender love and 
encouraging gestures in the form of drawings, charts and tailored achievement
7
certificates for me which even now adorn the walls around my table, and later her 
coffee treats for every chapter that I completed helped me carry on. For the last year, 
my younger daughter, Anahita has also been a great source of hope and inspiration.
Finally, no words can ever express my heartfelt gratitude to my companion and 
husband, Fayaz Shiraz Alibhai. His continuous love, encouragement, generosity and 
the many sacrifices he has made, not the least of which has been to defer his own 
studies, provided me with the courage and support to complete this work. Without 
him this would have not been possible.
Introduction
The Hollywood production of Not Without My Daughter (Brian Gilbert, 1991) 
became a great hit in the West, grossing around $15 million just in US ticket sales. 
Sally Field played the American wife trapped in Iran, whose cruel and fanatic 
Iranian husband, Mahmoudy, would not allow her to leave the country with their 
daughter. It was the sensationalist storyline and Field’s presence more than anything 
else that turned the film into a box office success in the West. Not surprisingly, the 
film was never screened in Iran. The Iranian media, nonetheless, criticised it for 
demonising Iranian people and culture, referring to it as yet another Western weapon 
aimed at weakening the Islamic Republic. Mahmoudy, the real-life ‘cruel husband’, 
appeared on Iranian television to refute the claims alleged in both the film and the 
book. The Mahmoudy represented on Iranian screens differed significantly from his 
Hollywood version, snippets of which were shown on Iranian television. On the 
Iranian screens, the depicted victim was Mahmoudy and not his wife.
The national attention the film received within Iran, however, was short-lived. In the 
larger socio-political context of 1990s Iran, Not Without My Daughter was an 
insignificant incident. The country had just emerged from a long and bloody war 
with Iraq (1980-1988). Indeed, the Islamic Republic’s social and political concerns 
ranged from the reconstruction of a war-ravaged country and people, to the repair of 
severed foreign relations, all of which far outstripped the concerns caused by the 
country’s negative representation in a Hollywood film. Within the arena of Iranian 
cinema itself, far more exciting events were in the making. Mohammad Khatami 
resigned as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1991 for siding with
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Makhmalbaf s A Time to Love (Nowbat-e 'asheqi), a controversial film that year 
which upset the sensitivities of conservatives of the Islamic Republic. By the end of 
the decade, many Iranian films were devoted to the plight of women suffering from 
the inequalities of living in a patriarchal society. These were films made from within 
the local context, and in many cases by women, and had a far greater relevance to 
the daily struggles of Iranian women than those depicted by Hollywood.
As I came to learn later, the image of Not Without My Daughter, however, proved to 
be longer lasting amongst many Westerners in the way it shaped their view of Iran. 
In 2000, as part of my graduate programme in Islamic Studies in London, I travelled 
to Sana, Yemen, to attend an Arabic immersion programme. The majority of the 
students at the programme were Americans. Many of them asked me on numerous 
occasions if  it had been easy for me to leave Iran and if  the situation of Iranian 
women was improving. Just as I would begin to admire their interest and knowledge 
in a foreign country and its women’s social position, the conversation would 
inevitably lead to Not without My Daughter, as though it were the only valid and 
available source to understand the socio-political context of Iran and Iranian women.
This was a great learning experience for me, one that defined the direction I would 
later take in my studies. I was fascinated at the power of Western media and the way 
it continuously shapes the image of the ‘Other’. Over time, however, I developed a 
greater interest in exploring the lesser-studied area of how these “Others” construct 
images of themselves. Thus, instead of looking at Hollywood representations of Iran 
and Iranians or indeed Hollywood constructions of Iranian religiosity, I decided to 
study Iranian cinema. I was particularly interested in studying how Iranian cinema,
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which emerges out of the only theocracy in the world, engages with religion and 
spirituality. For this, I have focused my studies on the post-Iran-Iraq war (1980- 
1988) period. The 1979 Islamic Revolution and the war that followed shortly 
afterward, strained much o f the country’s resources. The post-war period has been 
referred to as the beginning of a period of recovery and qualitative growth as well as 
a time during which morality codes were relaxed (Tapper, 2002: 8).
Academics, theologians, religious authorities and believers have defined religion and 
spirituality variously. However, a detailed study of what constitutes religion and 
spirituality is outside the scope of this research. In fact religion is often studied either 
as a text with an emphasis on scripture and sacred texts, or as rituals with an 
emphasis on the legal norms. Similarly, many of the studies on Islam, by and large, 
have approached it from one of these angles. However, focusing solely on sacred 
texts and rituals can be limiting in understanding the experiences and engagements 
of the believers with religion. Some scholars have therefore, argued for a cultural 
approach to the study of religion, emphasising the importance of cultural 
construction in the religious articulations and expressions. In my study of film’s 
engagement with religion, the cultural context of Iran plays an important role in 
understanding Iranian Shi ‘ i expressions of Islam. I, therefore, lay great emphasis on 
the development of Shi‘ism in Iran and in locating its religious expressions within 
that larger cultural context.
In studying religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema against this background, my 
research revolves around the following three themes:
1. analysing diverse articulations of what constitutes religion in film both in
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Western scholarship and inside Iran
2. exploring different modalities of Shi‘i interpretations within Iran
3. examining some of the ways in which films participate in and engage with 
Shi‘i expressions of Islam
The sensitivities surrounding Iranian Cinema are complex. Cinema in Iran is an 
industry monitored closely by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to 
ensure its compliance with the Islamic Rebuplic’s aspirations. Amongst others, the 
following regulations ban all films and videos that:
o Weaken the principle of monotheism and other Islamic principles, or insult 
them in any manner;
o Insult, directly or indirectly, the Prophets, Imams, the guardianship o f the 
Supreme Jurisprudent (velayat fciqih), the ruling Council or the jurisprudents 
(mojtaheds)\
o Blaspheme against the values and personalities held sacred by Islam and 
other religions mentioned in the Constitution (quoted in Naficy, 2002b: 36).
Considering the sensitivities outlined above, any approach to the depiction of 
religion that deviates from the official stance could result, at the very least, in the 
banning of the film or even the arrest and imprisonment of the filmmaker. Not 
surprisingly, most films that do directly refer to religion are those that exalt the 
Islamic regime and are therefore referred to as propagandist films. However, the 
religious discourses in Iranian films are not limited to this category. Instead, many 
filmmakers have creatively sought ways to circumvent censorship and engage in a 
different approach to religion, which may not necessarily be in line with officially 
endorsed Shi‘i interpretations o f Islam.
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However, what constitutes a serious engagement of film with religion remains a 
contentious topic. Within Western academia, various scholars have adopted different 
frameworks in which to situate their arguments on the study of religion and film. As 
I will demonstrate in Chapter 1, the variety and range of these methods have their 
own strengths and weaknesses, making it clear that no single method could ever be 
preferred over another in studying religion in film. Additionally, since Western 
scholarship has focused mainly on examining Christian and Judaic elements in 
Western productions, it is important to fill in this gap by exploring any parallel 
literature on Iranian films. In Chapter 4 , 1 critically analyse the literature on religion, 
spirituality and Iranian cinema and compare and contrast the various debates on 
these topics both within and outside of Iran. I also explore the launch of the ‘spiritual 
cinema’ category in Iran in 2005 and the various attempts by filmmakers, journalists, 
academics and the authorities to define this category. Subsequently, I explore some 
o f the various ways in which films participate in and engage with Shi‘i expressions 
o f Islam.
Shi‘ism encompasses modalities of interpretation that range from the communal and 
public to the highly personal and spiritual. These variant approaches to religion and 
spirituality clearly demonstrate the plurality and complexity of Iranian Shi‘i identity. 
Therefore, in any study of the Shi‘i expressions of religion and spirituality in Iran, it 
is important to attend to both the formal and legalistic as well as the more personal 
approach to religion, each of which plays a formative role in these expressions. 
Given the breadth of the topic and the numerous expressions of Shi‘ism in Iran, I 
have selected three main areas within the religious discourses, namely the 
formalistic, the mystical and the popular, and I examine films that have seriously
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engaged with these broad themes in Chapters 5, 6, and 8. In addition, in Chapter 7 , 1 
study the philosophical approach to these religious discourses and its engagement 
within the filmic narratives.
Clearly, the nature of my study demands an in-depth understanding of the different 
modalities of interpretation within Shi‘ism in Iran. In this regard, analysing the 
formation and development of Shi‘ism and its manifestations in Iran enables us to 
better locate more recent articulations of its deeply-rooted ideas and traditions. It is 
additionally imperative for us to understand the specificity o f Shi‘ism within the 
larger Islamic tradition if  we are to understand Iran and Iranian film, and particularly 
their engagement with religion and spirituality. Chapter 3, therefore, provides a 
socio-historical background to some of the different modalities of Shi‘ism, which 
will be further explored in their filmic narratives in later chapters. Situating my study 
within this larger context allows me to locate the filmic discourses within a much 
longer-standing and continuing discourse on religion and spirituality in Iran. 
Therefore, as a medium that has thus received little, if any, serious attention in the 
analysis and understanding of Shi‘i religious expressions and articulations, my study 
situates film as a valid and important tool in the understanding of many of the 
current debates within Iran, which are often rooted in historical and traditional 
discourses.
In examining the formalistic approach to religion, I study the clerics and their centres 
of learning. A brief examination of the history of clerical influence within the Iranian 
context reveals a very complex picture, one that makes any simple reading of the 
situation highly questionable. Even though Iran is currently governed and led by the
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clerics, one cannot point to a consensus amongst them about their own social role. 
Indeed, the diversity of views and understandings has turned the current debates on 
the role of the clergy into one of the most dynamic and exciting developments in the 
long history of this institution in Iran. In Chapter 5 ,1 explore the formalistic aspects 
of religion represented by the ulama and their centres of learning. The films I study 
here articulate a discourse that differs from previous representations of the clergy in 
Iran.
The formal and institutional approach, however, has never been the sole expression 
of the beliefs and practices of the Shi‘i laity. Indeed, the Sufi and mystical approach 
has often existed in tandem as an alternative to the legalistic approach to religion and 
spirituality. But those whose personal approach to religion diverged from the public 
and communal aspects propagated by the establishment and centres of authority, 
were usually regarded unfavourably and subsequently marginalised by the latter. 
However, their rich and varied readings of ways to arrive at spiritual maturity has 
influenced many aspects of Iranian culture and thought. In Chapter 6, I study the 
highly personal and Sufi approach to religion. Here, I analyse how Majid Majidi’s 
films are depictions of man’s struggle to spiritual attainment, a discourse that stems 
from Sufism, a mystical dimension of Islam.
In Chapter 7, I study the philosophical approach to religion. By the philosophical 
approach I mean the approach that reflects upon the various religious discourses, be 
they formalistic, mystical or even scientific. In this chapter I propose to study Abbas 
Kiarostami’s films within a philosophical framework and demonstrate how they may 
be read as ‘poetic philosophies’ that both resonate with Wittgenstein’s thought and
15
simultaneously emphasise the lyrical language of Iranian poets.
Finally, in Chapter 8 I explore how cinema has provided a new medium of 
expression for one of the most popular discourses within Shi‘ism. Here, I examine 
film’s engagement with one of the oldest Shi‘i narratives, the death of the third Shi‘i 
Imam, Husayn, through ta ‘ziyeh. Ta'ziyeh is a re-enactment of the events of Karbala 
that culminated in the death of Husayn. Referred to as the only Islamic drama, 
ta'ziyeh originates from much older pre-Islamic forms of performance. Being a 
popular discourse within Shi4ism, it does not always draw its language or facts from 
the official discourses on Husayn. Rather, these expressions of the laity have 
provided a means for personal and direct engagement with the figure of the Imam. 
They have also led to the creation of religious rituals, many of which have 
historically met with the disapproval of the clergy, and have been condemned by 
them as unlslamic.
Note on transliteration: The system of transliteration used in this thesis generally 
follows that of the International Journal o f  Middle East Studies (IJMES), with a few 
modifications to render Persian vowels closer to their local pronounciations. Thus, 
for Persian words, the short 4o’ has been used in preference to 4u ’ and 4e’ is used in 
preference to 4i’. The silent h at the end of Persian words is rendered as 4eh’ as in 
d a 1ziyeh\ Diacritical marks have been dispensed with. Arabic and Persian terms that 
appear in a standard English dictionary, such as jihad, hijab and hadith, have not 
been transliterated or italicised and are treated as English words. Transliteration 
systems of sources quoted directly have been maintained. Even though I have 
followed IJMES in rendering names such as 4Husayn’, I have retained alternative
16
spellings such as ‘Hossein’ where individuals have themselves transliterated their 
names as such in English. The spelling of proper names that frequently appear in 
English publications, or on official websites, for example Kiarostami, Khamenei or 
Beyzaie has similarly been retained.
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Chapter 1: Approaches To The Study Of Religion And Spirituality 
In Western Cinema
Long before its release, Mel Gibson’s The Passion o f the Christ (2004), caused a 
great stir in the media. The controversies included debates about the legitimacy of 
the long and gory scenes of torture, the anti-Semitism of the film, and breaking 
Hollywood norms in having the entire dialogue in foreign languages (Latin and 
Aramaic), thus forcing audiences to read subtitles. These debates were not limited to 
the film alone, and dragged Mel Gibson himself into the picture. He turned into an 
even more controversial figure with his Catholic background becoming the subject 
o f detailed discussions in the media. Indeed, the general furore culminated in 
television documentaries that examined his life and work against the backdrop of his 
religious beliefs and ideas.
The anticipation rapidly building up around the film became its greatest marketing 
tool, and contrary to initial predictions of a box-office failure, it succeeded in earning 
a record $125.2 million in its first five days in theatres across the United States. 
Many churches bought huge blocks o f tickets, reserving theatres in advance, and 
news reports broadcasted people emerging from the theatres in tears and comparing 
their film viewing to a religious experience.
The Passion o f  The Christ is a good example of the complexities surrounding the
study o f religion in film and the various criteria that could determine a film as
addressing religion, or containing the religious. Would this film qualify as an
appropriate example of religion in film for its depiction of a religious figure or is it,
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rather, a religious film because it parallels with a certain theology, in this case 
Roman Catholic? Could it be studied as an attempt to shape a religious identity of 
one Self through demonising an Other (in this case the Jews and the Romans)? 
Alternatively, does it fit into the study of religion and film not so much because of its 
content, but because of its effect on the audience, many of whom compared it with a 
religious experience? Equally, could it be studied as religious propaganda that 
attempts to impose one sect’s reading onto others? Some Evangelicals condemned 
the film as idolatrous, and accused the Catholic Church of using this film ‘as an 
excellent way to convey the Catholic Christ’ (Bennett and Dunbar, 2005). 
Furthermore, is the religious background of the director as important as the film 
itself in determining the possibility of exploring religious themes in film? As 
mentioned above, many analysed and reviewed The Passion by situating it within the 
context of Gibson’s own beliefs, ideas and biography. These are just some of the 
various approaches by which religion may be studied in this particular film, without 
entering into another problematic area -  that of defining religion itself.
Various scholars have adopted different frameworks in which to situate their analysis 
of the study of religion and film, now turning into a fast-growing field of study. 
Since a substantive part of these explorations are established within a Western 
context that examines Christian or Judaic elements in film, I have devoted much of 
this chapter to a survey of current Western scholarship in this regard. I will first 
discuss the various approaches to the study of religion and spirituality in film. I have 
categorised these leading studies into eight sections in this chapter. They comprise: 
the theological approach, the mythological approach, the ideological approach, film 
as religion, films with explicit religious references, the religious interpretation of
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film, film as hierophany and philosophy in film. However, it is important to note that 
while these approaches comprise some of the main methods in the study of religion 
and spirituality in film, they are by no means inclusive of all the existing studies. I 
will introduce each of these eight categories and provide examples of how the 
proponents of each theory have employed their particular methodology in analysing 
films. I will also examine the various criticisms of each approach.
The Theological Approach
The theological approach is one of the main approaches in the study of religion in 
film and analyses films by drawing parallels with the arguments of a certain 
theology. This approach, which derives its tools of analysis from religious studies, 
typically explores the traditional Judaeo-Christian theological concepts in film, such 
as good and evil, the nature of God, redemption, salvation and grace. In discussing 
the theological approach, Martin and Ostwalt state that the ‘basic assumption behind 
theological criticism is that certain films are properly understood, or can be best 
understood, as an elaboration on or questioning of a particular religious tradition, 
text or theme’ (Martin and Ostwalt, 1995: 13-14). They further argue that theological 
criticism depends entirely on the notion that either the ‘critic, director, screenplay 
writer, or some other creative force behind the film develops a certain theological 
agenda or concept, and the distinctive goal of the theological critic it to uncover that 
concept’ (Martin and Ostwalt, 1995: 14).
Ostwalt studies what he calls ‘modernity’s apocalyptic consciousness’ in films. He 
discusses the apocalyptic imagery in three films: apocalyptic character in Pale Rider
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(Eastwood, 1985), apocalyptic setting in Apocalypse Now  (Coppola, 1979) and 
apocalyptic plot in The Seventh Sign (Schultz, 1988). He compares the hero in Pale 
Rider, who defeats evil and restores peace in a small mining community, to the 
messianic figure defending the righteous at the end of time. The hellish setting of the 
American garrison in the jungles of Vietnam resonates with the battlefields of 
Armageddon in Apocalypse Now. And finally, the seven signs of apocalypse unfold 
one by one in the Seventh Sign, marking the end of the world, only to be stopped by 
the hope and sacrifice of a mother. Even though all three films base their narrative 
on Judaeo-Chrisitian apocalyptic imagery and folk tradition, they also depart from 
them ‘to define the twentieth-century attitude toward the cosmic cataclysm that 
marks the end o f the world’ (Ostwalt, 1995: 56). Ostwalt argues that, as reflected in 
these cinematic versions, the modem apocalypse ‘keeps the notion of destroying 
evil; however, it loses the notion of world destmction by God’s hand, and it transfers 
the messianic kingdom from a new-age heaven to a second-chance earth’ (Ostwalt, 
1995: 62). Thus, by moving sovereignty from God to humanity, the cinematic 
apocalypse attempts to provide hope for this world instead of an eschatological 
kingdom (Ostwalt, 1995: 62).
It is not necessarily films with outwardly religious themes, such as the stories of the 
Old and New Testaments, that attract theological criticism. For example, Grimes 
employs this method to analyse Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960). He examines the 
depiction o f bodies, sin, debt and death in Psycho within the Christian tradition and, 
through comparing the long scenes of waiting in the film to the Christian Advent, 
concludes that Hitchcock has made an Advent film (1995: 19-29). Grimes argues 
that, in addition to addressing the fact that we are all fated to die and that death is
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embedded in life, in Pyscho, ‘Christian discourse finally shapes story into the 
affirmative with regard to the question, Shall these bones live?’ (Grimes, 1995: 28). 
Estess examines the screen version of Ironweed (Babenco, 1987), in the context of 
the Catholic background of its author and screenwriter, William Kennedy, and what 
he calls his purgatorial vision (1995: 30-43). He reads the various stages of the 
character’s lives as being in the state of purgatory. He suggests that Kennedy, as the 
author, ‘views all human life, from start to finish, as purgatorial in character. 
Whether one realizes it or not, redemption is needed, expiation is required’ (Estess, 
1995: 34).
There have been various criticisms of this method. Martin takes issue with it for 
resulting in a narrow definition of religion which mostly focuses on films with Christ 
figures and Christian and Judaic theology. He considers this to be insufficient and as 
tending towards ethnocentricism. He proposes that approaches other than the 
theological are also required to fully understand the relation between religion and 
film (Martin, 1995: 9). The other danger of this approach is that the ‘theological 
critic will choose these [theological] concepts as the window to understand the film’s 
intent, even if it means discounting other dimensions of the film’, and there is the 
danger of overlooking other social and political meanings conveyed in film (Martin, 
1995: 14).
Just as this approach emphasises the character of the creative force behind the film in 
developing a certain theological agenda or concept, some Iranian critics, whom I will 
discuss at length in Chapter 4 have also argued this point. For Maddadpur, the 
filmmaker’s faith becomes the only validating factor in film’s ability to discuss
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religion. Both Bolkhari and Ansari-Basir draw parallels between film’s narratives 
and symbols and the Islamic religious texts in their analysis. Ansari-Basir argues 
that the filmmaker’s familiarity with the sacred Islamic texts o f the Qur’an and 
hadith are crucial. Bolkhari’s comparison, on the other hand, includes parallels 
drawn between the Qur’an and Western films. Even though none of the approaches 
of the Iranian critics discussed above have been identified as a theological approach, 
there are congruences in their criteria for studying religion and spirituality in film.
The Mythological Approach
The mythological approach analyses how some films function in the same way as 
myth. Myth is the means through which religion communicates with its participants. 
It consists of ‘stories that provide human communities with grounding prototypes, 
models for life, reports of foundational realities, and dramatic presentations of 
fundamental values’ (Martin, 1995: 6). The mythical approach, thus, broadens the 
scope of exploring religion to include not only those traditions that fall outside the 
monotheistic institutions, but also those aspects of monotheistic cultures that are, 
strictly speaking, not part of their theology.
Calling cinema the ‘dream factory’, Eliade comments on the relationship between 
film and myth by stating that cinema ‘takes over and employs countless mythical 
motifs—the fights between the hero, the paradisal landscape, hell, and so on’ 
(Eliade, 1987: 205). One can learn a fair amount about religion in contemporary 
America by ‘studying the ways Hollywood reinterprets, appropriates, invents or 
rejects inherited archetypes, mythic stories, ritual acts, symbolic figures, and
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spiritual values’ (Martin, 1995: 6). Myth criticism is employed to study the ways in 
which myths and symbols are evoked in film.
One of the main features of mythological films is to take audiences to ‘places 
beyond the boundaries of the unknown and require the viewer to negotiate an 
encounter with “a world elsewhere,” with a world that is “wholly other” and, 
therefore, sacred or religiously significant’ (Martin and Ostwalt, 1995: 69). Science- 
fiction films, such as the various episodes of Star Wars (Lucas, 1977) or Alien 
(Scott, 1979), are one of the most discussed genres in this approach, precisely 
because of their fantastical imagery and plot, which are comparable to those of 
myths. Gordon analyses the first Star Wars, employing Joseph Campbell’s (1949) 
definition of the ‘monomyth’ and its three main stages of departure, initiation and 
return, to reveal the film’s mythical structure. He attributes the film’s success to 
Lucas’s construction of ‘a coherent myth out of his pastiche of pop culture’ (Gordon, 
1995: 78). By situating the film within the situation of American society prevalent in 
1995, which he refers to as a ‘world that seems drained of spiritual values’, he 
concludes that Lucas has created ‘out of the usable past, out of bits of American pop 
culture, a new mythology that can satisfy the emotional needs of both children and 
adults’ (Gordon, 1995: 82).
The mythical function is not explored solely in films with overtly fantastical stories. 
Nathanson, for example, suggests that Woody Allen’s Shadows and Fog (1992) is ‘a 
specifically and characteristically (but not exclusively) Jewish way of thinking’ 
based on religious tradition rather than on ethnic psychology or sociology (2003: 
90). He demonstrates this by drawing detailed comparisons of the character and
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atmosphere in the movie with that of myth. He argues that the atmosphere of the 
film evokes a Central European city between the wars, a time immediately preceding 
the rise of the Nazi period, and the protagonist as the archetypal character of the 
‘legendary wandering Jew’. However, the aim of the film is not to show Europe 
under the Nazis, but to suggest that, even though the Nazis are long gone, ‘the moral, 
spiritual, and intellectual abyss they represented’ still exists in 1990s America 
(Nathanson, 2003: 92). He maintains that the film functions as a myth, albeit a 
‘secular myth’, for it ‘does for an ostensibly modern and secular society what 
religious myths do for traditional and religious societies. In this case, it brings 
viewers face to face with a mystery that lies at the core of human existence at all 
times and in all places: death’ (Nathanson, 2003: 95).
The mythical approach has been criticised on various grounds. One of the main 
criticisms is the tendency to focus on similarities in various stories and, therefore, to 
over-generalise the contents of myths at the expense of overlooking the details in 
each story. The monomyth, therefore, as proposed by Campbell (1949) and Jung 
(1968) is criticised as an inapplicable model for it Tos[es] the distinctiveness of 
individual myths as well as meanings attributed to them by those who tell them’ 
(Lyden, 2003: 62). Consequently, critics reject it as not being pertinent to film 
analysis. Another criticism of the mythical approach is that it ‘focus[es] on our 
psychological quest for meaning but tend[s] to ignore the way meaning is always 
politicized and historicized’ (Martin, 1995: 10). Doniger (1988) on the other hand, 
dismisses the validity of popular-culture myths for their inability to enforce a moral 
vision in society (quoted in Lyden, 2003: 77).
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The Ideological Approach
The ideological approach to film explores how films perpetuate racial, social, 
religious, gender and class hegemonies. Martin argues that the primary focus of this 
method is ‘the social and political effects of cultural expressions’ in which ‘the quest 
for meaning is secondary, and the relationship to a traditional religious figure or 
theme is even less relevant’ (1995: 10). He further states that the main aim of the 
ideological critics is to understand ways in which ‘a specific cultural expression 
reinforces or undermines the structure of power relations in a given society at a 
particular time’ and to study the relationship of religion and society (1995: 10). 
Ideology in film, Miles asserts, is the ‘unstated assumptions and perspectives... at 
work in the myriad choices made in the process of production, choices of subject and 
narrative, scriptwriting, casting, shooting, and editing’ (1996: 81).
In analysing Roclzy (Avildsen, 1976), Martin reads it as an ideologically conservative 
film within the context of the US defeat in Vietnam, Watergate, and the US 
economic recession of 1973. He asserts that the New Right vision of the film 
includes ‘an attack on the civil rights movements, glimpses of a race war, and a call 
for the resubjugation of African Americans (1995: 126). RocJcy (1976), written by 
and starring Sylvester Stallone, is the first of a series of Roclcy and Rambo (Kotcheff, 
1982) films that share not only the same hero, but more importantly, a common 
ideological objective. Together, they ‘help resacralize traditional power relationships 
abroad and at home. They participate in and encourage the conservative cultural and 
political backlash against the 1960s’ (Martin, 1995: 129). Martin studies the 
character of Rocky as the European American working-class man who stands up
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against the improper power and undeserved visibility of the African Americans in 
the post-1960s America. In this context, Rocky attempts to restore the lost 
‘American Dream’ and hand it back to its rightful European American heirs (Martin, 
1995: 130).
Miles (1996) studies the representations of ‘Others’ in films such as Not Without My 
Daughter (1991). She contextualises the film within the framework of American 
curiosity and anxiety about Islam and Muslim culture after the Iranian hostage crisis 
and the 1991 Gulf War. Defining the ‘Self through the ‘Other’ is a process that 
includes identifying and excluding those who differ in race, class, religion and 
gender. ‘Otherness must be imagined before it can be rejected, and popular film is 
one medium in which pictures of difference are circulated’ (Miles, 1996: 68). 
Similarly, in Not Without My Daughter Miles demonstrates how the image of Iranian 
Muslims is constructed and how a majority is demonised as primitive and 
oppressive. Thus, ‘in the absence of other film representations o f Iranian religion and 
society’, Not Without My Daughter, ‘enjoyed a monopoly in circulating its 
perspectives on Islam and Muslims to a broad audience’ (1996: 71).
The ideological approach appears to be a favourite method for those exploring 
gender issues and specifically the representation of women in films. Using this 
approach, Makarushka demonstrates how Nine and a H alf Weeks (Lyne, 1986) 
rejects the gender polarisations of woman being the victim and man the victimizer 
(1995: 151). McLemore explores how Blue Velvet (Lynch, 1986) calls attention to 
voyeurism and fetishistic scopophilia, ‘foregrounding issues of representation and 
the construction of the subject” (1995: 139).
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Lyden criticises the ideological approach employed in cultural studies, particularly 
that of Miles, for neglecting audience reaction and ethnographic study in the 
‘processes that produce the films as cultural products— in particular, how they are 
marketed’ (2003: 28). He continues that the dominant paradigm o f reading popular 
films primarily as ideology in feminist film theory, leftist political film theory, 
psychoanalytic film theory, screen theory, genre studies and cultural studies is to 
overlook the equally important aspects of films as ‘texts’ that are read by audiences 
(2003:31).
As seen in the above examples, this approach is more a demonstration of ideology in 
film rather than a method of exploring and studying ‘religion’, ‘spirituality’ or ‘the 
sacred’ in film. Miles’s analysis o iN o t Without My Daughter demonstrates how the 
film ideologically represents the ‘Other’s’ religion. Martin asserts that critics 
employing this method to study ‘how religion legitimates or challenges dominant 
visions of the social order’ (1995: 7). Nevertheless, his own analysis of Rocliy fails 
to demonstrate how religion specifically succeeds in doing so. He proposes that we 
should not limit our focus solely to ideology, for at ‘its deepest level’ the film ‘offers 
a profound religious reconstruction of U.S. history’ (1995: 130). However, he only 
provides a page on this topic, comparing Rocky to a Christ figure and pointing to the 
representation of power in flesh as a twist on Classical Christian Docetism, which 
‘put[s] down the flesh, equating it with finitude, weakness, the profane’ (Martin, 
1995: 131). This analysis is closer to the theological rather than the ideological 
approach. Indeed, Martin might have consciously chosen the theological approach 
for this part o f his analysis of Roclcy. However, the bulk of his analysis, which leans
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on the ideological approach, has very little to do with religion in film. In fact, most 
studies that employ this method fail to demonstrate how the ideological approach 
offers a unique and distinctive method in the study of ‘religion’ in film and how the 
approach is different from the idea that popular films function primarily as ideology.
In the case of Iranian cinema, when Dabashi studies M akhmalbaf s early film career 
he regards it as a resistance to capitalist modernity. This approach employs the same 
arguments of the ideological approach -  even though it has not been identified as 
such -  in that it attempts to understand how a specific cultural expression 
undermines the structure of power relations in a given society at a particular time. 
Dabashi’s approach is studied in more detail in Chapter 4.
Film as Religion
Some critics do not explore the religious in the content of the film, but consider the 
form and its reception itself to perform a religious function (Plate, 2003 and Lyden, 
2003). Lyden, for example, does not maintain a difference between religion and 
culture, contending that the realms of these two areas overlap much more than 
scholars of religion or culture would like to admit. In this way, he suggests, the 
classical distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ is to be ‘put aside for a more 
nuanced view that sees all features of culture as having religious aspects that cannot 
be separated from their nonreligious aspects’ (Lyden, 2003: 17). As such, film as a 
cultural phenomenon, normally perceived as not having an inherently religious 
aspect, is identified as religious for the function it plays. As Plate states, ‘religion is 
imagistic, participatory, performative, and world-creating— and sometimes it is
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cinema that best provides these activities’ (Plate, 2003: 2). Ostwalt argues that the 
movie theatre itself has acted ‘like some secular religion complete with its sacred 
space and rituals that mediate an experience of otherness’ (1995: 154).
O f those proposing this approach to the reading of religion in film, Lyden takes it 
furthest. He sets out to develop a method for analysing films that illustrates their 
religious functions. He focuses his study on popular films and claims to limit his 
interpretation to that of the average filmgoer. He does not ‘seek to uncover hidden 
meanings in the films that can be detected only by the scholar who is trained in 
abstruse methods of analysis, but to point to the ways people’s beliefs, values and 
feelings are affected by films’ (Lyden, 2003: 5). He proposes observing audience 
responses as the main tool for this method and claims to have utilised them both 
from his own experiences where available and from other published sources. This 
attitude, he asserts, will help us see films as viewers do ‘instead of seeing them as 
scholars are wont to do’ (Lyden, 2003: 135). For this purpose, he divides the films 
under various genres of ‘Westerns and Action Movies’, ‘Gangster Films’, 
‘Melodrama, Tearjerkers, and “Women Films’” , ‘Romantic Comedies’, ‘Children’s 
Films and Fantasy’, ‘Science Fiction’, and, finally, ‘Thrillers and Horror Movies’, all 
o f which he deems as popular Hollywood genres.
In discussing romantic comedies, for example, Lyden questions the ideological 
approach to this genre, which claims that films are created by a male industry aiming 
to indoctrinate women’s subjugation to men. He states the popularity of these films 
with women rather than with men as evidence to the contrary of this assumption 
(2003: 180). One of the films that he discusses under this genre is When Harry Met
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Sally (Reiner, 1989). Lyden states that the protagonists of the film, Harry and Sally, 
are portrayed as ‘a stereotype of their gender: men only want sex and resist 
commitment, and women are desperate to marry and have children’ (Lyden, 2003: 
187). However, as Harry and Sally realise through their own friendship, sex is the 
least important part of a relationship. Audiences, Lyden argues, ‘found this 
romanticism refreshing, as it shows love to be more important than sex, and sex 
following love rather than the reverse’ (2003: 187). Drawing from his analyses, 
Lyden then concludes that romantic comedies ‘do not tend to subvert conventional 
ideas about love and romance.. ..The myth of romantic perfection is one that people 
seem to long for, especially in an age when so few seem to find it’ (2003: 190).
What remains ambiguous in Lyden’s argument of the above example is how exactly 
these romantic comedies function as religion for their audiences. Indeed, it is only in 
his analyses of children’s films that he provides a brief explanation of the religious 
function of films. He states that the fantasies of films like E. T.: The Extra- 
Terrestrial (Spielberg, 1982) or Hook (Spielberg, 1991) evoke an image of the 
world as we would like it to be, which parallels with religion. Religion, he states, 
‘offers us the hope of a better world not by describing the world as it is but by 
describing it as it could be. In this way, we begin to believe that religions’ models 
fo r  reality could be our models o f  reality as well’ (Lyden, 2003: 201).
Lyden proposes to illustrate the religious function of films. However, it is difficult to 
conceive his approach as being distinct from other methods for the study of film and 
religion, discussed earlier, such as the ideological or mythological approach. For 
example, when he asserts that he seeks ‘to point to the ways people’s beliefs, values
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and feelings are affected by films’ (Lyden, 2003: 5), one is inclined to question how 
this is different from the ideological approach. Similarly, his models o f  and fo r  
reality have already been extensively applied in the mythological study of religion. 
One way of justifying his approach is perhaps to say that the ideological or mythical 
are aspects of religion and in instances where films function as such, they could by 
extension be seen as functioning religiously. However, this is only a supplementary 
statement to an already existing corpus of methodology.
There are also several inconsistencies in Lyden’s argument, such as his initial 
emphasis on audience studies and criticism of scholars who rely on textual analysis. 
He equates film’s popularity with ‘acting religiously’ for a large number of people 
(2003: 247) but fails to explain how. He states that his interpretations of films are not 
‘attempts to read content into them so much as to read the response of viewers to 
them’ (Lyden, 2003: 6). He also suggests that our interpretations should not rely on 
our own understanding of the film but rather the understanding of ‘how the average 
viewer sees it, what she liked about it, where she saw it, why, and with whom’ 
(2003: 47-48). Valid and interesting as these points are, he fails to deliver on specific 
details and examples in the course of his study. Moreover, as he proceeds, it appears 
that he, too, is unable to escape textual analysis, relying more and more on his own 
reading of the text. Indeed, other than a few fleeting statements generalising student 
opinions on films or concepts such as ‘love’ (2003: 187), there is no mention or 
detail o f his own audience study, leaving the role of ethnographic study in his 
approach obscure. In the conclusion of his book, he briefly refers to the reason for 
this dearth as
partly because such [ethnographic] studies are currently in short supply, and partly
because such studies do not always tell you what you would like to know. Although it
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is crucial to listen to what viewers say, sometimes they do not articulate very well the 
reasons a film has affected them, or they may not even realize why they liked one film 
better than another. For this reason, I do not apologize for engaging in textual analyses 
of the films in order to better understand how they do what they do, as this is not 
irrelevant to understanding audience appreciation of a film (Lyden, 2003: 246).
In the study of Iranian films, form and reception have also been considered as having 
a religious function. Lyden, Horn and Yathribi, for example, all of whom I discuss 
in detail in Chapter 4, have also emphasised the role o f the audience in recreating a 
religious experience or ritual.
Films with Explicit Religious Material
The study of Jesus and Christ-figures in films comprises the most explored topic 
within the literature on religion and film. This is perhaps the result of the surfeit of 
films produced with these themes. Just two years after the invention of the 
cinematograph, in 1897, two cinematic presentations of the passion play were 
produced: The Passion o f  Christ, also known as Lear Passion was produced by 
Societe Lear filmed in Paris, and the American production filmed in Bohemia 
entitled The Hortiz Passion Play (Freeman). Following the success of the American 
production, The Original Oberammergau Passion Play (Vincent, 1898) was 
produced in New York a year later. This film is ‘considered important in film- 
history and in the history of the religious film because it was one the first examples 
of a recreated or refictionalized version of a historical event in film’ (Baugh, 1997: 
9). Even the cinematic Christ-figure can be traced back to as early as 1916 in D.W. 
Griffith’s Intolerance with cinematic metaphors of innocent victims of human 
cruelty. The story of Jesus and the Christ-figure continued to be produced over the
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years. In fact it could be argued that these cinematic themes were bom alongside 
cinema itself.
Those studying the filmic representation of Jesus films propose a series of issues 
associated with the making of these films. Baugh notes some of the following 
problems: He states that the four distinct portraits of Jesus in the gospels of Mark, 
Matthew, Luke and John make it a complex choice for the filmmaker, who might 
choose one or a combination of these portraits for their filmic representation. Also, 
the filmmaker is challenged to reconcile the lack of suspense or surprise in the 
content of this story with the demands of cinema requiring a dramatic stmcture. The 
filmmaker’s faith in Christianity, Baugh notes, is another vital point to be 
considered, particularly in matters regarding transcendental elements such as the 
Incarnation of God, Transfiguration, Resurrection and so on. The audience’s 
preconceived notions about Jesus through nineteen centuries of visual art on the 
Jesus-theme places another demand on the filmmakers who need to take a position in 
the types of choices they make in rejecting, imitating or being inspired by these 
visual arts (Baugh, 1997: 3-5).
Tatum also enumerates four aspects of what he calls ‘the problem of the cinematic 
Jesus’ (Tatum, 1997: 6). These four dimensions of the problem are the artistic, the 
literary, the historical and the theological, all of which are similar to those mentioned 
by Baugh. The artistic refers to cinema as an art form with its own demands, as well 
as the preconception of the viewers about Jesus. The literary problem alludes to the 
various portrayals of Jesus in the four gospels, and the limited information they 
provide on Jesus and his outer life, with almost nothing about his motivations and
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private life. The historical problem revolves around the distinction between the 
Christ of faith and Jesus as a historical figure. Finally, the theological problem 
concerns the faith claims made by a Jesus film which should align itself with the 
theological sources and the subsequent complications that might arise in instances 
where a film deviates from the scripture or Christian tradition (Tatum, 1997: 6-12).
One of the most discussed Jesus films is Scorsese’s controversial The Last 
Temptation o f  Christ (1988). Based on Kazantzakis’s 1955 novel of the same title, it 
depicts a Jesus ‘beset by doubts and fears about his identity and mission, constantly, 
oppressively tempted by evil’ (Baugh, 1997: 51). There were great objections to the 
film even before it was shot, resulting in the withdrawal of financing by various 
producers, and the delay of the film’s production by almost eight years. Not 
surprisingly, once it was released it stirred up heated controversies and protests. 
Baugh states that the major objections were to the long final scene of the film where 
Jesus comes down from the cross and enters an earthly paradise by first marrying 
Mary Magdalene, and in a rapid filmic sequence, after her death marries both Mary, 
the sister o f Lazarus and her sister, Martha, fathering numerous children with them. 
However, Baugh does not consider these sequences as the main problem of the film, 
for in fact, he states, these are only ‘a temptation sequence represented by Scorsese 
as a fantasy’ that Jesus finally overcomes (1997: 52).
Baugh studies the problem with The Last Temptation o f Christ through a different 
lens. Scorsese’s biography as an Italian-American Catholic growing up in 1950s 
New York finds centre stage in his analysis. Baugh draws various interviews of 
Scorsese, his grandmother’s Sacred Heart portrait and his expulsion from the junior
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seminary because he had allegedly fallen in love with a young lady. These somehow 
explain the extreme use of blood and violent scenes and Jesus’s persistent struggles 
with guilt reflected in the film. Baugh also compares Scorsese’s Jesus character with 
his other film characters and finds many similarities between them, which he asserts 
‘exhibit classic masochistic symptoms’ (Baugh, 1997: 63). He concludes that ‘the 
problem is not that Scorsese does not know the gospels, or that he is totally 
incapable of reasoning theologically’ but his ‘eagerness to create a Jesus closer to his 
own experience, in his own image and likeness...get in the way’ (Baugh, 1997: 61). 
However, he points that there are also theological problems in the film such as 
Jesus’s misunderstanding of and resistance to his messianic identity (1997: 65-66).
Tatum on the other hand, does not take such a critical stand to Scorsese’s Last 
Temptation o f  Christ. Instead, he states that Jesus in this film ‘does eventually 
understand why he must die’ (1997: 169). In his view, the controversies stemmed 
from the fact that Scorsese dared to do what no other filmmaker had dared to do so 
thus far: ‘to get into the mind of Jesus so that the viewer not only hears Jesus speak, 
not only hears Jesus speak about what he has been thinking, but actually hears Jesus 
think!’ and, therefore, opening up the interior life of Jesus, which reveals a ‘reluctant 
suffering-servant messiah’ (Tatum, 1997: 169).
Jesus o f  Montreal (Arcand, 1990) is another example of a Christ-figure film. Daniel 
Coulombe, the protagonist of the film, is an actor who plays the role of Christ in a 
passion play in modern-day Montreal and is ultimately transformed into a Christ- 
figure. Baugh comments that ‘Daniel and his story, lived out against the background 
of the passion play, assume both in their main contours and in their details,
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incontrovertible dimensions of the Gospel events, clearly creating in Daniel a Christ- 
figure’ (Baugh, 1997: 121-122). Baugh further elaborates on these contours: 
Daniel’s mysterious background and origins, his search for companions and the 
formation of a community, parallel those of the Jesus story. He also has a ‘privileged 
relationship with women: they are among his first followers and they and not the 
male disciples accompany him to his passion and death’ (Baugh, 1997: 122). The 
lawyer who tempts Daniel with the riches he could have if  he cooperated is the 
corresponding Satan in the Jesus story. And finally, ‘the Resurrection of Christ’ is 
represented in ‘the experience of Daniel in the new life and hope given to the 
recipients of Daniel’s transplanted organs’ (Baugh, 1997: 128).
Religious Interpretation of Film
This approach does not seek to find explicitly religious themes and images in the 
study of religion in film. Instead, it proposes that some films, including mainstream 
and popular films, which appear to have little to do with religious themes, are open 
to religious interpretation. May is amongst the earliest proponents of this method. He 
suggests that regardless of the filmmaker’s reputation concerning his religious belief, 
the autonomy of the film as an art form needs to be respected. Indeed, for a work to 
be considered religious, ‘one need not demand that the language of religion or 
theology be present in a work’ (May, 1982: 31). It is thus ‘more precise to speak of a 
film’s world view as being open to a religious or sectarian interpretation or to 
appropriation for the faith experience’ (May, 1982: 43). Similarly, Deacy more 
recently proposes that the study of religious films should not be limited to those that 
contain specifically religious material. Instead, he suggests, it may be ‘more
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appropriate to speak o f the “religious interpretation o f film” rather than of the 
interpretation of religious film’ (Deacy, 2001: 18).
In applying this religious interpretation to his study of films, May suggests that we 
should view film as a ‘visual story’. He then contends that myth and parable are 
‘forms of story’ that are ‘inextricably interwoven into the fabric of religion’ (1982: 
33). He thus proposes to study the religious in apparently non-religious films by 
appealing to the mythic and parabolic modes. These modes, he explains ‘would also 
help both to illuminate principles that have tended toward the abstract and, I would 
hope, to provide further demonstration of the validity of visual story as a 
religious/sectarian hermeneutic for film’ (May, 1982: 37). He briefly examines the 
religious interpretation of a few films, such as Polanski’s Chinatown (1974) and 
Malick’s Days o f  Heaven (1978). Chinatown, he concludes, has a mythic mode with 
a pattern of separation-and-retum. Days o f Heaven, he asserts, ‘emphasizes the 
insignificant passage of man against the awesome panoply of nature’s death and 
rebirth’ (May, 1982: 38).
In a more detailed study of this approach, Deacy argues that the power of film can be 
recognised in the film critic’s encounter and examination of ‘such perennial religious 
themes as grace, forgiveness, alienation, the apocalypse and redemption’ in popular 
films (2001: 19). He applies this method of study to his examination of the Christian 
notion of redemption in American film  noir of the post Second World War period. 
Deacy asserts that even though film is a secular medium, it may ultimately be seen to 
perform ‘a religious function in contemporary western culture by addressing and 
confronting fundamental issues and themes which are distinctively and
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quintessentially religious in form’ (2001: 20). In illustrating the relevance of 
Christian redemption to film  noir, he compares the teachings of St. Paul, St. 
Augustine and Martin Luther about the world and human existence, with the world 
and human condition of film  noir. In both cases the world is corrupt and filled with 
sin, and the human condition is depicted as alienated and estranged. Deacy argues 
that despite this seemingly bleak picture, redemption runs through film  noir. In fact, 
film  noir is a ‘fertile repository’ for redemption: ‘As in the case of Christianity, 
redemption thus proceeds not from an escape from reality but from a more resolute 
confrontation with the truth and the actuality concerning the human condition’ 
(Deacy, 2001: 54).
Exploring Christian redemption without the existence of the Christ-figure in film  
noir might seem impossible at first sight. Deacy overcomes this challenge by 
examining the development of Christian theology in the last few centuries. He argues 
that as the redemptive figure in Christian theology has shifted its emphasis from 
Christ to human individuals, the heroes in some of the film  noirs can be read as the 
redeemer-figures equivalent to Christ (Deacy, 2001: 69). Thus, even though there 
are no explicit or implicit references to the influence of Christ in film  noir, the hero 
‘performs the Christ-like role of undertaking a process of redemption from sin, guilt 
and alienation, the benefits o f which may be passed on and imparted to other human 
beings’ (Deacy, 2001: 76). Deacy then proceeds with the study of redemption in 
various film  noirs, with evil and suffering as the precursor to redemptive activity and 
the protagonist as the redeemer.
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The cinema of Martin Scorsese is one of the major focuses of Deacy’s study of
redemption. Here I shall refer to his study of Taxi Driver (1976). The protagonist,
Travis Bickle, lives a lonely life as a taxi driver in New York, an environment, he
says, ‘where all the animals come out at night—whores, skunks, pussies, buggers,
queens, fairies, dopers, junkies'. His abhorrence of this state o f affairs turns into a
determination to confront the sin and depravity of the city (Deacy, 2001: 113-116).
What makes him a redeemer-figure and his act comparable to that of Christian
redemption is his mission in fighting against sin and suffering. His encounter with
the 12-year-old prostitute, Iris, provokes him to finally take action. As in
Christianity, Travis’s redemption is accompanied by sacrifice. Deacy compares the
violence and blood scenes at the end of the film to the act of cleansing and Baptism
in Christianity. In his words:
Only by engaging with, and confronting, the ‘filth’ that has suffused the city can 
Travis’s redemptive mission be fulfilled, in a manner analogous to -  albeit 
ontologically different from -  Jesus’ becoming incarnate and bearing the sins of 
humanity in order to fulfil his redemptive miss ion... Through his [Travis’s] 
redemptive action, therefore, there is a sense in which Travis has managed to redeem 
himself, in the respect that by facing up to and confronting the factors which have 
precipitated his alienation he has succeeded, at least to some extant, in extricating 
himself from the plight (Deacy, 2001: 117-118).
In looking beyond films with explicitly religious materials or themes, this approach
allows for a more open way to the study of religion and spirituality in film. However,
May’s explanations prove inadequate in providing a solid methodology in this field.
Whilst his approach liberates films from specifically religious themes, the reading of
cinematic elements finds primacy in the interpretation of the films:
In proposing that films be viewed as visual story in order to discern religious 
potential, I have emphasized the structure of story... certain cinematic elements seem
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more suitable than others for the visual representation of our basic concerns about the 
universe, others, and self. For instance, composition of frame, camera movement, and 
editing are most pertinent to shaping a film’s world, whereas choice of physical 
reality, type of shot (camera distance), and mise-en-scene in general are typically 
more suggestive of human interrelationships or the lack of it. Finally, camera angle 
and cutting are usually aimed at giving the viewer a feeling for the human subject 
(May, 1982: 43).
May does not provide any further details or examples to illustrate how these 
cinematic elements provide a religious reading of the films. Moreover, his proposal 
to read films as religious by detecting modes that are analogous to mythical or 
parabolic structures adds little, if  any, substance to the mythological approach. What 
remains ambiguous in this analysis is whether any detection of a mythic or parabolic 
mode in film, does, in fact, constitute a religious reading. Deacy however, takes this 
study further, elaborating on how films without explicit religious materials are open 
to religious interpretations. By focusing on a single Christian theme such as 
redemption, he illustrates the possibility of detecting this religious theme in popular 
films with no explicit religious references. Thus, by comparing the various elements 
o f a film— such as the way the world and the human condition are depicted—to the 
various elements of key notions in Christianity such as redemption, he demonstrates 
a viable and valid methodology in the study of religion in film.
In the context of the study of religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 4, Mir-Ehsan employs a Heideggerian framework to further argue 
cinema’s ability to engage with religion. He also lists the inclusion of ethical and 
traditional values in films, such as halal and haram (the permissible and forbidden), 
as an indicator of films that display spirituality.
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Film as Hierophany
This approach proposes that film style enables the exploration of the sacred. Eliade 
first proposed the term ‘hierophany’ to refer to the study of the sacred through the 
profane. He maintained that the sacred is not limited to holy places or things, but 
rather it is possible for the entire cosmos to become a hierophany (Eliade, 1987: 12). 
Bird applies Eliade’s general analysis of culture and its ability to manifest the sacred, 
to the specific art o f film. He argues that the manifestation of the sacred in film is 
possible not through grand religious dramas, but the medium’s ability for realistic 
depiction. Following film theorists such as Bazin, Agel and Ayfre, Bird invokes the 
idea of film as an art form, which enables the disclosure of reality. These theorists 
argue that whilst art-as-transformation applies to other art forms such as painting, the 
same does not apply to film. Thus, while painting is an art only if the painter 
creatively transforms or interprets the reality in front of him rather than produce a 
mechanical imitation of an object, film does not follow the same argumentation. 
Instead, film achieves its purpose not by adding anything to reality but by virtue of 
its style, enabling the disclosure of reality. Drawing from these film theories of 
realism in cinema and Eliade’s notion of hierophany, Bird concludes that film’s style 
enables the exploration o f the sacred (1982: 14).
Bird dismisses the ability of the so-called religious films with their grand drama and 
technical beauty to convey the sacred to the audience. These films fail because they 
neglect the stylistic virtues of the medium (1982: 13). The sacred needs to be 
experienced whereas these films overwhelm the very factors by which this
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experience would have been possible. Creating supernatural episodes in these 
ostensibly religious films hinders the possibility of experiencing the sacred. 
Employing Ayffe’s theory, Bird argues that ‘genuinely religious films’ are those ‘in 
which the cinematographic recording of reality does not exhaust reality but rather 
evokes in the viewer the sense of its ineffable mystery’ (Bird, 1982: 14). Bird also 
employs Tillich’s (1959) argument about belief and realism to elaborate on the 
possibility of exploring the sacred in realism rather than in supernatural creations. 
Tillich asserts that contrary to the dominant notion, realism does not negate belief. In 
his theological analysis of culture, Tillich contends that reality points beyond itself. 
Bird appropriates Tillich’s view of the self-transcendency of reality to elaborate how 
certain films in realist cinema have succeeded in exploring the sacred.
Bird identifies Robert Bresson as one of the filmmakers to have discerned the power 
of realism in film. He examines The Diary o f a Country Priest (1951), to illustrate 
how Bresson’s film style has enabled the exploration of the sacred. Bresson directs 
his actors to minimise their acting, and ‘they pose as transparent figures through or 
behind whom a spiritual significance is discerned’ (Bird, 1982: 17). Bird asserts that 
Bresson’s films are an ‘intensification and dissolution’ of human boundaries (1982: 
19). Thus, cinema is not the voice of the filmmaker, but rather ‘a diaphragm which is 
sensitive to the speech of the cosmos waiting to be heard’ (Bird, 1982: 20). By 
employing cinema’s inherent realism, filmmakers such as Bresson enable us to hear 
the speech of the sacred. Quoting Eliade, Bird concludes that when cinema becomes 
the agent of ‘the manifestation of something of a wholly different order, a reality that 
does not belong to our world’ (Eliade, 1987: 11), that film becomes hierophany.
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Some scholars criticise the theory of reading the divine through the profane in films. 
Lyden refers to this approach as the Roman Catholic approach that attempts to 
interpret ‘theonomy’ in film. In his view, this method is more of a reading of 
religious themes ‘onto’ films than ‘into’ films. It therefore, risks ‘falling into 
heteronomy, in spite of its concerted efforts to avoid it, by only seeing the 
significance of films through the ways they prepare the audience for the Christian 
message of grace and hope’ (Lyden, 2003: 27). This approach, he concludes, would, 
therefore, undermine the autonomy of the films.
Bird’s main emphasis, however, is that even though it is not possible to portray the 
infinite, it is possible to allude to it through the finite, and in this case, the film’s 
simple and realistic style does just that. It is difficult, however, to see how this 
approach is specifically Roman Catholic, even if this method has so far been 
employed to study specifically Roman Catholic ideas and notions embedded in film. 
The theory of implicit references to the divine or the sacred through the profane, 
which forms the backbone of this argument in the study of religion in film, can be 
employed independent of religious denominations.
Returning to the Iranian context, Yathribi argues that the exploration of the spiritual 
is not attained only through explicit religious figures, symbols or epics. As I will 
discuss further in Chapter 4, she instead emphasises the primacy of the spiritual over 
the material, and cinema’s ability to bring this out without referring to religious 
issues.
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Philosophy in Film
Recently, some scholars of philosophy have been attracted to films in their study and 
analyses of philosophical thought. Their approaches vary from studying philosophy 
through film to considering film as philosophy itself My interest in this approach is 
the relevance and applicability of some of these arguments to religion, spirituality 
and film. Falzon mentions two main concerns that might arise in the study of 
philosophy through film. One is philosophy’s attitude towards visual images, for 
philosophy is concerned with the abstract and universal whilst images on the other 
hand are material and particular. Thus, it might be argued that philosophy is 
prejudiced against images as being ‘remote from the austere world of conceptual 
understanding’ (Falzon, 2002: 3). Second, from the film’s point o f view, the concern 
is that this approach might reduce film to mere philosophical examples, neglecting 
film’s autonomy and richness. However, Falzon argues that film and philosophy are 
not intrinsically opposed to each other. Philosophers, he argues, had ‘recourse to 
vivid pictorial images to illustrate, illuminate and provoke philosophical thinking’ 
(2002: 5). And films, on the other hand, serve much more than mere illustrations of 
philosophical issues. Falzon proposes to study various films ‘to identify 
philosophical positions, themes or questions that are being presented or worked 
through in particular films’ (2002: 6). Thus, he introduces an approach which does 
not intend to impose philosophy on film, but rather brings out what is happening in 
film.
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In discussing moral philosophy for example, Falzon focuses on the central question 
of ‘Why we should be moral’. For this, he provides a range of arguments on the 
topic including those proposed by Plato, Kant, Utilitarianism and Existentialism. 
According to Kant’s moral theory (1987) moral worth is dependent not on the 
consequences of our acts but on the motivations behind them. Utilitarianism, on the 
other hand, argues that the consequences of our acts determine what is moral. 
Therefore, even if  an act produces some unhappiness it can be justified as good as 
long as the happiness and pleasure it produces in the world outweigh this 
unpleasantness. Existentialists differ from all of the above in that unlike Kant they 
do not base morality on reason or in the Utilitarian spirit of human happiness. The 
answer does not lie with religion either, for God is not viewed as the lawgiver. 
Instead, Existentialists argue that humans have free choice and should take full 
responsibility for their actions. Falzon selects particular films that deal with the 
question of morality in a manner that is comparable to these theories. Woody Allen’s 
Crimes and Misdemeanours (1989) is one such example. When one of the characters 
faces the dilemma of what to do with his mistress when she threatens to expose their 
affair, we are introduced to a number of views as to why one should be moral 
(Falzon, 2002: 87). Falzon studies these various perspectives, such as keeping in line 
with God-given moral law, the role of the conscious in people’s lives and the pursuit 
of one’s own happiness.
Goodenough (2005: 1-25) identifies four reasons for the philosopher’s interest in 
film. One is the technical aspect of film itself, where the philosopher might be 
interested in understanding the technology, process, and social meanings of watching 
films. Another reason is that some films illustrate philosophical themes and issues.
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Goodenough refers to The Matrix trilogy (Wachowski brothers, 1999-2003) as a 
series of fantasies that provide graphic illustration of a number of philosophical 
issues. However, since the financial success of a film is central to its production, 
action becomes the primary concern of the film. Thus, content is not approached in a 
very philosophical way and becomes secondary to these special effects. There are 
other films, however, that raise philosophical issues in a serious and central way. 
This is the third reason for the philosopher’s attraction to film. These are, as 
Goodenough refers to them, ‘films about philosophy’. Jarman’s Wittgenstein (1993) 
is one such example, where philosophical thought is explicitly discussed and 
constitutes the main content of the film. The last approach is Goodenough’s thesis of 
film itself as philosophy. Drawing heavily from Mulhall’s (2002) arguments, 
Goodenough states that films are independent forms that think seriously and 
systematically about philosophical arguments and issues (2005: 21). They are 
different from and stronger than literary texts, for the written arguments and texts tell 
us about philosophy, whereas films show us philosophy (Goodenough, 2005: 21-23).
The filmmaker’s intention in showing philosophy is irrelevant to the film’s ability to 
do philosophy. Drawing from a number of arguments on this topic, Goodenough 
asserts that a film is not to be considered only if it conforms to any of the existing 
philosophical theories. Rather, it is the kind of questions that a film poses and the 
kind of answers that it provides, which can be of a philosophical nature, and which, 
therefore, make it appropriate for this kind of study. Similarly, Litch proposes to 
study and discuss some of ‘the enduring questions within philosophy’ through 
feature films. In her view, whether or not the writer or director of a film intended to 
do philosophy is irrelevant to the possibility of a film dealing with philosophical
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questions. She thus states that the main criterion for the selection of films in her 
study is to ‘present and defend an answer to one of philosophy’s classic questions’ 
(Litch, 2002: 2). For example, in her study of morality she analyses Crimes and 
Misdemeanours as one such film which presents one of philosophy’s classic 
questions.
Goodenough mentions Blade Runner (Scott, 1982) as another such film that 
demonstrates the ability to think in films. He argues that this film thinks seriously 
about philosophical arguments and issues, including personhood and identity. He 
analyses these concepts with reference to personhood as defined by Dennett and 
Wittgenstein. The human-made replicants in the film, who possess rationality, 
intentionality and linguistic ability, look and act exactly like humans. However, 
society refuses to treat them as more than run-away machines. ‘This discrepancy 
between our intuitive feelings about replicants and this future society’s provides 
much of the film’s philosophical tension’ (Goodenough, 2005: 11). A film that 
seriously thinks about philosophical arguments and issues should ultimately ‘act as a 
kind of philosophical mirror, making us look to see how we see ourselves’ 
(Goodenough, 2005: 14).
Even though this approach to philosophy in film does not directly fall under the 
study of film and religion, it is a method that can usefully be applied to this area of 
study. Both philosophy and religion, and specifically theology, are concerned with 
questions such as identity, human relationships with the world, the nature of evil, 
morality and so on. This approach, however, is different from the theological 
approach in that it does not aim to detect parallels between the theological arguments
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and films. Rather, it detects how films themselves can reflect on philosophy, 
theology or religion. When a film contemplates a theme such as morality within a 
particular context and studies the various understandings of morality, it does not seek 
to draw comparisons with theological arguments. Rather, it reflects on the 
theological definition of morality alongside perhaps other definitions and thinks 
seriously about these arguments. Thus, this approach is a useful tool that opens up 
another avenue for studying how religion is dealt with in films. I have also employed 
a philosophical framework when I study the engagement of Kiarostami’s films with 
religion and spirituality in Chapter 7.
Conclusions
As in Mel Gibson’s Passion, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear 
that one could employ a number o f these eight approaches to study religion in film. 
This would perhaps depend on two main factors: the film under study and the 
academic discipline from within which the scholar studies the film. What is clear 
from this review, however, is that there is no one method that would do justice to the 
study of religion in film in all its depth and breadth. In fact, one could argue that 
there is no such single approach. Each method, whether mythological, theological, 
ideological, or any of the other approaches employed on its own, studies only one 
aspect of film. Film, on the other hand, is a rich and multi-layered text and an art 
form in its own right. It is possible, therefore, for a film to have multiple layers 
through which religion is depicted, explored, referred to or criticised. Consequently, 
it is vital to clarify the specific aspects that the scholar intends to study whilst
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acknowledging that it is by no means the all-embracing method. Each of the methods 
above provides a fruitful avenue in the study of religion in film.
My division of these approaches into eight categories is by no means an all-inclusive 
list. For example, it is possible to study religion in film from the viewpoint of the 
filmmaker’s biography. Thus, one could study all of the films made by a particular 
filmmaker from the viewpoint of his or her belief system, or of filmmakers who 
share a similar perspective. However, like any other approach, this is a theme with 
its opponents and proponents, and is addressed in most of the above categories. In 
the theological approach for example, Estess analyses Ironweed in the context of the 
Catholic background of its author and screenwriter to determine the purgatory state 
of the character’s lives (1995: 30-43). In the approach that studies films with explicit 
religious material, Baugh lists the filmmaker’s faith in Christianity or lack of belief 
as one of the fundamental points to be noted in studying films about Jesus or the 
Christ-figures. He even goes further to suggest that the quality of the belief itself, 
whether a fundamentalist or enlightened belief, is of utmost importance to the film 
(Baugh, 1997: 3-4). On the other hand, others such as May, in approaching film as 
hierophany, dismiss this position in the assessment of a film’s ability to deal with 
religion. May argues that employing such criticism is ‘heteronomous because it 
measures the film not on its own merits as cinematic art but against the scale of 
“religious background” or “expressed intention”’(May, 1982: 27). Thus, even 
though I have not categorised the biographical approach, for it is a theme that runs 
through many o f the already stated approaches, it could also be considered as an 
independent category.
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Moreover, it is noticeable that many of these approaches overlap in certain aspects, 
making it almost impossible to have a distinct and independent methodology in the 
study of religion in film. For example, one could detect intersections between the 
theological approach, religious interpretation, and studying films with explicit 
religious material. As Martin and Ostwalt state, the theological approach includes 
understanding films through a particular religious tradition, text or theme (1995: 13- 
14). Similarly, the study o f Jesus and the Christ-figure also draws heavily from the 
religious text within film. When Deacy focuses on the Christian theme of redemption 
in film  noir, it is clear that the role of theology in film bears significant importance in 
the religious interpretation. However, even though theology is of core importance to 
each of these approaches, they are different in more ways than they are similar. In 
the same way, the distinction between the mythological and ideological approach 
could be blurred if  one were to study them according to Barthes’s definitions. 
Barthes (1993) categorises myth and ideology together. Following a Marxist point 
of view, he asserts that ideology is the product of social and economic interests and 
myth is a message or cultural representation motivated by ideology. In this system of 
study it is very difficult to separate the two terms from each other. Thus, it is 
important to bear in mind the fluidity of the boundaries drawn between each of these 
categories.
Most of the approaches studied in this chapter have been criticised by other scholars. 
As I argue in each section, there are more grounds for some of these criticisms than 
there are for others. I have also raised the inconsistencies of some of these 
approaches. However, my reason for doing so is not to detect faults in these studies. 
It is, rather, to demonstrate the various difficulties that scholars have faced in the
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study of religion in film. This is perhaps a result of the infancy o f the field, wherein 
various theories are still being tested. Despite their problems, all these approaches 
make a valuable contribution to the field. In fact studying them made it more clear to 
me that an outright rejection of any one approach is a grave mistake, for certain 
elements of each approach provide an opening into the study of the field that are 
applicable to some films and not to others, and each fulfils specific purposes.
Considering that the study of religion in film began in the Western context, it was 
important to examine the existing frameworks and theories before beginning to 
formulate my own argument. Having discussed these various approaches within the 
Western context and their limitations and strengths, it is also important to identify 
whether any of these theories are applicable to a different religion situated within a 
different socio-political context.
When studying Iranian discourses on religion and spirituality in cinema, which I will 
turn to in Chapter 4, one can detect a number of parallels and similarities, as well as 
certain differences, with the Western discourses.
For example, the reliance on philosophy in some of the Iranian discourses regarding 
religion and spirituality in cinema is evident. Interestingly, some Iranian critics have 
employed Western philosophy, such as Heidegger’s to support their arguments in 
their approaches. Unlike the approach of philosophy in film discussed above, these 
Iranian studies are not about seeing how film does philosophy. As I will discuss 
later, these Iranian critics, instead, employ Heidegger’s ideas on technology to study 
the encounter of art and technology, and of Islam with modernity. Thus, despite the
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Western origin of their theories, they develop a uniquely Iranian approach and one 
that is rooted in a much older history of Iranian intellectuals who employed 
Heidegger to provide a philosophical understanding of their disenchantment with 
modernity and the Pahlavi’smodemising projects. However, when Dabashi, who 
employs Heidegger’s theory of the techne extensively, studies M akhmalbaf s early 
cinematic career as a resistance against capitalist modernity, there are parallels with 
the ideological approach studied above. The ideological approach reads film as an 
attempt to undermine the structure of power relations in a given society at a 
particular time. So Dabashi’s approach is at the same time both very similar to this 
Western approach (ideological approach) and at the same time particularly distinct 
since it is rooted within the Iranian history and discourses.
Like many Western studies, a number of Iranian discourses on religion and 
spirituality in film focus on popular films. As I will discuss later, amongst these are 
those who draw parallels between film and theology, similar to the theological 
approach studied above. Their focus often includes many Western popular films 
such as Ghost (Zucker, 1990) and The Sixth Sense (Shymalan). Interestingly, 
however, the parallels between these foreign films are not drawn with their 
corresponding Judeo-Christian tradition, as one might expect, but instead with 
Qur’anic verses and hadith. Indeed, these comparisons are sometimes even extended 
to include the ideas of the 12th-century Muslim philosopher Sohravardi, the 13th- 
century poet-philosopher Rumi and the 17th-century philosopher Mulla Sadra. Thus, 
while employing an approach (i.e. the theological approach) common within 
Western studies of religion in film, these critics give it an Islamic twist by 
appropriating or reading Islamic and Shi‘i concepts within their analysis, so that
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somehow Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, for example, is read within the context 
of surah 84, verse 19 of the Qur’an, which I will explain further in Chapter 4.
The approach of film as hierophany, even though not categorised as such in the 
Iranian discourses, can also be detected in the analysis of religion and spirituality in 
film. Just as Bird employed Eliade’s study of the sacred as not being solely limited 
to holy places and things but applied to the whole of creation, some Iranian critics, 
such as Yathribi, also argue that there are filmmakers such as Satyajit Ray, 
Kobayashi and Tarkovski who turn ordinary and living things into religious signs 
and creations. However, even though there are parallels between the Western 
discourses and that of Yathribi, she herself does not refer to these studies on 
hierophany, nor even use the term. Moreover, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, 
Yathribi goes to great lengths to draw the differences between what she categorises 
as ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ religious films, implying the possibility o f hierophany 
only within ‘Eastern’ films.
What I intended to highlight through the examples above is the parallels that can be 
drawn between the Iranian and Western discourses. Whether or not Iranian critics 
have consciously borrowed these Western approaches or arrived at them 
independently is difficult to gauge, particularly because bibliographic references are 
not often included in their works. By 2006, however, there were over five volumes 
of these Western studies on religion and spirituality in cinema that were translated 
into Persian, including titles such as Finding God in the Movies: 33 Films o f  Reel 
Faith (Barsotti and Johnston, 2004), Robert Bresson: A Spiritual Style in Film 
(Cunneen, 2004) and sold at the Fajr International Film Festival desks and
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bookshops.1 In any case, it is clear that one cannot easily dismiss these Western 
studies as irrelevant to the Iranian context. Instead, the Iranian approaches focus on 
drawing out the relevance to their own context and making connections between the 
films they study and Islamic, and particularly Shi‘i ideas. One of the main 
differences between these discourses, however, is the concern of those Iranian critics 
whose primary focus is on the congruity and relevance o f the medium of cinema 
with Muslim Iranian society, one which did not arise in Western discourses.
My approach to the study of religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema is not based 
on the above categories. However, it is possible to detect some similarities between 
them. For example, in my study of the clergy in Chapter 5, I have employed some 
elements of the mythological approach. Similarly, when studying Sufism, a 
dimension o f Islamic mysticism, in Majidi’s films, I explore how Majidi’s filmic 
narratives enable the exploration of the sacred and the mystical. Even though I do 
not label it as ‘film as hierophany’, the category could conceivably be applied to it. 
However, this would be different from Bird’s use of the term ‘hierophany’ in film, 
where he refers to the medium’s capacity for realistic depiction and, therefore, 
disclosure o f reality. In addition, a parallel can be drawn between the study of 
Husayn’s figure in Chapter 8 and that of Jesus and Christ-figures in films with 
explicit religious material. The closest o f all these categories to an aspect of my 
study, however, remains the philosophical approach. I had already independently 
framed my study o f Kiarostami’s films within a philosophical framework before
1 Rezadad, the director of the Farabi Cinema Foundation, expressed great interest in 
my thesis and offered to translate it into Persian once it was completed.
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coming across the very recently published Western studies of philosophy and film. 
In the next chapter, where I discuss my research methodologies, I will also talk about 
the relevance o f some o f these Western approaches to my own study.
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Chapter 2: Aims and Methods of Research
Iranian cinema is the one of the few cinemas to have emerged from a Muslim 
country and gained significant international acclaim. Whilst this makes it an 
interesting and rich source of study for the engagement o f film with religion and 
spirituality, it remains largely an understudied area. So far, other than a few brief 
studies, religion and spirituality in Iranian films have been examined solely within 
the genres o f propagandist films and Sacred Defence Cinema (Sinama-ye defa'-e 
moqqadas), a term coined by the Islamic Republic to refer to films that deal with the 
theme of the Iran-Iraq war. My research, therefore, aims to contribute to filling in 
this gap by examining religion and spirituality, particularly its Shi‘i expressions, in 
Iranian cinema outside of these two genres.
Like many PhD students, when I first began my studies I was eager to answer many 
unanswered questions. In my quest to uncover all that hidden knowledge and take 
untrodden paths, I ambitiously set out to study religion and spirituality in Iranian 
cinema not only within its own ‘narrow’ context, but also in comparison with other 
references to Islam in Indian and Turkish cinema. In my first year, therefore, I 
enthusiastically audited the Indian cinema class at university, triumphantly found 
and watched Turkish films and made extensive notes. It took me only a term to 
revisit and reconsider my definition of the word ‘narrow’. It was a humbling lesson, 
and I also quickly learnt that ‘Iranian cinema’ as a general theme was too wide a 
topic for a meaningful study within the scope of a PhD thesis. Therefore, no matter 
how tempting it was, I realised it was impossible to turn the thesis into an extensive
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study that covered all references to religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema from 
the pre- to the post-Revolutionary period.
I had already decided that I would not study the Sacred Defence Cinema, even 
though some Shi'i expressions, such as martyrdom, have been heavily employed in 
this genre. This was primarily because it has already been the subject of several 
studies (e.g. Varzi, 2006, Reichmuth, 2001) and I did not wish to duplicate these 
works. In the same vein, I have not examined the already exhausted topic of 
propagandist films, despite their extensive use of religious discourse. I have instead 
focused on the post Iran-Iraq war period (from 1988 onwards), which has been 
referred to as the beginning of cinema’s recovery and qualitative growth as well as a 
time during which morality codes were relaxed.
Although there has been some research on film and religion from the post-war period 
(Fischer, 2000, Ridgeon 2000, 2008) this has primarily taken the form of individual 
articles rather than full-length treatments of the subject. This lack of a detailed study 
on religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema within both Western and Persian 
literature boosted my confidence, for it meant that I was entering a field in dire need 
of more extensive scholarship. More immediately, it also fulfilled the criteria of 
originality of research that is required for PhD studies. However, this also meant that 
I had to create a framework from scratch, which came with its own challenges. As a 
PhD student in film and media, with a background in social anthropology, I felt it 
was imperative to gain a thorough knowledge of film theory, which I assumed would 
be essential to my thesis. After having spent a year studying film theory, I was 
confident that even though the knowledge I had gained was valuable, it could not
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drive my approach or define the framework of my studies. The best lesson I learnt 
from film theory experience was that it was not the only framework for the study of 
film.
On my first field trip to Iran in 2003/2004, I found only a handful of books that 
attempted to discuss religion and cinema. In fact, when I interviewed some of the 
authorities in Iran, including those working within the Farabi Cinema Foundation, 
many of them were intrigued by my research topic. The Farabi Cinema Foundation 
was established in 1983 as the executive assistant department of the Ministry of 
Islamic Guidance. According to their official website it ‘started its activities based 
on the executive policies and methods of the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] cinema 
and continued the supportive programs in respect to the production and screening of 
feature films with the aims of supporting the Iranian cinema industry, giving 
qualitative and quantitative aids and reinforcing the cinematic activities.’ 
(http://www.fcf.ir/english/home.asp?dbname=profile, visited 4 July 2006). By the 
following year, however, a new category by the name o f ‘Spiritual Cinema’ was 
included in the Fajr International Film Festival (FIFF). By 2006, Farabi had 
published over a dozen books on this topic, including articles by Iranian authors as 
well as translations of Western scholarship. A new term was coined within Iranian 
cinema, and as I will discuss in great detail in Chapter 4, both the authorities and 
authors struggled to articulate a definition for ‘Spiritual Cinema’ and for that matter, 
what qualifies a film as ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’.
However, as with the question I posed at the beginning of the previous chapter 
concerning Mel Gibson’s Passion o f Christ, and as was evident from the various
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approaches discussed in that chapter, the reading o f religion and spirituality in films 
cannot be restricted to just one or two categories. Even the Islamic Republic appears 
to have realised that in order to attain a place in filmic religious expressions, it needs 
to go beyond propagandist films and Sacred Defence Cinema, both o f which have 
failed to gain any significant attention in the world of cinema. Indeed, the very 
introduction of a new category o f ‘Spiritual Cinema’ in the FIFF o f 2005, which I 
discuss in more detail later, is indicative of a new approach taken by the Iranian 
authorities in this respect.
Fieldwork in Iran
In carrying out my research, I made three field trips to Iran between 2003 and 2006. 
During this time, I attended international film festivals, collected and studied local 
publications, interviewed film authorities, filmmakers, film critics, journalists and 
academics within Iran. All of these provided valuable insights to my research, the 
findings of which I discuss in the appropriate chapters.
The 10-day event of the Fajr International Film Festival is one of the most exciting 
times for the cinema industry, filmmakers and filmgoers in Iran. It takes its name 
from and coincides with the 10-day Fajr celebrations that mark the victory of the 
1979 Islamic Revolution.2 The festival not only showcases the most recent 
productions within the country but is also a platform to recognise the achievements 
of those who have contributed significantly to the industry in various capacities.
2 The only exception was in 2006, when the Festival was brought forward because 
the Fajr celebrations coincided with the 10-day mourning period of the month of 
Muharram.
60
The Farabi Foundation had kindly issued me with a press pass for two of three 
consecutive years (2004 - 2006) that I attended the FIFF in Tehran. Every winter, in 
order to gain access to the Festival, I visited the Farabi Foundation located within the 
complex of the glass museum in the south of Tehran and presented them a certified 
letter from my university that further bore the stamp of the Iranian consulate in 
London. I was then granted either a series of tickets or a press pass to attend the 
Festival. The press pass was by far the better one to receive. Each year, one of the 
participating cinemas in the Festival is allocated exclusively to film critics and 
journalists. The press pass entitled me to unlimited access to the cinema and film 
screenings over the entirety of the Festival. O f all the cinemas participating in the 
10-day Festival, this particular cinema becomes one o f the most vibrant and 
exhilarating places o f the cinema world in Tehran.
The number o f events taking place in this designated cinema far exceeded that o f the 
screenings, which usually began around 10:00 in the morning and continued until 
late at night. There was a real buzz about the place. It was frequented by stars o f the 
Iranian silver screen who turned up to attend either the screenings of their own films 
or the evening panels. These daily panels were not only a chance for journalists to 
interview film casts and crews but also an opportunity for the latter to publicise their 
recent works. Outside the screen hall, the conversations in the lobby and upper-level 
cafe varied from the latest legislation of the Ministry of Culture to gossip about 
spoilt B-rated actresses who still played with their Barbie dolls. Iranian hospitality 
was displayed through the free tea, coffee and numerous trays of sweets and cakes 
that were laid on the cafe counter during the breaks. The round tables in the cafe 
would quickly fill up after each screening and the sweets in the trays would fly off at
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the same speed as the heated views that were being exchanged about the last 
screening. The fog would then begin to thicken. The no-smoking regulation that 
applied to all Iranian cinemas was constantly flouted during this 10-day period in 
this particular cinema or, to be more precise, it was very difficult to enforce.
Looking back now, I have to admit that, despite suffering constant headaches, I 
found that the heavy smoke in the old and unrenovated cinema building actually 
gave the place a particular charm, just as did the crowd o f journalists frequenting the 
cinema hall, sporting balmoral hats and long overcoats that had once again become 
fashionable in 2006 Tehran. Tehran’s infamous air pollution outside the downtown 
cinema was not much of an alternative to my passive smoking inside the cinema hall 
during the breaks. In any case, I preferred to stay inside and mingle with all these 
people who seemed to be incredible sources of information. I conducted interviews 
with some of the directors in the cinema lobby, such as Farhad Asghari and Ramin 
Mohseni. I also had many informal chats with journalists, critics and Farabi insiders, 
all of whom shared their information and insights with me. My press pass also gave 
me access to the film market, held each year in conjunction with the festival. The 
film market provides an opportunity for Iranian producers to present and publicise 
their latest productions. Here, I met those involved in the production and distribution 
of the films, and also came across filmmakers such as Bahman Farman Ara, who 
welcomed me at his table in the cafe of the film market, and answered my questions.
From the beginning, however, it was clear that I was an outsider when attending the 
festival screenings in the designated cinema, for not only was I the only person 
whom nobody knew initially, but I was also too tall for an Iranian gathering to
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simply disappear in the crowd and become the proverbial fly on the wall. I later 
discovered, to my amazement, that I had provoked all sorts of gossip about my 
identity, including the notion that I was half-Iranian and half-German. At least the 
half-British rumour was more plausible, considering that I was visiting from London. 
Even though I explained that I was not ‘half-’ but ‘fully-’ Iranian, I was still 
perceived as an outsider, unfamiliar with many aspects o f Iranian life and culture.
As an Iranian woman who then, as now, lived in the UK but who had studied and 
worked extensively in Iran, I had overestimated the ease with which I would 
undertake my research in Iran. I had already accounted for the usual discourse of the 
insider/outsider in my research plan, where I would be an insider in terms of 
belonging to that culture, but an outsider for having lived abroad long enough to take 
notice of facts that are otherwise taken for granted by insiders. In stark contrast to 
my previous experiences of living in Iran, many of the people I encountered viewed 
me as an outsider. Moreover, I had to struggle to find my way in a male-dominated 
field. Thus, even though I had placed myself as an insider in relation to my own 
culture and background in my initial research plan devised in London, I was clearly 
viewed otherwise.
To my surprise, I discovered that I was indeed an outsider for reasons I had not 
previously considered. The discovery of the fact that I no longer fully ‘belonged’ to 
that context came to me as a painful shock. The context in which I arrived had 
changed from the image I had nostalgically frozen in my memory. I no longer had 
my place of work, my neighbourhood, nor all of the previous kinship networks in 
which I had located myself. I had resigned from my job, moved out of my
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neighbourhood, and as happens in many divorces, severed some of my familial 
relationships. To put it briefly, I was an Iranian who had lived away long enough to 
notice in the encounter with my ‘local* context that both I and the context had 
changed. The context was certainly familiar, but no longer ‘mine’. The familiar had 
the uncanny ability to make me feel like a stranger at times. I thus had to revisit the 
initial assumptions based on my previous knowledge and experience, and rework my 
plans to fit the changed realities of the field.
And so, I learnt to live with the perceptions of those around me, to whom I was an 
outsider, unfamiliar with my own history and culture. Many of them, particularly the 
journalists, felt obliged to explain basic religious concepts to me. I formed a longer 
friendship with a few journalists, because I would see them throughout the festival. 
Some would even ask rather personal questions of faith, such as whether or not I 
performed, or even knew, my daily prayers. As such, I resolved to continue to focus 
on my research rather than try to convince others of my roots and cultural 
knowledge. I, therefore, politely accepted their attempts at explaining the ‘Iranian 
ways’ to me, and particularly certain ‘religious concepts’ (such as the occultation of 
Mahdi, the twelfth Shi‘i Imam), in the same way that they politely tried to accept my 
‘odd’ choice to study Iranian cinema in London.
Additional Research Methods and Source Materials
My fieldwork was not restricted to Iran. With the many international film festivals, 
conferences and cultural events held in the UK, I was fortunate to gain access to 
many Iranian filmmakers who had travelled abroad. For example, in late 2004, I
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heard about a London-wide programme of events entitled Abbas Kiarostami: Visions 
o f the Artist, which aimed to ‘celebrate the achievements of this artist and his impact 
on contemporary culture and society both inside and outside Iran’ (festival booklet). 
These events were organised by the Iran Heritage Foundation in collaboration with 
some o f the UK’s leading national institutions including the Victoria and Albert 
Museum (V&A), the National Film Theatre (NFT), Channel 4, the London Film 
School, the French Institute and the British Film Institute (BFI). The events included 
installations, photographic exhibitions, a Kiarostami film retrospective, film 
workshop and conference, as well as publications, DVDs, various interviews and in­
conversations.
These events, which were held between 27 April and 19 June 2005, provided an 
unprecedented and unique access to Kiarostami’s collection of works. I could not 
believe my good fortune for having all this research material and the potential access 
to Kiarostami at my doorstep, particularly because my fieldtrips to Iran had 
coincided with his travels abroad and I had not been able to meet him. The 
Kiarostami events in London, therefore, proved an excellent opportunity to obtain 
data, certainly far more than what would have been possible through a formal or 
even semi-formal interview with him. I also participated in a 10-day film workshop 
led by Kiarostami, himself, during which time I was able to engage in a series of 
conversations with him during the breaks and after class. Much of my approach to 
his films in Chapters 7 and 8 has been informed by this experience.
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The Historical Approach
Like Western cinema, Iranian cinema, too, is a product of its context. As such, the 
historical approach is an important aspect of the grounding of my research. Iran is 
currently not only the sole theocracy in the world, but also the only Muslim country 
with an overwhelming majority of around 90% of its population being Shi4as. 
Having said this, it is important to note that Shi‘ism is not a monolithic religious 
tradition. Rather, there are different modalities of interpretation within Shi‘ism itself. 
These include not only its communal and public aspects but also a highly personal 
and spiritual approach with many Sufi components. It is clear, therefore, that the 
Iranian context differs from that of the Judaeo-Christian West and thus requires an 
in-depth analysis of the formation of Shi‘ism and its many manifestations in Iran so 
as to better understand recent articulations of its deeply-rooted ideas and traditions.
In order to understand Iran and Iranian films and particularly their engagement with 
religion and spirituality, it is imperative to understand the specificity of Shi‘ism. I, 
therefore, study the importance of the early Shi‘i Imam, Husayn, in the formation of 
Iranian Shi‘i identity, the religious authorities and institutions in Iran, as well as the 
mystical dimension o f Islam as expressed in Sufi literature. These themes are 
examined in a whole set of films I have demarcated for my study. Thus, whether it 
is the more formalistic aspects of religion such as the ulama and their centres of 
learning (madrasas) discussed in Chapter 5 or the more mystical and personal 
approach to religion explored in Chapter 6, the historical context plays an important 
part in my research.
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The next chapter, on Shi‘ism in Iran, is meticulously devoted to this socio-historical 
context as an important framework within which I locate my research. One of the 
strengths I bring into this study is my background in Islamic Studies. Prior to my 
Masters degree in Anthropology of Media, I had completed a two-year graduate 
programme in Islamic Studies and Humanities, which had equipped me with the 
skills required for this research. Importantly, the historical method used in my 
studies is not a mere research tool. Rather, it allows me to locate the filmic 
discourses within a much longer-standing and continuing discourse on religion and 
spirituality in Iran. Therefore, as a medium that has thus far received little, if any, 
serious attention in the analysis and understanding o f Shi‘i religious expressions and 
articulations, my study situates film within the larger and more conventional sources 
as a valid and important tool in the understanding of many of the current debates 
within Iran, which are often rooted in the historical and traditional discourses.
Source M aterials
My research data also expanded to comprise both Persian and English sources. Being 
a native Persian speaker, I had access to a wide range of primary sources, which I 
studied as my research data. These included texts such as religious treatises, 
academic publications, journals and film magazines as well as interviews with 
various people. Almost all o f my primary sources have so far been unavailable in 
English translation. As part of this study, therefore, I have translated large sections 
of these sources and thereby bridged a key gap between internal Iranian discourses 
on cinema and Western academia. These discourses have until now remained
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inaccessible to English-speaking audiences and have, therefore, often been 
overlooked. In Chapter 4, for example, where I discuss Iranian discourses on 
religion and spirituality in film, my analysis draws from the treatise of an Ayatollah, 
wider Iranian scholarship, and authoritative newspaper and magazine articles, most 
o f which are published only in Persian.
Internet-based sources
Persian websites also proved a significant resource that enabled me to keep abreast 
of developments within Iran generally and its cinema world in particular. Moreover, 
they provided a medium by which I could access alternative debates on various 
issues and films. This polyvocality of views proved to be far more difficult to 
achieve through interviews, particularly on topics that were deemed sensitive, such 
as religion. In fact, the relative anonymity that the Internet allows its users provides a 
far more open discussion than is sometimes possible through interviews, especially 
because interviewees are often concerned about formally articulating opinions that 
might jeopardise the positions and careers they hold.
I used the Internet not just as a resource to access primary data within Iran. Reviews 
of Iranian films found on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) website, self-styled as 
‘the Earth’s Biggest Movie Database’, enabled me to gauge the international access 
and reception o f these films within a wider context. The user reviews and availability 
of DVDs on online retail sites such as Amazon were similar indicators of the 
international scope of the audiences and the distribution of particular Iranian films.
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In Chapter 6 , 1 draw my data for analysing and comparing the international success 
of the Iranian filmmakers Majidi and Beyzaie from the IMDb film reviews.
The Internet also provided me with other sources of research data. Podcasts available 
on the Persian BBC website, for example, allowed me to record and analyse some of 
the latest music productions that inform my study on the commemorations of 
Muharram discussed in Chapter 8. I have also used the video postings on YouTube 
as research material. To this end, the video footage discussed in Chapter 8 of a cleric 
delivering sermons about the rites and rituals of Muharram, provides a fascinating 
insight into the changing attitudes of the local authorities on such commemorative 
rituals in particular and the official Iranian Shi‘i practices in general.
Film analysis
As my research is the study of film, I have, o f course, extensively employed film 
analysis throughout this thesis. I have also examined the filmmakers’ backgrounds in 
my analysis, referring to the larger body of their works and how they relate to my 
study. Where relevant, I have also discussed the reception of the films both 
nationally and internationally for a more detailed examination of the films and their 
role in society. My analysis furthermore locates the films within the socio-historical 
context of Iran discussed in Chapter 3. I, therefore, discuss the tradition(s) from 
which the films emerge and their engagement with and participation in current 
debates on religion and spirituality in Iran. These debates are variously rooted in 
what may be loosely categorised as the theological, philosophical and intellectual 
approaches to religion. Although it is impossible to delineate these interconnected
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approaches, a certain leaning towards one or another is evident in each o f the filmic 
discourses that I study, and which may be usefully teased out for a better 
understanding of these debates. For example, I employ Kant and Wittgenstein in my 
analysis of Kiarostami’s films, thereby positioning a theoretical framework that does 
not appear to have been used before in the study of his films. My analysis also 
draws the connection between film and other media, such as the performing arts of 
ta ‘ziyeh discussed in Chapter 8.
Relevance o f the Western Approaches to the Iranian Context
I have discussed in the previous chapter the various approaches to the study of 
religion and spirituality in film within the Western context as well as their strengths 
and limitations. However, it is important to examine whether these theories are 
applicable to a different religious tradition situated within a very different socio­
political context. Again as I have already outlined earlier, as my research 
progressed and my analysis evolved, I found that there were, in fact, echoes of these 
approaches in my own studies.
However, there are also stark contrasts with some of the approaches studied within a 
Western context and their applicability to the Iranian one. For example, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, some scholars such as Lyden (2003) suggest that the very 
experience of going to the movies itself is akin to a religious ritual. The dark cinema 
space and the communal participation of huge numbers of viewers who attend 
popular screenings, he argues, is like participating in a religious act.
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The Iranian context, however, does not at ail conform to this definition of viewing a 
film in a cinema hall. This is partly because Iranian cinema screens do not provide 
the same experience as their Western counterparts. Not only is there a low number 
of theatres throughout the country, but also ‘the undesirability o f theatre locations, 
the bad conditions o f halls and projection systems, the low quality o f many of the 
films exhibited and the demographics of spectators, who are predominantly young, 
unmarried and unemployed men who sometimes heckled women’, (Naficy, 2002b: 
38) has turned them into a less than popular experience.
In my own field trips to Iran, I also visited many ordinary cinema halls to view the 
latest screenings. I was shocked at the tolerance of loud mobile phone conversations 
and the noisy cracking of nuts (the Iranian equivalent of popcorn) at some of these 
screens. In addition, the Islamic morality codes enforced within the country also 
stipulate that the lights within the cinema halls cannot be completely turned off, so as 
to prevent any immoral behaviour during the screenings; indeed, a staff member with 
a torch walks around the hall to ensure that no such acts take place. Clearly, the 
physical conditions of a cinema and the corresponding experiences of cinemagoers 
in Iran are significantly different from that in the West, and certainly do not lend 
themselves to a communal religious experience.
Conclusions
In conducting my research, I employ a wide range of source materials in different 
languages as well as media (oral, written, film, music, Internet), and encompassing 
both traditional and modem. My study is thus informed and enriched by materials
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ranging from Qur’anic verses and treatises of Ayatollahs to histories of the Safavids 
and Mongols, and from the philosophy o f Wittgenstein to Iranian underground rap 
music.
I should also note that my study o f the available literature is also not a mere 
collection and review of data. In the first chapter, I have synthesised and categorised 
the various approaches to the study o f religion and spirituality in Western 
scholarship and critically examined them afresh. Similarly, in discussing the socio- 
historical context o f Iran, the chapter that follows is more than a simple recounting 
of historical facts and events. Rather, it is a critical synthesis of the emergence and 
development of Shi‘ism in Iran.
In choosing to study the variety of expressions of Shi‘ism, one of the primary 
challenges I faced was to examine very divergent fields o f study, each of which 
could become a PhD thesis in their own right. This became very demanding as I 
employed Islamic history, Islamic mysticism, Iranian performing arts and Western 
philosophy as part of my research.
The next chapter will explore the historical background of the three Shi‘i themes 
that I have chosen to study in film in order to situate my studies within the larger 
socio-political context of Iran. It will examine the development of Islam and 
particularly Shi‘ism in Iran and how its religious traditions have evolved within its 
particular cultural and historical milieu.
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Chapter 3: Socio-historical Background of the Iranian Context
This chapter provides a historical background to the themes to be discussed in the 
forthcoming chapters. In the first section, I explore the appeal of Shi'ism in Iran 
during the early Islamic period. Most studies conventionally trace the significance of 
the Shi‘a in Iran back to the Safavids in the early 16th century. However, as I argue, 
the Shi‘a role and influence in Iran stretches back to the formative period of Islam. I 
proceed to discuss both the role and development o f the clergy after the 
establishment of the Safavid Shi‘a state in Iran as well as that of the Shi‘a madrasas, 
which constitute the formal and institutional facets of Shi‘ism. In the next section I 
study some of the more personal approaches of Shi‘as to Islam by focusing on 
mysticism. Finally, I examine the various approaches to commemorating the death of 
Husayn, the third Shi‘a Imam, who is fundamental to Shi‘i Iranian identity. The 
figure of Husayn and particularly his death in the 7th century have attracted both the 
laity’s imagination and the clergy’s attention. This has allowed for a more personal 
approach to religion through the laity’s expressions as well as the more formalistic 
articulations of the clergy.
The appeal of Shi‘ism in Iran and the foundations of Twelver ShPism
Disagreements surrounding the Prophet Muhammad’s succession upon his death in 
632 in Medina marked the beginning of what was later to be referred to as the Shi‘a- 
Sunni split. A few of the Companions of the Prophet elected Abu Bakr as successor, 
who thus became the first of the four ‘Rightly Guided’ caliphs. It has been argued, 
however, that ‘Abu Bakr’s succession was realized neither through a free election in
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any sense of the term nor through a free choice of the community’ (Jaffi, 1979: 49). 
Indeed, a small group o f Muslims regarded ‘Ali, the son-in-law and cousin o f the 
Prophet, as the rightful successor to the Prophet. They believed that ‘Ali was best 
qualified for the position and they thus ‘became generally designated as the S h i‘at 
‘Ali, “party of ‘Ali” or simply as the Shi‘a” (Daftary, 1998: 23). The dispute 
between the upholders o f 6 Ali’s right to the caliphate and the supporters of Abu Bakr 
‘centred on considerations of what is necessary under the circumstances, and what 
ought to be* (Jafri, 1979: 50), with the Shi‘a being of the latter opinion.
Development o f Shi‘ism in the early Islamic period
It is one of the fundamental beliefs of the major Shi‘a groups that the Prophet
Muhammad himself ‘had designated ‘Ali as his successor, a designation or nass
instituted through divine command and revealed by the Prophet at Ghadir Khumm
shortly before his death’ (Daftary, 1998: 23). The Sunnis maintain that since the
Qur’an refers to Prophet Muhammad as the ‘Seal of the Prophets’ (33: 40), this
means that ‘he was not to be succeeded by any of his family according to God’s
design’, but that Muhammad had left his community to decide on this matter based
on the Qur’anic notion of ijm a‘ or consultation (Madelung, 1997: 17). The Shi‘as,
however, defend the doctrine o f the imamate and assert that since the Sunni caliphs
succeeded the Prophet in every aspect other than his prophethood, this status was
befitting of his family. They, too, refer to the Qur’an and the examples of the earlier
prophets mentioned therein to support their arguments.
In the Qur’an, the descendants and close kin to the prophets are their heirs also in 
respect to kingship (mulk), rule (hukm), wisdom (hikma), the book and the 
imamate...the Qur’an advises the faithful to settle some matters by consultation, but
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not the succession to the prophets. That, according to the Qur’an, is settled by divine 
election, and God usually chooses their successors, whether they become prophets or 
not, from their own kin (Madelung, 1997: 17).
‘Ali was passed over two more times upon the deaths o f the first and second caliphs. 
He was finally appointed as the fourth caliph in 656 but his rule ended with his 
murder four years later. This marked the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate 
(661-750) and the beginning of the dynastic caliphate in Muslim history. For the 
Shi‘as, however, ‘A li’s role as imam, or spiritual leader, was a divinely designated 
role that began upon the death of the Prophet, independent of his political role as 
caliph and quite aside from the issue o f the three caliphs before him having unjustly 
‘usurped’ this position. For the early Shi‘a, it was the protest against the Muslim 
majority who ignored this designation that separated the partisans o f ‘Ali from the 
rest o f the Muslim community (Daftary, 1998: 24). The revolutionary aspect of the 
Shi‘as is, therefore, sometimes traced to the very beginnings of the formation of 
Islam.
The expansion o f the Muslim Empire began with the rule of the second caliph, 
‘Umar. The Muslim armies conquered many of the Near Eastern lands including 
territories o f the Persian Empire in 636/637. The Arab conquerors were not as keen 
on imposing their religion on their new subjects as they were on imposing the jizya, 
a poll tax on each non-Muslim male adult, for the revenues they brought in. As with 
most of the other conquered territories, very soon most of the Persians had also 
converted to Islam. However, they remained the only occupied land at that time to 
have been Islamicised but to have nevertheless resisted Arabisation.
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The dissatisfaction of the various factions within the Umayyad empire contributed 
greatly to its fall in 750. The people o f Khurasan, in Eastern Iran, were one such 
group frustrated at their loss of status and the imposition of unjust taxes. The 
Abbasid propagandists launched their revolt against the Umayyads ‘in the name of 
the ah I al-bayt [the family of the Prophet] with much appeal to the Shi‘a and the 
Persian mctwali [non-Arab Muslims]’ (Daftary, 1998: 31). They claimed familial 
legitimacy through their ancestor Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle, and won the support of 
many Shi‘as. As such, the Abbasids succeeded in gaining military support amongst 
the disgruntled population of Khurasan, which also had Shi‘a sympathies. The Shi‘a 
supporters were nevertheless left bitterly betrayed when the Abbasids aborted their 
Shi‘a position upon coming to power. Instead they established a Sunni caliphate and 
disavowed any support for Shi‘a belief.
The relations between the Abbasid state and Shi‘ism were problematic. For a brief 
period, there was hope of a reconciliation between the Sunni caliphate and what 
came to be known as Twelver Shi‘ism (the majority group within Shi‘as who believe 
in a line of twelve imams) when the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813-833), 
appointed the eighth Imam, ‘Ali al-Rida as his heir. However, when al-Rida 
accompanied M a’mun from Marv to Baghdad, he died under peculiar circumstances, 
‘poisoned at the caliph’s orders, say a number of sources’ (Berkey, 2003: 133). The 
situation became even harder for the later imams, with the tenth and eleventh living 
under house arrest in Samara. The Abbasids ‘cultivated rivalries within the family of 
the ‘Alid Imams as a way of weakening the potential influence of any one claimant’ 
and even went as far as assigning midwives to monitor their wives for any potential 
pregnancies (Berkey, 2003: 133-134).
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Things took a different turn for proto-Twelver Shi‘ism with the death o f its eleventh 
imam, Hasan al-Askari, around 874 when he was only 29. Various theories arose 
around the succession to him, particularly because there were doubts as to whether 
he had left any heirs or not. Finally, however, the accepted theory was that he had 
indeed left a five-year-old heir, Muhammad, who was the twelfth imam but had gone 
into occultation. The period of his occultation has been divided into two main 
periods -  ghaybat al-soghra and ghaybat al-kobra, the minor and the major 
occultations respectively. The minor occultation lasted until 940, during which time 
the Imam is believed to have communicated with his followers through his safirs 
(intermediaries) also referred to as wakih  (trustees) or babs (gates), each appointed 
by the previous safir. His major occultation started with the death of the fourth safir, 
‘Ali al-Samarri in 940/941. Unlike his predecessors, he did not appoint a successor, 
stating six days before his death that the imam himself had dictated a letter to him 
asking him not to designate a successor (Richard, 1995: 40-42; Halm, 2004: 33-37). 
To this day, the Twelver Shi‘a await their hidden imam to manifest himself.
The Iranian influence
From the very early days of the Islamic empire— both during the Umayyad and,
later, the Abbasid caliphates— many Persian elements were employed in the court.
During the reign of the Umayyad caliph Hisham (724-743),
Persian court procedures were adopted, and the first translations of Persian political 
documents were made. Under the ‘Abbasids, Persian scribes, merchants, workers, 
and soldiers saw to the translation of Persian manuals of behaviour and protocol 
(iadab) for scribes and administrators into Arabic. The manuals contained advice on 
how to conduct affairs of state, carry out duties of various offices, and behave in the
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presence of rulers, and described the qualities required for different positions 
(Lapidus, 2002: 76).
Arabic, however, became the dominant intellectual language of the Islamic lands, 
which included Iran, and it was thus that the Persian language went ‘silent’ for about 
200 years. It was only in the 10th century that, in an attempt to revive the Persian 
language, Persian scholars once again began writing in the vernacular (Mottahedeh, 
1985: 156-157; Lapidus, 2002: 127). Ferdowsi’s (d. 1020) masterpiece, the 
Shahnameh, a national epic that took him over 30 years to write, was a seminal work 
in this period. Similarly, other Persian authors chose to write their travelogues, 
works of philosophy, astronomy and theology in Persian. To name a few, one can 
mention Nasir-e Khusraw (d. after 1072), Ahmad Nasafi (d. 943), Abu Rayhan 
Biruni (d. 1048) and Khwaja Abdullah Ansari (d. 1088). This trend continued in the 
works of later scholars such as the philosopher, poet and astronomer, Nasir al-Din 
Tusi (d. 1274). This phenomenon has been seen as a resistance movement that began 
as a Persian response to the Arabisation of Islam—a movement that was concerned 
with the preservation and protection of Persian culture and identity.
It was also around the 10th century that Shi'i revivals are witnessed in Iran. By then, 
the Abbasid empire was fragmented and had lost much of its direct control over the 
peripheral areas of its extensive territories. This resulted in the emergence of various 
dynasties in these regions. The Shi‘i Buyids from the Caspian province of Daylam in 
Northern Iran are one such dynasty. They rose to power and ruled much of the 
central provinces of the Abbasid empire during the 10th — 11th century. In 945, they 
entered Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate, but decided against overthrowing 
it. The Buyid ruler, M u‘izz al-Dawla, ‘was aware that the Shi‘is were in minority,
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and that, had he destroyed the Caliphate in Baghdad, the institution would have 
reappeared elsewhere. It was better to keep it under his thumb, both to legalise his 
authority over the Sunnis in his states and to strengthen his diplomatic relations with 
the world outside by the weight o f the respected moral authority which the Sunni 
princes still enjoyed by right’ (Cahen, 2008). The Buyids ruled until 1055 and it was 
under their patronage that Twelver Shi‘ism ‘began to take a more explicit doctrinal 
form’ (Berkey, 2003: 115).
The establishment of the Shi‘i Ismaili Fatimids in North Africa in 909 had also 
attracted a following, even if  small, in the Iranian lands. Following the crisis of the 
Fatimid leadership in 1094 the Ismailis split into two groups, the MustaTis and the 
Nizaris. The insurgency of the Nizari Ismailis against the Sunni authorities appealed 
to many Iranians. The Nizari Ismailis, under the leadership of Hasan-e Sabbah, based 
their headquarters in Iran. They took over many fortresses including the impregnable 
castle of Alamut, south of the Caspian Sea, which was to become the centre of their 
religio-political activities. ‘At the direction of Hasan, the Ismailis of Iran launched a 
scattered but vigorous revolt against the Saljuq regimes that dominated the Iranian 
world in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries....The “Ismaili revolt” was 
dramatic and, for a time, posed a serious challenge to the Sunni political order, and 
especially to the various Saljuq regimes’ (Berkey, 2003: 193).
There are various reasons for the attraction of the Iranian population to Shi‘ism. For 
one, many scholars have alluded to the connections between the Shi‘a form of Islam 
and the Iranian context. Indeed, the divinely designated leadership of the Shi‘i 
imams was similar to the familiar kingship model of the pre-Islamic Sassanid
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Empire, itself also based on the idea of a divinely ordained ruler. The imperial 
ideology of the Sassanids espoused the idea of a God-King, in which the kings were 
not only supported by Ahura Mazda, the Good God, but also claimed divinity for 
themselves (Kennedy, 1986: 7). The kingship was restricted to a single lineage and 
the king’s right to rule was sacral and divinely ordained (Choksky, 2008). Thus, the 
Shi‘a idea of a divinely guided and divinely appointed leader was probably more 
amenable to the Iranians who were familiar with this leadership paradigm. Indeed, 
Aslan traces the early attraction of Iranians to Shi‘ism to the time of the death of 
‘Ali, the first Imam. He states that even though the Shi ‘at ‘Ali were few, they were 
‘still an influential faction, particularly among the Iranians o f the former Sasanian 
Empire, who saw in the ahl al-bayt an alternative to the ethnic Arab domination of 
the Umayyads’ (Aslan, 2006: 174).
Many scholars have also attributed the Shi‘i revolts popular in Iran more to national 
rather than religious sentiments. Thus, the Shi‘i supporters o f the Abbasids are seen 
as motivated by nationalist reactions to the ruling Arabs. The Abbasid dynasty, in 
turn, adopted an imperial ideology by not only claiming familial relations with the 
Prophet but also promulgating the view that it was ‘the successor of the ancient 
imperial dynasties in ‘Iraq and Iran, from the Babylonians through the Sasanians, 
their immediate predecessors. In this way they were able to incorporate Sasanian 
culture, which was still the dominant culture of large masses o f the population east 
of ‘Iraq, into mainstream ‘Abbasid culture’ (Gutas, 1998: 29). Similarly, the Nizari 
Ismaili movement is seen as a reaction against the ruling Saljuq Turks. ‘Less 
conspicuously, Hasan’s revolt was an expression of Persian “national” sentiment -  a
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factor that accounts for its early popular appeal and widespread success in Persia’ 
(Daftary, 2007:316).
With the continuing persecution of the Twelver imams, particularly during the 
Abbasid caliphate and the occultation of the twelfth imam, the Shi‘as had settled for 
a quietist policy. In the 13th century, the Mongol invasion o f the Islamic lands was 
followed by large-scale murder and plunder. The Nizari Ismaili state in Persia came 
to an end in 1256 with the fall o f Alamut to the Mongols. Two years later, in 1258, 
the Mongols conquered Baghdad and abolished the Abbasid caliphate. ‘When they 
arrived, the Mongols practiced a religion ... commonly labelled “shamanism”, 
which is to say they did not embrace any of the universalist, and generally 
monotheistic faiths which had emerged from the ancient Near East’ (Berkey, 2003: 
182). However, one of the ‘major and far-reaching consequences of the Mongol 
policy of religious diversity was the gradual erosion of some of the tensions that had 
previously divided various religions and sects under the Saljuqs’ (Jamal, 2002: 85).
As a result, following a long period of persecution and quietism, Twelver Shi‘ism 
finally found favourable ground, even if  inadvertently, under the Mongols. Two of 
their main rivals— the Sunni Abbasids and the Nizari Ismaili Shi‘as— were 
eliminated and the policy of relative religious tolerance gave them a new-found 
scope of activity. The famous Twelver Shi‘i scholar, Allam-e Hilli, moved to Persia 
in 1305 and even converted the Mongol ruler Oljeytu who had previously converted 
from Shamanism to Christianity and later to Sunni Islam before becoming a Shi‘a. 
Subsequently, even though
Sunnis remained the majority in Persia and continued to dominate its major urban
centres for several centuries, there was a gradual resurgence of Twelver Shi‘ism
81
which was allowed, for the first time, to organise and express itself openly without the 
fear of persecution.... At the same time, there is evidence of a general movement 
away from Sunnism to Shi‘ism during the Mongol period. According to Bausani, 
these people sought refuge in Shi‘ism because they were disgusted with the squabbles 
among the different Sunni schools, and especially as regards Iran, between the 
Shafi’ites and the Hanafites (Jamal, 2002: 85).
The dominance o f Sunni rule in the early Islamic period and its close surveillance 
and persecution of the Shi‘a imams, particularly of the Twelvers, resulted in the 
quietist approach of the Shi‘a. There were, however, periods when the Shi‘as 
challenged Sunni powers as in the case of the Buyids in Baghdad, the Nizari Ismailis 
in Iran, and the Fatimids in North Africa. As we have seen above, Shi‘a sympathies 
within the Iranian lands posed a significant challenge to the status quo at various 
times. The Shi‘a appeal to Iranians was thus both as a religious conduit for 
nationalist responses to the Sunni Arab dominance as well as an authoritative form 
of governance with close affinity to the earlier pre-Islamic Iranian models of empire. 
Clearly, the significance of the Shi‘a in Iran cannot be overlooked. Importantly, and 
as shown above, their role and influence in these lands stretches back right to the 
formative period of Islam, and not merely to the Safavids in the early 16th century as 
is conventional in most other historical accounts o f Shi‘ism in Iran.
The Twelver ShVi State o f Iran and the Shi‘i Ulama
The Mongol dynasty of the Ilkhanids in Iran and Iraq lasted until the death of Abu 
Sa‘id, the last Ilkhanid ruler, in 1353. From then onwards, Iran witnessed a period of 
political upheaval with short-lived dynasties including the Sunni Turko-Mongol 
Timurids who entered from Transoxania. The 14th and 15th centuries witnessed a
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spread of Shi‘ism and Sufism in Iran. It was during this time that the Safavi Sufi 
order found widespread support. The order took its name from its ancestor and 
founder, Sheikh Safi al-Din Ardabili (d. 1334). By 1488, the order obtained a 
markedly Shi‘a characteristic: Shah Haydar, the Sufi leader of the time, dreamt that 
Imam ‘Ali instructed him to wear a distinctive headgear with twelve pleats to 
commemorate the twelve Shi‘a imams.
The consolidation o f Shi‘ism in Iran came about with the political rise of the 
Safavids, for ‘by the fifteenth century, Sheikh Safi’s descendants had emerged as 
political rulers in northwestern Iran, the border area between Iran and Azerbaijan’ 
(Nasr, 2006: 64). In 1501 Shah Ismail I established what became the Safavid dynasty 
(1501-1736). However, from very early on the Safavids patronised and established 
numerous religious schools, or madrasas, on a grand scale. This attracted a steady 
stream of learned Shi‘i men from other parts of the Islamic world, mainly southern 
Iraq and Lebanon, and very soon Iran turned into an important Shi‘i centre.
On becoming Shah, Ismail Safavi declared Shi‘ism to be the official religion of Iran. 
It was during this time that the clerics developed a hierarchical role that was to 
evolve to demand obedience from the believers and, ultimately, the right to rule over 
them. Over the centuries various events contributed to the growth of power amongst 
the Iranian Shi‘i clergy, culminating in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the 
subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic, which brought about the rule of 
the clergy. The claims to power of the Iranian Shi‘i clergy take a unique expression, 
rooted as they are in the historical and political development of the countiy. In this 
section I will briefly examine these historical developments so as to situate the
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current debates amongst the intellectuals and, consequently, draw parallels with 
contemporary filmic discourses in the subsequent chapters.
Superiority of the clergy over laity
It was during the Safavid period that the Shi‘i ulama arrogated to themselves a role 
elevating them over the laity. Ordinary people, they argued, ‘are incapable of 
recognising and thus unable to choose on their own the most learned and pious from 
among the ‘ulama’ (Jahanbakhsh, 2000: 123). Thus, the Shi‘i clergy not only 
enjoyed political support from the state, but also came to be seen as necessary in the 
lives of the believers. The hierarchical organisation of the Shi‘i clergy is not a 
feature of the Sunni ulama. Indeed, it was a new development, one that did not exist 
in the early Shi‘i doctrines or organisations either (Keddie, 1995: 24). Thus, even 
though there were cases where Shi‘i ulama had previously held key roles within the 
ruling elite, such as Allam-e Hilli in the Mongol court or the Shi‘i viziers of the 
Abbasid caliphate, these were usually as individuals who out of their personal 
quality or merit had succeeded in attaining high positions. It was only from the time 
of the Safavids that the ulama as an institution found great significance. It is in this 
regard, Keddie continues, that hierarchical organisation became a characteristically 
Iranian Shi‘i development. The fact that we see similar developments amongst the 
Shi‘a outside Iran is due to more recent Iranian influences.
Another factor that contributed to the growth of clerical power was the victory of the 
Usuli or Mujtahidi school of ulama over the Akhbari school by the early 19th 
century. The Akhbari school was established during the Safavid period by Shaykh
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Muhammad Sharif Astarabadi (d. 1624), but ‘its greatest influence was when the 
ulama were excluded from participation in the affairs of a Shi‘i state, namely the 
interregnum between Safavid and Qajar rule (Algar, 1980: 35). It was mainly Aqa 
Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (1705-1803) who led the doctrinal reassertion of the 
Usulis:
He established the Usuli position, which asserted the legitimacy of the functions of 
mujtahid, as the dominant one in Shi‘i Islam, attempted to repress Sufism, taught and 
inspired a large number of mujtahids who attained great influence in Iran in the reign 
of Fath ‘Ali Shah (1797-1834), and in his own person vigorously asserted the 
functions of mujtahids claiming ‘enjoining good and prohibiting evil’ to be his 
peculiar duty (Algar, 1980: 34).
The main difference of interpretation between these two schools lay in the 
understanding of the role and necessity of the clergy as intermediaries between man 
and God. The Akhbaris maintained that ‘individual believers could understand the 
Quran and the Traditions (akhbar) of the Prophet and the Imams and did not need to 
follow the guidance of mujtahids, who claimed the right of ijtihad ( ‘effort to 
ascertain correct doctrine’) 5 (Keddie, 1995: 97). The Akhbaris argued that ijtihad 
was an innovation in Shi‘ism, dating from the time of Kulayni (d. 941), author of 
Kitab usul min al-kafi, a collection of traditions of the Imams, a guide to 
authoritative Imami doctrine in theology and fiqh. Indeed, they accused the Usuli 
mujtahids of adopting Sunni positions of Hanafi rationalism. The Akhbaris gave 
total precedence to naql (transmitted doctrine) over aql (exertion of reason) and 
argued that all believers should be muqallids (emulators) only of the imams and not 
the mujtahids (Algar, 1969: 35).
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The Usulis, however, who introduced the concept of ijtihad into Shi‘ism, succeeded 
in asserting the necessity of the mujtahids and maintained that ‘every believer was 
required to follow the rulings o f a living mujtahid, and whenever there was a single 
chief mujtahid, his rulings took precedence over all others’ (Keddie, 1995: 97-98). 
These mujtahids were referred to as m arja‘-e taqlid or models for emulation. The 
Usulis, therefore, soon established a clerical power that positioned them as 
intermediaries between believers and God, and this has been the dominant Shi‘i 
theology to this date.3 Accordingly, any Shi‘a who has not attained the same level of 
authoritative judgement in interpreting the law from the sources ‘must choose a 
mujtahid to be their own spiritual guide (marja‘ al-taqlid, ‘model for/source of 
emulation’), whose opinions in matters of religious law are binding on those who 
follow him’ (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 10).
By the early 19th century, in addition to establishing clerical superiority to laity, ‘the 
Shii clergy were able to get their right to direct collection of religious taxes’ (Keddie, 
1995: 22). The religious dues of khums and zakat were thus paid directly to them. 
This economic independence further strengthened their position and consequently 
gave them political freedom from the ruling state.
The clergy’s organised ties with the merchants or bazaaris was another empowering 
factor. As Keddie states, the ties between these two groups have been very close and 
very often both were from the same families through intermarriage. In fact, ‘ulama’
3 For a detailed account of the doctrinal reassertion of the usulis, led mainly by Aqa 
Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (1705-1803), see Hamid Algar, Religion and State in 
Iran: The Role o f the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: 
University of California Press, 1980) pp. 33-44.
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was not an occupational term but rather a reference to men with certain religious 
learning (Keddie, 1995: 92). Thus, many of the clerics were occupied in various 
professions; indeed, some of them were bazaaris, while others were craftsmen, 
shopkeepers and even landlords. The ulama and bazaaris ‘worked together in a 
variety of ways and influenced each other, so that any picture o f merchants as a 
discrete group getting ulama as a divergent group to do something is belied by the 
interconnected history of the two’ (Keddie, 1995: 93).
Even though the first records of the ulama’s claims to rule go back to the late 17th 
century,4 these did not materialise until the victory of the Islamic Republic in 1979 
under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Soon after the 1979 Revolution, the doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, was introduced. This gave the leader 
the final say in the running of country. Named as ‘Leader for Life’ in the 
constitution, ‘Ayatollah Khomeini now combined supreme temporal and religious 
authority’ (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 19). This transition from charismatic 
leader of the Revolution to head of state seemed natural. Khomeini, however, was 
initially irresolute when it came to entrusting the reins of the country to the clerics. 
Indeed, he was concerned that the earthly desires of politics would corrupt the clergy 
and subsequently jeopardise their credibility with the public (Brumberg, 2001: 118).
Khomeini’s rapid change of position in entrusting the running of the state to the 
clergy may be traced to a few key incidents soon after he came to power. The death 
of some 70 of his supporters in the June 1981 bombings of the headquarters of the
4 Keddie reports that the French Huguenot watchmaker, Chardin, ‘who spent years in 
Iran, tells us that one group of mujtahids claimed that they were more qualified to 
rule than were the wine-bibbing impious shahs’ (1995: 165).
87
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) is one such crucial factor. This was followed two 
months later by the death of two o f his other allies, the newly-elected president, 
Muhammad ‘Ali Raja’i, and Prime Minister Muhammad Javad Bahonar. These and 
other political assassinations were blamed on the Islamic-Socialist party of 
Mojahedin-e Khalq (MK). The final straw was when President Abulhassan Bani- 
Sadr, an Islamic modernist opposed to clerical rule, and the leaders of IRP were 
unable to resolve their differences.5 Khomeini then had Tittle choice but to exercise 
his “revolutionary duties” by siding with the clerics whose actions deeply worried 
him’ (Brumberg, 2001: 118).
With all rival parties defeated and Khomeini’s stamp of approval on clerical rule, the 
clergy stabilised their power in the ensuing years. Khomeini, for his part, attempted 
to articulate this new responsibility within his theological discourse. Giving it a 
mystical dimension, he asserted that it was not rational knowledge nor the need to 
determine interests that entrusted the clergy with the duty to rule. Rather, this duty 
‘could only ensue from a form of mystical revelation that anyone could strive for, 
but only a few among the clerics would attain’ (Brumberg, 2001: 88). He also 
delegated the rulings of secondary ordinances -  a narrow range of contractual issues 
that were not directly addressed in the Qur’an -  to the clergy. As Brumberg states, 
these had traditionally fallen within the government’s remit. Khomeini, however, 
declared that he could not ‘imagine that God would not have looked at every aspect 
of any problem’ and thus by ‘implying that secondary rulings were also mandated by
5 For a detailed account of the events that led to the success of the IRP over Bani- 
Sadr, which reflected the defeat of the moderates and the left-wing political group, 
see Bakhash (1985: 92-165).
God, Khomeini virtually equated the clerical power to issue such rulings with the 
authority o f God himself! ’ (Brumberg, 2001: 129).
The Shi‘a madrasas
Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the eminent 10th/11th-century Persian philosopher and scholar 
recounts his studies giving us an insight to the old methods of learning. These 
included ‘the wandering from teacher to teacher, the informal discussion circle, the 
debates o f learned men thrust into each other’s presence by a bored and curious 
monarch’ (Mottahedeh, 1985: 89). These encounters were the norm before the 
appearance of the madrasas proper. ‘Madrasa, in the modem usage, [is] the name o f 
an institution of learning where the Islamic sciences are taught, i.e a college for 
higher studies, as opposed to an elementary school of traditional type (kuttab); in 
mediaeval usage, [it is] essentially a college of law in which the other Islamic 
sciences, including literary and philosophical ones, were ancillary subjects only’ 
(Pedersen, et al. 2007).
The madrasas originally began as private endowments of scholars teaching their 
students but gradually developed into institutions that were supported by mlers and 
other men of power (Halm, 2004: 58-59). In fact, it was no longer solely a matter of 
scholarly interest and patronage that led their founders to establish these schools. 
Rather, the ‘establishment of madrasas served the political interests of those who 
founded them, both individually and collectively, but the institutions themselves, and 
the academic activities they supported, were not subjected to systematic 
governmental regulation and control, and did not undergird any particular political
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program’ (Berkey, 2003: 45). However, many of these patrons would usually found 
madrasas o f their own denomination and some were more closely involved with the 
running o f the school. For instance, the endowment acts of the Nizamiyya of 
Baghdad, established by and named after Nizam al-Mulk, the 11th-century Persian 
ShafPi vizier to the Saljuq sultans, stated that teachers had to be either ShafPi or 
Ash‘ari. Indeed, he himself was directly involved in the selection of the teachers 
(Farmanian, 2002: 453).6
It has been argued that the madrasa is the result of a three-stage development of the 
college in Islam. The first was the period during which teaching took place within 
the confines of the mosques, especially in their designation as non-congregational 
mosques. The second stage was that o f the masjid-khan complex, where the mosque 
(masjid) was also used as a hostelry {khan) for out-of-town students. Finally, the 
madrasa proper appeared when the functions of both mosque and hostelry were 
combined in an institution based on a single endowment deed (Pedersen et al, 2007). 
Madrasas were, therefore, a development bom from the spaces and activities within 
the mosques.
The first madrasa appeared in the 10th century in north-east Iran and was later 
‘spread by the Seljuqs over the whole of Iran to Iraq, Syria and Asia Minor’ (Halm, 
2004: 58). In Cairo, the Shi‘i Fatimids founded the Azhar mosque complex in 970. 
Al-Azhar ‘developed into a center for higher learning and was richly endowed to 
support students, teachers, and one of the largest libraries of the time in the Muslim
6 Some have argued that the Nizamiyyas were taken from the Fatimid al-Azhar 
model, where the Ismaili da'is taught the faith (Farmanian, 2002: 453).
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world’ (Nanji, 2006: 84). Later, in 1005, the Fatimid Imam-Caliph, al-Hakim, 
founded the dar al- ‘ilm, also known as the dar al-hikma, which was devoted to Shi‘i 
Ismaili teachings. It is, therefore, important to note that even though madrasa became 
the dominant term later, in their initial stages of development there were different 
centres of learning in the Muslim world, referred to by different names.
In fact, it has been argued that the sudden surge of the Sunni Saljuq madrasas was a 
reaction to these centres as ‘a counter to the propaganda efforts of militant Ismaili 
Shi'ism organised by the Fatimids from Al-Azhar’ (Pedersen et al, 2007). This in 
turn had the ripple effect that other Shi‘i centres surfaced around the same time as 
the Saljuq madrasas in many Iranian cities, including Rayy, Qom, Kashan, Varamin, 
Sabzevar and elsewhere. However, ‘to judge by the later consonance between the 
Sunni and Shi‘i madrasas in the Iranian world, there was probably no formal 
distinction between them’ (Pedersen et al, 2007). In any case, it was not until the end 
of the 11th century, but ‘at least a hundred years before their Western counterparts, 
the European universities’ (Mottahedeh, 1985: 89), that the madrasas made their 
definitive appearance.
As discussed above, with the coming to power of the Safavids, numerous Shi‘i 
madrasas were built to help propagate and establish Shi‘ism as the new state faith. 
Shi‘ism was in fact an instrument to gain legitimacy for the new state based on 
religious authority. Traditionally, the Shi‘i madrasas have been ‘located mainly in 
religious centres which tended to be shrine cities. Najaf, Kerbala and Sammara in 
Iraq as well as the Iranian cities of Mashhad and Qum’ (Zubaida, 2003: 183). In Iran, 
the significance of the madrasas grew so much that even with the advent of modem
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sciences into the country and the training of lawyers and physicians, these members
of the upper class elite were still likely to have undergone at least some aspects of
this traditional education.
With their huge endowments and their wide acceptance as the citadels of true 
knowledge and correct belief, madresehs usually dominated and often monopolised 
the world of Iranian education. In the Shiah Islamic world they had surprisingly 
uniform curricula and methods—something unthinkable in the time of Avicenna—and 
they therefore dominated the content and methods of education as well (Mottahedeh, 
1985: 105).
Zubaida mentions three cycles, each lasting four years, in the Iranian Shi'i madrasa 
curriculum. The first cycle concentrates on the study of the Qur’an, Arabic language 
and grammar. Upon completion of this first level, the graduates may perform minor 
religious functions in mosques as well as read and recite the stories of Karbala 
during the mourning ceremonies o f the month of Muharram. During the second 
cycle, students study fiqh  (jurisprudence) and are introduced to the intricacies of 
Sharia through appropriate texts, commentaries and methods of deduction. This 
allows them to lead mosques and congregations and, in some cases, act as judges. At 
the final stage they are trained in ijtihad (arriving at independent opinion on matters 
of law and interpretation) by further exploring texts, traditions and commentaries. 
When students feel that they have arrived at that stage of independent judgement, 
they submit a written piece of work to their teacher. If accepted, the student is given 
a license to practice ijtihad, at which point he becomes a mujtahid (Zubaida, 2003: 
183-184).
The traditional education system in Iran was significantly affected in its encounter 
with Western secular education. In 1851, the Iranian government established the
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Polytechnic College, with the aim of educating Iranians in the European sciences. 
Thus, for the first time, an educational system modelled on a Western system was 
introduced in Iran. This had its own varying effects in Iranian society, including the 
formation o f a new elite and intellectuals who wanted a change in the country’s 
entire system of law. ‘By the end o f the century some of these intellectuals 
demanded a “fundamental law” for the state, a constitution that described the limits 
of the government’s power’ (Mottahedeh, 1985: 52). These demands voiced against 
the government were gradually extended beyond that of the intellectuals to include, 
at least initially, some of the ulama as well. However, after the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906, the first constitutional revolution in the Middle East, the ulama 
slowly departed from the intellectuals, paving their own way to lead society.
The success of the Constitutional Revolution resulted in honour and fame for the 
supporters of the new educational system. However, this support did not extend 
nationwide or indeed seem to be evident among people from different walks of life. 
Some of the bazaaris, who, as discussed earlier, had always maintained a close 
relationship with the religious authorities, despised the new learning and regarded it 
as unreligious and hence unworthy. It is likely that they recognised the power of the 
new educational system, for by its very secularised nature it was largely independent 
from the religious authorities. This new rival power posed a threat to the religious 
authorities and, thereby, to the bazaaris too.
This threat became even more potent after Reza Shah (r. 1925-1941) came to power 
and embarked on his modernising project. Adopting a policy of secularising the 
educational system, he went as far as to shut down all the maktabs (religious schools
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for the teaching of Qur’an and hadith, equivalent to elementary schools in modem 
times) in Iran. However, that he spared madrasas the same fate is a testament to the 
power o f the clergy and its institutions, and suggests that he realised that it would be 
folly to completely eliminate them. Reza Shah’s strategy to enforce modernisation 
was frequently twinned with violence, particularly towards the religious 
establishment. After he was forced to abdicate in 1941 in favour of his young son, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the latter adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the 
religious establishment. In fact, in 1946 Ayatollah Boroujerdi, who emerged as the 
‘undisputed chief marja' of the Shi‘i world, ...worked out a modus vivendi with the 
state, based on the clergy keeping out of politics and opposition, but being assigned 
their niche in the religious institutions and general respect and dignity’ (Zubaida, 
2003: 188). In this way, the ‘shrine cities in Iran and their madrasa and religious 
culture continued to provide centres of autonomy for the ulama and a means of 
perpetuating their institutions and discourses’ (Zubaida, 2003: 188).
Boroujerdi remained tme to his word for the rest o f his life, during which the 
religious establishment remained largely aloof from the political upheavals of the 
country. Indeed, when Ayatollah Kashani and a few other clerics participated in the 
political turmoil o f 1951, first siding with the Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Mosaddeq, on nationalising Iran’s oil and later changing sides, they were sidelined 
by the religious establishment (Zubaida, 2003: 190-191). Khomeini, too, another 
disaffected cleric, did not openly oppose the ruling regime out of respect for his 
teacher, Ayatollah Boroujerdi. However, upon the latter’s death, he felt himself 
relieved o f this restriction and, building upon his earlier ideas, began a vociferous 
campaign against the Pahlavi regime. Thus, Qom turned into a political centre for
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Khomeini’s opposition. On the day of ‘Ashura 1963, he gave a defiant speech 
directly attacking, satirising and ridiculing the Shah. ‘In a charged atmosphere of 
mounting confrontation between security forces and the religious students in Qum 
and elsewhere, retribution was swift: government forces laid siege to the city and to 
Khomeini’s residence, and in the clashes that followed there was much violence and 
bloodshed’ (Zubaida, 2003: 193). By the time of his release within the year, all the 
other senior mujtahids had reconciled themselves with the government. Khomeini, 
however, once again took the opportunity to denounce the Shah’s policies, this time 
regarding concessions of extra-territorial immunity to US and Israeli personnel. He 
was arrested yet again and sent into exile.
The hierarchical organisation of the clergy, the dependence of the laity on them in 
their relation with God, particularly after the victory of the Usulis, and their 
economic independence through direct collection of religious taxes, all consolidated 
their increasing influence. This growth culminated in the victory of the Islamic 
Republic and their acquisition of political power through the supreme leadership of 
velayat-e faqih. The madrasas became influential institutions not just as religious 
centres, but also as powerful political centres that were actively engaged with 
developments in state and society. Their roles in the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906 and in the overthrow of the Pahlavi Shah in 1979 are illustrative of this point.
In the foregoing discussion I have explored the more formal and institutional facets 
o f Shi‘ism and its development in Iran. Even a brief examination of the history of 
clerical influence in the Iranian context reveals a very complex picture, one that 
makes any simple reading of the situation highly questionable. Even though as a
95
theocracy Iran is currently governed and led by clerics, one cannot point to a 
consensus amongst the clerics themselves about their social role. In fact, this has led 
to a diversity of views and understandings, turning current debates into one of the 
most dynamic and exciting situations in their history.
An exploration of only the clergy and their institutions of learning would, however, 
provide an incomplete picture of Shi‘ism and its practices in Iran. Ridgeon argues 
that even though Islam is a communal religion, it is not necessarily opposed to 
individualism, for ‘the Sufi interiorization of Islamic doctrine permitted the self to 
develop’ (Ridgeon, 2003b: 148). This is a reminder that Islam is not a unified system 
of thought, doctrines and rituals but rather a diverse set of schools and thoughts that 
have evolved historically and responded variously within different circumstances. In 
the following sections, I shall outline the historical background and key concepts of 
some o f the more personal approaches of Shi‘as to religion, focusing on mysticism.
The Mystical Approach
Mysticism in Islam cannot be studied in isolation from their broader religious, social 
and cultural contexts. In fact Sufism, one of these mystical approaches ‘has been 
inextricably entwined with the overall development of Islamic devotional practices, 
theological ideas, esthetics, and religious and social institutions’ (Knysh, 2000: 326). 
As Knysh argues, it is therefore misleading to talk about a ‘spiritual essence’ of 
Sufism as though this were a trans-historical concept. In fact, Sufi concepts have 
evolved over time and been articulated variously by different Sufi masters. 
Moreover, even though they might not have originated within Shi‘ism, they have
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influenced many current Shi‘i understandings and articulations in Iran. However, 
since this is not a study of Sufism per se, here I will only summarise some major 
Sufi concepts, particularly their Persian articulations, in order to discuss their 
application in some of the films to be discussed in the later chapters.
Sufi States and Stations
The teachings o f Islam are generally associated firstly with the Qur’an and the hadith 
and, secondly, with their application to Muslim societies generally and the lives of 
believers in particular. Consequently, many discussions on Islam as a religion are 
restricted mainly to its theories and practice. Reducing Islam in this way, however, 
runs the risk of overlooking another more interiorised dimension o f Islam, that of 
religious experience, which is equally— if not more— significant in many Islamic 
interpretations.
With the expansion of Islam outside its original Arabian context, Islam was faced
with various intellectual and social upheavals. Makris states that Sufism was one of
the responses to these challenges, one that dialogued with new ideas, practices and
ways of thought. It was more concerned with
striving for perfection through a subjective conception of a social reality animated by 
the spirit of God. This view sprang from the belief that spiritual maturity could be 
reached by following a particular training regime under the direction of a guide-cum- 
master with saintly qualities’ (Makris, 2007: 144). It was thus that Sufism appeared 
relatively early in the history of Islam.
The Sufis referred to the first two codified categories of knowledge and law, the 
Qur’an and hadith, as the ‘Way’ or tariqa, which led to a third element. This element
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‘not set down so explicitly in the Koran or Hadith’, is ‘spiritual realisation, or the 
ascending stages of human perfection resulting in proximity to God’ (Chittick, 1983: 
10). Those who aspire to follow the mystic path strive to pass from the finite to the 
infinite, ‘from that which seems to that which is, out of all lower forms of reality to 
that which is Supremely Real, and, in the end, to become Being itself (Smith, 1995:
4).
Smith identifies four postulates on which mysticism bases its claims o f the soul’s 
ability to undertake this journey. The first is intuition or the soul’s ability to see by a 
spiritual sense. ‘Reality, in its highest form, cannot be understood by intelligence, 
but only by something above it’ and through intuition man can ‘perceive things 
hidden from reason’. The second is the inward light or Divine spark ‘that seeks 
reunion with the Eternal Flame’, for only if  the soul is itself a partaker o f the Divine 
can it know God. The third is going beyond the self, which is required for the 
purification from the self: ‘The soul must be stripped of the veils of selfishness and 
sensuality if it is to see clearly the Divine vision’. Lastly, love is the guide and 
inspiration o f the soul in its ascent to God (Smith, 1995: 3-6).
The predecessors of the Sufi movements ‘strove to achieve a psychological and 
experiential proximity with God through self-imposed deprivations (especially 
abstinence from food and sex), self-effacing humility, supererogatory religious 
practices, long vigils, pious meditation on the meaning of the Qur’anic text and a 
single-minded concentration on the divine object’ (Knysh, 2000: 8). Attaining 
proximity to God remained one of the constant goals throughout Sufism, even as 
various, and at times contradictory, approaches were identified as ways of achieving
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this closeness. For example, seclusion was propagated by some as essential in 
attaining proximity while others encouraged an active involvement with worldly 
affairs.7
In the same vein, whilst most Sufis agreed that the goal of the mystical path was 
achieving the haqiqa or Ultimate Reality or God, the various states and stations that 
led to this destination were not always defined in the same way. As we shall see 
shortly, this meant that what was characterised as a Sufi station in one definition of a 
particular Sufi master or group was at times recognised as a Sufi state in another. 
However, stations and states were recognised by the majority as undisputable 
necessities in the Sufi path. These stations and states stand between the lover and the 
Beloved and the lover has to traverse them before reaching his Beloved.
In the earliest formal exposition of Sufism in Persian, K ashf al-mahjub, the 11th-
century Sufi ‘Ali b. Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri states:
The term ‘spiritual station’ (maqam) denotes one’s ‘standing’ and ‘rising’ in the Way 
of God, not the devotee’s dwelling there, and his fulfilment of the obligations relevant 
to that station until he completely realizes it as far as is humanly possible. It is not 
allowable that the devotee take leave of that station until he completely meets its 
requirements and fulfils its obligations. In this respect, the first station is ‘repentance,’ 
then ‘conversion,’ then ‘renunciation,’ then ‘trust in God,’ and so on. Hence, no one 
may lay claim to knowing ‘conversion’ without first experiencing ‘repentance,’ nor 
pretend to ‘trust in God’ without ‘renunciation.’ (quoted in Lewisohn, 2001: 178).
According to al-Hujwiri, following the stations on the Way are the mystic states 
(ahwal) of ecstasy bestowed upon the seeker’s soul as signs of favour and grace to
7 For a comparison of the various religious attitudes and devotional styles see Knysh 
(2000: 18-26) on Ibrahim b. Adham, Ibn al-Mubarak and Fudayl Ibn Tyad.
99
encourage him on his path. They are the gift o f God alone, and in no way depend 
upon the mystic’s own striving (Smith, 1995: 203). In short, whilst the seeker 
completes each station through his strict endeavours, the state is a gift that is 
endowed upon him through God’s grace; he can have no active role in attaining it.
Jalal al-Din Rumi, the eminent 13th-century Sufi philosopher and poet, does not set
out to give a systematic definition of each station and state. Like the three
dimensions of Sufism, his works can be broadly divided into three categories. The
first two are knowledge ( Him) and action ( 'amal), or law and practice. Rumi refers to
the third category not merely as a destination, but rather as a process that includes
‘stations’ (maqamat) and ‘spiritual states’ (ahwal). The believer is compared to a
traveller who undergoes these inner experiences during his journey. This dimension
concerns all the “virtues” (akhlaq) the Sufi must acquire in keeping with the Prophet’s 
saying, “Assume the virtues of God!” If acquiring virtues means “attaining to God,” 
this is because they do not belong to man. The discipline of the Way coupled with 
God’s grace and guidance results in a process of purification whereby the veil of 
human nature is gradually removed from the mirror of the primordial human 
substance, made in the image of God, or, in the Prophet’s words, “upon the Form of 
the All-Merciful.” Any perfection achieved by man is God’s perfection reflected 
within him (Chittick, 1983: 11-12).
Persian Poetry and Sufism
Persian Sufi literature composed over the last millennium is diverse and extensive. It 
ranges from Qur’anic commentaries, didactic metaphysical works, and ethical 
treatises to poetry composed in a wide range of classical forms. However, ‘the 
greatest masterpieces of this literature appeared as poetry and because of their great
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beauty and spiritual quality [they have] left their imprint on the whole of Persian 
culture’ (Nasr and Matini, 1991: 332).
Historically, Persian poetry has played a significant role in the expression of Sufi 
concepts and ideas in Iran. The works of Sufism’s greatest poets, Farid al-Din Attar 
(12th century), Jalal al-Din Rumi (13th century), and Nur al-Din Jami (15th century) 
are just the most eminent examples, which are still recited and relevant to Iranians 
even several centuries after their composition. It is notable that many of these great 
Sufi poets were negative about the art of poetry, regarding it as subordinate to 
religion. However, as Lewisohn argues, ‘an esoteric double entendre is never far 
away in any discussion of poetry among Sufis’ and in fact the ‘subordination of 
Poetry to Prophecy, of Art to Love, is, indeed, the central fact in Sufi aesthetics’ 
(Lewisohn, 1995: 19). But even if being a poet was to be the lowest degree of the 
Sufi, since his spiritual mastership was by far the higher status, and even if poetry 
was subordinate to religious practices and metaphysics, it nevertheless remained the 
most popular medium of Sufi expression.
Knysh draws interesting parallels between poetry and mysticism. He argues that 
there is an affinity between poetry and mysticism, as both ‘convey subtle 
experiences that elude conceptualization in a rational discourse which by its very 
nature requires lucidity and a rigid, invariable relations [sic] between the signifier 
and the signified...Both carry emotional rather than fictional content; both depend, 
in great part, on a stream of subtle associations for their effect’ (2000: 150). 
Moreover, the open-endedness o f poetic language, in contrast to the argumentative 
language o f science and logic, gives it an elasticity that allows it to refer to multiple
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signifieds. This, in turn, allows readers to create meaning, even if  the poem was 
written in distant times. The mystical experience compels the mystic to share his 
unique perspective with others even though it is too ineffable or subtle to be 
precisely conveyed to others. The characteristics of poetry make it the preferred 
vehicle for mystical experiences in certain religious traditions (Knysh, 2000: 150- 
151).
From the 10th century, cultural life within the Islamic world was gradually moving 
eastwards. Kynsh suggests the ‘transition, in the eastern areas of Islamdom, from 
Arabic to Persian as the principle vehicle of ascetic and mystical ideas underline this 
momentous change in the cultural orientation’ (2000: 139). Notably, this transition 
also coincides with the revival o f literary Persian in Iran after almost two centuries 
of silence following the Arab conquest. In fact, Nasr suggests that Persia is not only 
one of the main arenas of Sufism with some of the greatest Sufi saints and sages 
hailing from there, but also that it was their poetic creations ‘which transformed the 
religious and spiritual life of much of Asia’ (Nasr, 1991: 206).
Sufi poetry deals with a variety of subjects. However, beauty, divine love and 
complete annihilation of man in God are recurrent themes in the works of many 
masters including those mentioned above. In his most famous work, Mantiq al-tayr 
(The Conference of the Birds), Attar narrates the story of a group of birds led by the 
hoopoe in search of the magical bird Simurgh, whose beauty surpasses any 
description. In this long and arduous journey, only thirty birds survive the challenges 
they face on their way to their destination. By the time they reach their goal, ‘these 
thirty birds have been reduced by their adventures to practically nothing in both soul
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or body’ and thereby ‘rediscover their true essences and see Simurgh (which in 
Persian means ‘thirty birds’) in a giant mirror. Simurgh turns out to be their own 
image and they achieve their goal by merging in the final act of fana  [self- 
annihilation] with the divine Essence’ (Knysh, 2000: 154).
Love is a central element within Sufism. Rumi’s works, and particularly his 
collection of poems, is a combination of mystical experience with poetic inspiration. 
Rumi’s encounter with the wandering dervish, Shams al-Din Muhammad Tabrizi, 
transformed him from ‘a sober jurisprudent to an intoxicated celebrant of the 
mysteries o f Divine Love’ (Chittick, 1983: 3). Shams discouraged his pupil from 
relying on the formal education he had received and emphasised love as the surest 
way to God, hence the many verses that Rumi dedicates to love in his poetry. Rumi’s 
intense love ( *ishq) for Shams inspired him to find a paradigm of his love of God 
(Hodgson, 1974: 305). Rumi’s view of the relationship between God and man is 
subtle, with ‘the process of the mystical annihilation o f man in the divine essence 
{fana’) ... never complete. As the flame of a candle continues to exist despite being 
outshined [sic] by the radiance of the sun, so does a mystical man retain his identity 
despite the overpowering presence of his Lord’ (Knysh, 2000: 161).
The various states and stations within Sufism have been explored most extensively 
within Persian poetry. Sufism influenced many aspects o f Iranian culture and 
thought, including poetry, painting, music and philosophy. Persian poetry, however, 
remained the most prominent medium of Sufi expression. In a comparison of Persian 
poetry and other Persian arts, particularly painting and architecture, Yarshater 
considers poetry to stand out amongst all other Persian arts. Poetry is ‘not only the
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fullest expression of artistic and aesthetic explorations of the people, but also the 
compendium of their deepest thoughts and religious sentiments. By engaging the 
most comprehensive artistic and intellectual interests of people, poetry constitutes 
the broadest stage for the manifestation o f a Persian Weltanschauung.’ (Yarshater, 
1962: 70). Many of the Sufi stations and states, including divine love, self- 
annihilation and inner sight are explored in Persian poetry. This unrivalled art form, 
however, was to inform another, film, which has also concerned itself with an 
intellectual perception. This engagement will be discussed in later chapters. As 
Saeed-Vafa asserts, it appears that as a result o f political censorship, cultural or 
personal taboos, or spiritual experience, codes and signs are inevitably employed in 
Iranian poetry, narrative and visual arts to convey incommunicable ideas. Thus, the 
‘mysteries o f the system and the universe are understood and conveyed only through 
metaphor’ (2003: 58).
The following section will explore another important influence on Iranian culture 
and thought, particularly on Shi‘i Iranian identity.
The figure of Husayn and Iranian Shi‘i identity
Husayn b. ‘Ali was the grandson of the Prophet and the third Shi‘i Imam. After the 
death of the first Shi‘i Imam, ‘Ali, the Shi‘as followed Hasan, his eldest son as their 
imam. Upon his death— or murder, according to Shi‘a tradition, by the order of the 
Umayyad caliph, M u‘awiya, in 669— ‘All’s second son, Husayn was to succeed as 
the third Shi‘a imam. The Shi ‘at ‘Ali who were displeased with their Sunni Umayyad 
rulers persistently invited Husayn to rise against the Umayyads. In 680, M u‘awiya
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passed away and was succeeded by his son, Yazid. The S h i‘at ‘Ali of Kufa, who had 
begun a rebellion against the new caliph, sent messages to Husayn asking him to 
lead them and take over the caliphate of Yazid. Husayn accepted their invitation and 
set out from Mecca to Kufa. He was accompanied only by members of his family 
and close companions. However, when Yazid sent an army of 4000 men to stop 
Husayn on his way, the Kufans failed to stand by their oath of allegiance and did not 
come to his aid.
Husayn refused to pay homage to Yazid and on the second day o f Muharram was 
forced to camp at Karbala, a desert place without fortifications or water. Yazid’s 
army closed off Husayn’s access to water by installing 500 men on the way to the 
Euphrates (Vaglieri, 2009). Husayn and his companions were made to suffer from 
thirst for three days. On ‘Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram, under the command of 
Shamir (referred to as as Shimr by the Shias) Yazid’s army attacked Husayn’s camp. 
By afternoon, they had slaughtered Husayn and all his men, including young 
children. The martyrs of Karbala numbered 72. Shimr would have also killed 
Husayn’s sick boy, Zayn al-‘Abidin, who had had to remain in his tent. However, 
Ibn Sa‘d, Yazid’s commander, restrained him and forbade anyone from entering that 
tent. As we shall see, the tragic death of Husayn and his companions at Karbala near 
Kufa in 61/680 ‘played an important role in the consolidation of the Shi‘i ethos’ 
(Daftary, 1998: 25-26), becoming the central historical event in the lives and 
consciousness of the Shi‘a
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Commemorating Husayn
Four years after the death o f Husayn, a small group of ShVat ‘Ali from Kufa
gathered at Karbala to lament his murder as an act of repentance for failing to come
to his aid. This group called themselves tawwabun or ‘Penitents.’ This event was
significant for various reasons. Firstly, even though lamentation as an act of
atonement already existed in the Mediterranean religions such as Zoroastrianism,
Manichaeism, Christianity and Judaism, this was the first time that it was practiced
within an Islamic framework. ‘Indeed, the collective lamentations of the Penitents at
Karbala were the first documented rituals of what would eventually become a wholly
new religious tradition’ (Aslan, 2006: 178). More importantly, it is from this time
onwards that the Shi *at ‘Ali, who as a group had sought the political leadership of the
Muslims from within the ahl al-bayt, or family of the Prophet, came to evolve into a
distinct religious tradition called Shi‘ism.
Put simply, the memory of Karbala was slowly transforming the Shi‘atu Ali from a 
political faction with the aim of restoring the leadership of the community to the 
family of the Prophet, into an utterly distinct religious sect in Islam: Shi'ism, a 
religion founded on the ideal of the righteous believer who, following in the footsteps 
of the martyrs at Karbala, willingly sacrifices himself in the struggle for justice 
against oppression (Aslan, 2006: 178).
A number of scholars have thus linked Shi‘a identity with Persian ethnicity, noting 
that the Persian struggle against Arab domination traces its roots back to the events 
of Karbala: ‘Husyan’s refusal to admit the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate had 
been a stance that he shared with the people of Kufa, ‘Ali’s capital. Many Kufans 
were liberated slaves and Persian prisoners of war who had risen in revolt against the 
distinctly Arab character of Umayyad rule’ (Nasr, 2007: 40). It is not only Iranians
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who project this link from within, but also Arabs from outside, who even today 
associate it back to the Abbasid period and the Shu'ubiya movement— a literary 
movement that ‘was formed to assert the cultural superiority of the Persians to the 
Arabs, and to influence the official culture o f the ‘Abbasid Caliphate’ (Lapidus, 
2002: 76). Indeed, Nasr asserts that the Arab ‘treatment o f Shias as outsiders -  as 
“lesser Arabs” -  has always found justification in the accusation that they are 
Iranian, and that their demand for rights is nothing more than a modern-day 
reenactment o f the Iranian-led sh o ’oubi revolt against Arab rule in the early 
centuries of Islam’ (2007: 108).
The first recorded public commemoration of Muharram has been traced to the 10th 
century Persian Shi‘i Buyid ruler, M u‘izz al-Dawla, who enforced it in Baghdad in 
963. All businesses were closed during the 10 days of Muharram and people were 
asked to participate in the lamentations for Husayn (Browne, 1956: 31). The 
practice, did not, however, survive long after the fall o f the Buyid dynasty in 1055. 
The religious sessions known as rowzeh-khani, or reading religious sermons about 
the events o f Karbala, popular among the Iranian Shi‘a today, are traced back to the 
Safivid period. Husayn KashefTs (d. 1504-5) composition o f Rowzat al-shuhada ’ 
(Paradise o f Martyrs), a literary masterpiece, became a popular text for rowzeh 
khani. ‘Originally, it was customary to recite or chant a chapter from The Garden o f  
the Martyrs in public each day during the first ten days of Muharram. Gradually, it 
was staged during the whole month of Muharram and the following month of Safar, 
eventually to be performed all year round’ (Chelkowski, 2009). As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, one of the religious functions that the madrasa graduates of the first 
cycle are able to perform is reading and reciting the stories of Karbala during the
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mourning ceremonies o f the month o f Muharram. These sessions are held either at 
the mosques, the private quarters o f individuals or tekiyehs, and are a means of 
generating income for the clergy.
It was also during the Safavid period that significant mourning processions, along 
with standards (alams), horses, and drums, were led on the streets during the first ten 
days of Muharram. These were also accompanied by some theatrical elements. The 
battle of Karbala also provided the ‘prototype for the only indigenous dramatic form 
in the world of Islam’ (Chelkowski, 1991: 771). This drama, in which the tragic 
events of Karbala are re-enacted, is referred to as ta ‘ziyeh, or passion play. The term 
‘ta ‘ziyeh’ itself ‘literally means expressions of sympathy, mourning and consolation’ 
(Chelkowski, 1979: 2).
Some scholars have traced back the roots of ta ‘ziyeh to earlier pre-Islamic Iranian 
rituals. The similarities between ta'ziyeh and particularly siyawush-khani has led 
many to believe that ta ‘ziyeh was rooted in these ancient practices (Beyzaie, 2001, 
Homayuni, 2001 and Malekpour, 2004). The innocent death of the Persian prince 
Siyawush some 3,000 years ago and the mourning rituals commemorating his death 
parallel Husayn’s martydom and the ta'ziyeh performances. Even though theatrical 
elements were present in Safavid mourning processions, evidence of ta'ziyeh 
performance itself is not found until the Zand period (1735-1787) (Beyzaie, 2001: 
117). As I will discuss further in Chapter 8, ta'ziyeh was condemned by both the 
clergy and the modernists, the former viewing it as a threat to their income and the 
latter as backward and old-fashioned.
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Husayn: Sayyid al-Shuhada \  Master o f the Martyrs
David Cook outlines a number o f factors that characterise the figure o f the martyr. 
The martyr must have ‘belief in one belief system and possess a willingness to defy 
another belief system’ (Cook, 2007: 1-2). His martyrdom is more effective if  this 
particular belief system is under attack or in a minority position, whether politically 
or culturally. ‘By demonstrating publicly that there is something in the subordinated 
or persecuted belief system worth dying for, the value other believers place upon it is 
augmented, and that belief system is highlighted’ (Cook, 2007: 2) The audience also 
plays an important role in the martyrdom narrative and in ensuring the success of 
martyrdom itself, for they are instrumental in shaping the historical memory of the 
martyr. This audience does not need to be physically present during the pre­
martyrdom suffering or at the moment of martydom, but must have access to the 
information. ‘Ideally for the martyrdom to succeed, there must be an absolute evil 
upon which the audience can focus their revulsion’ (Cook, 2007: 3). This can be a 
ruling power or its representative that is oppressive or at least conceived to be as 
such within the narrative.
One can easily trace all of the above elements in the narrative of Husayn. Husayn, 
the grandson o f the Prophet, refused to give in to the Umayyad usurpers and their 
unjust rule. In fact, his ‘martyrdom epitomized the essential illegitimacy of the 
Umayyad rulers, who contrasted unfavourably with his pious lifestyle’ (Cook, 2007: 
58). He was demonstrating a willingness to defy the Umayyad belief-system. He was 
in a position of minority, as leader of a political group of the Shi'at ‘Ali, as well as in 
terms of the military might of his enemies who attacked him. The first audience is
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Husayn’s family, particularly his sister Zaynab, who is taken captive to the court of 
Yazid in Damascus. History has recorded the eloquent speech she delivers in Yazid’s 
court, condemning his actions at the unjust murder of Husayn. The community itself 
also becomes the audience. This can be traced back to the tawwabun (Penitents) 
discussed earlier, who gathered to lament his death four years after his murder. As 
demonstrated, this continued over the centuries and found various forms of 
expression. The absolute evil, Yazid, the Umayyad ruler, and Shimr, the killer, 
became the subject of absolute hate and revulsion for the Shi‘i mourners, 
epitomising all that is evil, cruel and repulsive.
The figures of Husayn and his opponents have been invoked not just in narrating the 
events of Karbala in the commemorative processions or in the religious ceremonies 
of rowzeh khani, but also in addressing contemporary historic moments. In fact, 
Khomeini’s rhetoric, both during the struggles to overthrow the Shah and after the 
success of the Revolution, relied heavily on these religious icons. The corrupt regime 
of the Shah, he stated, was the present taqut, a Qur’anic reference to the idolatrous 
and tyrannical Pharaohs. Khomeini thus implied that he was the Moses of his time, 
who was to free the people from the enslavement of the unjust rulers. The 
‘unlslamic’ reign of the Pahlavi Shah was to end so that the Muslim community and 
umma could be preserved. However, soon after the Revolution, when another 
Muslim country, Iraq, attacked Iran, the rhetoric changed: it was no longer that of a 
Muslim umma against idolaters and heretics. Rather Husayn once again became the 
mobilising figure in uniting Iranians to defend their country against the tyrannical 
Saddam and his Arab armies. Suddenly, Iranian ethnicity was once again relevant to
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the Islamic Republic, which had hitherto tried to downplay it in favour of a wider 
Islamic identity. The historical Sunni-Shi‘a differences returned to the forefront.
Husayn remains the only figure whose death has been commemorated so extensively 
in Iran. He plays a pivotal role in the formation of Iran’s Shi‘i identity. His 
martyrdom has turned him into one of the greatest mythical figures of Iranian 
narrative— a narrative that has been appropriated by various factions at different 
periods. Thus, Khomeini employed this narrative in his anti-Shah rebellions from 
1961 onwards. He created a new image of Husayn that ‘was to be not only the object 
of mourning and pity, but the example of courage and resistance. His image was 
redefined from one of passive suffering to one of protest against tyranny’ (Lapidus, 
2002: 483). The story o f Husayn also found expressions amongst both laity and 
clergy, such as pardeh khani, ta ‘ziyeh and rowzeh khani. The former expressions 
allowed the laity a personal and direct engagement with religion as well as resulted 
in the creation of certain religious rituals which historically have not always met 
with the approval of the clergy. Some of the most recent developments in this regard 
will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Conclusions
The dominance o f Sunni rule in the early Islamic period and the rulers’ close 
surveillance and persecution of the Shi‘a imams, particularly that of the Twelvers, 
resulted in the quietist approach of the Shi‘as. There were, however, periods when 
the Shi‘as challenged Sunni hegemony, as in the case of the Buy ids in Baghdad, the 
Fatimids in North Africa and the Nizari Ismailis in Iran. Nevertheless, as discussed
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above, Shi‘a sympathies had existed within the Iranian lands and had posed a 
significant challenge to the status quo at various times. Shi‘ism’s appeal to Iranians 
has been read both as a religious conduit that allowed nationalist responses to Sunni 
Arab dominance as well as an authoritative form of leadership and governance with 
a close affinity to earlier pre-Islamic Iranian models o f empire. Whatever the 
reasons, the significance of the Shi‘a role in Iran cannot be overlooked and can be 
traced back far before the establishment of the Safavid Shi'i state in the early 16th 
century.
The establishment of the Safavid state in Iran marks the beginning of the 
consolidation of the power of the Shi‘i clergy, culminating in the founding of the 
Islamic Republic. The formal and institutional approach to Shi‘ism, however, was 
not always in line with the actual practices of the laity. The Sufi mystical approach 
was an alternative to the legalistic approach of religion and spirituality. Those whose 
personal approach to religion diverged from the public and communal aspects 
propagated by the establishment and its centres of authority were usually regarded 
unfavourably and subsequently marginalised. However, their rich and varied 
readings o f ways to arrive at spiritual fulfilment has influenced many aspects of 
Iranian culture and thought. These variant approaches to significant religious 
practices, as exemplified by the different ways of commemorating the figure of 
Husayn, clearly demonstrate the plurality and complexity of Iranian Shi‘i identity. 
Therefore in any study of the Shi‘i expressions of religion and spirituality in Iran, it 
is important to pay attention to both the formalistic and the more personal 
approaches to religion, each of which are significant influences in the formation of 
these expressions.
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This chapter provided a socio-historical background of Iran and the development of 
Shi‘ism within it. The themes discussed above are examined in a whole set of films 
that I will return to in detail in the following chapters so as to study recent attempts 
at articulating and engaging with religion and spirituality in and through film in Iran. 
The discussion on the clergy is, therefore, then picked up in Chapter 5, where I study 
films whose discourses in depicting the clergy provide a space for the articulation of 
recent debates on their role within society. Similarly, the discussion of the mystical 
approach to religion in this chapter provides the background for Chapter 6, where I 
study films whose discourses reflect mystical teachings in Islam. In the same vein, 
the final discussion here o f the figure o f Husayn within the context of Iranian Shi‘i 
identity informs Chapter 8, where I explore the ways in which film provides a new 
medium of expression for one of oldest narratives in Shfism.
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Chapter 4: Contemporary Iranian Discourses on Religion and
Cinema
Films participating in the Fajr International Film Festival are entered into numerous 
competing and non-competing sections such as ‘International Cinema’, ‘Asian 
Cinema’, ‘Iranian Cinema’, ‘Guest Films’, and cinemas of a specific region or 
filmmaker. The 2005 festival witnessed a new addition to its categories, namely 
‘Spiritual Cinema’, rendered into Persian as sinama-ye m a ‘nagara. This marked the 
beginning o f heated debates amongst journalists, film critics, authorities and lay film 
fans as to what constituted sinama-ye ma ‘nagara. The title ma ‘nagara became the 
centre of these arguments both outside and inside the festival circle, including the 
festival’s own daily newsletter, Jashnvareh.
Jashnvareh is a 20-30 page newsletter published daily during the 10-day festival and
includes the latest news about the festival and the participating films, directors,
actors and other film-crew members. The first 2005 issue of Jashnvareh carried an
interview with Alireza Rezadad, director of the Farabi Cinema Foundation and the
Fajr Intemtional Film Festival, which marked the beginning of many attempts at
defining the controversial term of m a ‘nagara cinema.
Interviewer: There is also a new and notable section, which is Spiritual Cinema. This 
section is very disputable from many viewpoints. How do you describe Spiritual 
Cinema?
Rezadad: We’ve described it many times. Spiritual cinema is a trend, not style nor 
genre or kind. It’s actually a tendency. This kind of cinema consists of those movies, 
which concern ultra-material [extra-material] phenomenon. This possibility exists in 
the nature of cinema and recent changes in the film industry have afforded more 
potential for ali filmmakers. Furthermore, human being’s [sic] today need for [sic]
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spirituality, religious and natural tendencies make the world pay special attention to 
Spiritual Cinema (.Jashnvareh, 31 January, 2005; 24).
This was the only part of the interview to be translated and included in the short
English section of the newsletter. The main discussion on Spiritual Cinema,
however, continued in the long Persian report of the interview. The next question
revolved around the word ‘m a 'nagara1 itself, which Rezadad explains by referring
to the two different meanings of the root-word ‘ma‘na’ in Persian:
In the [Persian] dictionary of Dehkhoda, one of the meanings of ma ‘na, which has a 
philosophical aspect, is that it is the opposite of form. Ma'na in the cinema of 
ma'nagara does not apply [to the other meaning of ma ‘na] as meaning. Instead, it is 
passing from form and appearance to the other side of the material world, a path that 
passes through the material world {Jashnvareh, 31 January 2005: 9).
This was one o f the earliest attempts at defining sinama-ye m a 'nagara. On a lighter 
note, however, the first issue also devoted its cartoon page to the new category of 
Spiritual Cinema, listing six different cinematic symbols that would make a film 
spiritual. These included: rain, wind, a child, Afghans, an apple and finally a
camera. Here is a translated version of these caricatures:
A discussion regarding the symbols of spirituality-makers!
First Symbol: Rain
Creating Instruments: ewer (<aftabeh), hose, watering can, anything that pours
water...!
Emanating Meaning: pouring love...love pouring, the rain of love, tear drops...
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Second Symbol: Wind
Creating Instruments: shovel + shovel handle + heap of soil, anything that creates 
wind
Emanating Meaning: the wind of life, the wind will bring us, kite, you were in my 
wind, I ’ve given you with the wind, fan,
Third Symbol: A Child
Creating Instruments: Bald child, snot-nosed child, bare-footed child, any other thing 
that brings a child to mind
Emanating Meaning: childish pity, stupid-wise children, children are always wise 
and adults stupid, the balder and more snot-nosed the child.. .the wiser!
Fourth Symbol: Afghans
Creating Instruments: one Afghan, Afghan accent, Afghan clothes, anything that 
looks Afghan
Emanating Meaning: misery with an accent, Afghan accent with a dressing of 
misery, the clothes of misery, violence against women, zombies, dirty-cleans.
Fifth Symbol: An Apple
Creating Instruments: Apple tree, an apple itself, anything red that looks like an 
apple
Emanating Meaning: love-y apple, round-red love, apple-y-poetry, apple-y-love, I 
would love to eat your apple, a poem that can be bitten into, a roundred edible apple
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Finally, the Sixth Symbol: A Camera
Creating Instruments: Second-hand camcorder, a broken camcorder, anything that 
has the capacity to film badly, a cameraman who hiccups (the consistent shaking of 
the camcorder makes it more ma ‘nagara!)
Emanating Meaning: Innovation in seeing, a new insight into seeing, another way of 
seeing simply, a new style of creation, transformation in seeing-recording.
These humorous snippets allude to the more serious problems and difficulties of 
defining ‘Spiritual Cinema’. Whilst the term has been around in the English 
language and Western studies for a while, rendering it into Persian proved more of a 
challenge than was perhaps anticipated. Persian language and culture, which boasts 
centuries of history on the ‘spiritual’, whether in its written texts or its religious 
practices, was now faced with a problem. The difficulty was not only in the choice of 
term but also in the definition of what exactly constituted Spiritual Cinema. One of 
the Persian equivalents of ‘spiritual’ is rowhani, which is also a term of respect for 
referring to the clergy, whilst mullah or akhund are now largely considered to be 
derogatory terms, particularly amongst the clergy themselves. Therefore, rendering 
spiritual cinema as ‘Sinama-ye rowhani’ could imply ‘clerical cinema’. M a‘nagara 
as a replacement for ‘spiritual’ was unable to address these ambiguities. Even though 
the term managed to deflect the attention from the clergy, its manifold implications, 
which we shall come to presently, ironically served to make what was being referred 
to, even more unclear. However, for the time being, the term appears to be here to 
stay. The biggest challenge, thus remains: what exactly constitutes the m a‘nagara 
cinema.
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In this chapter, I will first explore the various responses, particularly those of the 
clergy and traditionalists, to the introduction and integration of cinema in Iran. These 
include the harsh reactions of the clergy and their later change of heart about the 
medium, which allowed for a far more favourable view o f it. Next, I will analyse 
debates on the encounter of Iranian cinema with religion and spirituality, and the 
question o f the medium’s compatibility or incongruity with religion and spirituality. 
In the last section, I will study the debates that followed the introduction of 
ma'nagara cinema in the 23rdFIFF in 2005. This opened up a whole new sphere for 
the articulation of religious discourse in the Islamic Republic. Finally, I will 
conclude by considering the relevance o f these definitions to the study of religion 
and spirituality in Iranian cinema.
Cinema’s Introduction into a Muslim Society
The debate over religion and film in Iran far predates the introduction of the Spiritual 
Cinema category in the 2005 Fajr Festival. In fact it can be traced as far back as the 
early days o f cinema’s public introduction in Iran. In a tradition where Sharia and 
fiqh  [Islamic jurisprudence] played an important role, this new western medium 
provoked questions, reactions and heated debates. There were those who rejected it 
outright and others who argued for its merits. Cinema’s position and status in Iran 
has thus not been stable and the Islamic reactions to it have varied. At times it was 
religiously decreed as forbidden (haram) and at other, times allowed {halal) (Mir- 
Hosseini, 2001:27). In this section I will briefly examine these responses to cinema 
in Iran and subsequently study how Islamic scholars in post-Revolutionary Iran have 
tried to articulate cinema’s status within Islamic jurisprudence.
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The early and later responses to cinema
The first public movie theatre opened in Cheragh-Gaz Avenue in Tehran in 1904. It 
was a Tong hall, its floors covered with cheap Persian rugs called zilos, upon which 
people sat as they did in the mosques or while attending rowzeh or ta 'zieh’ (Issari, 
1989: 60). However, only a month after its opening, the cinema was forced to shut 
down because of ‘religious opposition to cinema and political harassment of its 
founder’ (ibid.). The clergy and traditionalists harshly opposed the introduction of 
this new medium. They argued that cinema was morally corrupting and against the 
Islamic doctrines that objected to any visual representation. On the other hand, 
‘Western-educated people welcomed it as a modernizing agent’ (Naficy, 2002a: 
256).
Cinema was there to stay, however, and it became an important medium in the 
negotiations of change that took place in Iran. By 1930 the number of theatres across 
Iran had grown to 33. Issari mentions two main events between 1930 and 1936 
which led cinema to become an important source of communication (1989: 71). In 
1932, as part of his modernising project, Reza Shah banned the performance of the 
ta'ziyeh, thus forcing the abandonment of major religious gatherings and instead 
encouraging secular activities and interests. The second event was the banning of the 
veil in 1936. Women had attended cinemas before but were no longer admitted if  
veiled. Additionally, unlike public ritual gatherings such as ta'ziyeh and rowzeh, 
where men and women were segregated, in cinemas they were allowed to sit next to 
each other. It can, therefore, be argued that cinema, was not only a new Western 
medium introduced into the Muslim Iranian society, but also a social instrument that
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broke the old hard and fast rules. It was not merely that the content of the films and 
the inappropriate role-models offered through the characters posed a threat to the 
religious classes and their beliefs, but also that by creating a space for mixed-sex 
entertainment, cinema also created a dangerous new ‘unlslamic’ ritual.
The position on cinema, however, did not remain the same amongst the clergy or 
indeed even amongst the educated elites. Even though the elite and those educated in 
the West had first welcomed cinema, by the 1960s many Iranian intellectuals had 
already begun articulating their disenchantment with modernity and what it had to 
offer. For example, Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1962) proposed a return to the Self against 
what he defined as Westoxication (gharbzadegi, literally West-struckness). This 
disillusionment with the West and a need to return to roots was also reflected 
amongst some of the elite filmmakers. Their films departed from the mainstream, 
commercial filmfarsi genre, which comprised tough-guy movies and low-quality 
melodramas, and instead tried to reflect this return to the Self through nativism.8 
This trend was referred to as the New Wave Movement. Afterwards, during the anti- 
Shah protests of the late 70s, some Islamists who had condemned cinema as 
supportive of the Shah’s westernisation project and United States hegemony burned 
or demolished 185 cinemas. Khomeini, on the other hand, who had earlier 
denounced cinema as a Western ideological tool detrimental to Islamic values and
8 In painting, Kamal-ul-Mulk (d.1940) introduced the Western realist style, which 
marks the beginning of modernism in Iranian painting. However, his students from 
the Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Tehran, brought about a new style of painting 
as a kind of resistance to what was considered foreign art. Zendeh Roudi, Karim 
Imami and Parviz Tanavoli are some of the painters who sought to establish nativism 
in their works. This style, later on referred to as the saqa khaneh style, was inspired 
not by high art but by local and thus religious forms. This was to create a 
distinguished form of Iranian painting, which bore what was assumed to be 
significant Iranian structures and styles. For more detail see Keshmershekan (2004).
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the development o f the country’s youth, now changed his position. He saw it as a 
powerful tool that could be put to the service of the Revolution. In his famous speech 
at the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery in 1979 he declared:
Cinema is a modem invention that ought to be used for the sake of educating the 
people, but as you know, it was used instead to corrupt our youth. It is the misuse of 
cinema that we are opposed to, a misuse caused by the treacherous policies of our 
rulers (1981: 258)
Thus, cinema got its stamp of approval within the first day of Khomeini’s return to 
Iran after the Shah’s downfall. However, it has arguably been one of the most 
contentious media in the Islamic Republic, strictly codified and closely monitored by 
the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) to ensure its compliance with 
the Islamic Republic’s aspirations. The MCIG codes, however, are not the sole 
factors that control which films make it to the screens. There are many cases of 
post-Revolutionary films that were banned after a short period o f screening despite 
obtaining screening approval from the authorities. To give a very recent example, 
even though The Lizard  (Marmulak, Tabrizi, 2004), which I will discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 5, was never officially banned, the clergy’s protests against this 
film resulted in it being removed from the cinemas only a month after its first 
screening.
Cinema’s place within Islamic jurisprudence
Once cinema and religion were no longer opposed territories, some of the 
traditionalists felt the need to articulate this new relationship within an Islamic 
discourse. One such attempt was Ayatollah Moravveji’s book, Cinema in the Mirror
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o f  Fiqh [Islamic Jurisprudence] (1999).9 The introduction to the book, by 
Mohammad Reza Jabbaran, a cleric based in Qom, provides an interesting overview 
on the necessity of discussing cinema in fiqh. Jabbaran states that since Islamic fiq h , 
and particularly the profound and fertile school of Shi‘ism, has never been silent or 
indifferent towards any aspect of human life, it should, therefore, have a stance about 
this important phenomenon [cinema] also (Jabbaran, 1999: 13). The reason for the 
silence offiqh  towards cinema was that this industry and the art of acting throughout 
the world, including pre-Revolution Iran, have been contaminated by forbidden acts. 
Even though M oraw eji does not immediately elaborate on what exactly constitutes 
forbidden acts, it is obvious to the Iranian reader that he is referring to the film-farsi 
genre of pre-Revolutionary films that depicted scantly dressed women with scenes of 
singing, dancing and sometimes erotic images. Thus, the term ‘cinema’ suggests 
vulgar acts undertaken by indecent individuals called actors (ibid.). He concludes 
that, at present, even if  one did not believe in the necessity of cinema and actors in 
society, the industry has already imposed itself upon people’s lives. Post­
revolutionary Iran, however, has proved through the efforts of its artists and 
filmmakers that cinema does not require the inclusion o f forbidden acts.
Cinema in the Mirror o f  Fiqh is divided into various topics, ranging from lying, 
backbiting and men and women mingling together, to acting the roles of the Prophet 
and the imams, and cross-dressing. M oraweji begins by stating that the book is 
about the position of the Muslim believers and Muslim artists regarding cinema 
(1999: 9). His analysis, however, does not directly deal with cinema. Instead, it 
examines various, and occasionally contradictory, hadiths on each of the listed
9 All quotations from M oraweji are my own translations from the Persian.
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topics. If  any of these are verified as prohibited or approved, then by extension the 
same applies to those topics within film and acting. Therefore, rather than being a 
discussion of cinema per se, the text is like any other treatise on Islamic 
jurisprudence.
One o f the topics o f M oraw eji’s discussion, for example, is the issue of the indirect 
gaze. An indirect gaze is defined as looking at a woman through her reflection in a 
mirror or in water, in a photographic picture or on the television screen. After 
examining different hadiths and viewpoints, he concludes that, like the direct gaze, 
the indirect gaze is forbidden, the only exceptions being photographs, television and 
film. Thus, if the pictures in the photographs, television or film are of unknown 
women, looking at any part o f their body is permissible. However, like any other 
gaze, this is only acceptable if  it is done without the intention of pleasure. M oraweji 
reasons that pictures of unknown women on screen or in photographs are similar to 
imaginary drawings of unknown women on paper, and are, therefore, permitted.
It is also important to bear in mind that whilst one Shi'i scholar might decree one 
way on a topic, another might be of a completely contrary view on the same issue. 
Thus, M oraw eji’s statements do not necessarily represent the unanimous opinion of 
all the Shi‘i scholars in Iran. For example, quoting from Ayatollah Azari-Qomi, Mir- 
Hosseini lists ‘Watching bad films, even if the actors are unknown Muslim or even 
non-Muslim women’ as one of the sources of fisad  or corruption (2000: 67). 
However, Azari-Qomi does not define what constitutes a bad film, basing his 
argument on the assumption that everyone knows what a bad film is. In the three 
kinds of ‘looks’ that should be avoided under any circumstances, Azari-Qomi
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mentions films as the third look, which ‘leads to chaos (fetneh), resulting in a 
forbidden act, even if it does not involve the intention of pleasure or evil’ (quoted in 
Mir-Hosseini, 2000: 68). By comparing the views of these two jurisprudents on the 
issue of the gaze in films, already two differences of opinion are noted: the 
legitimacy of looking at non-Muslim women, whether known or unknown, with or 
without the intention of pleasure, differs according to each of these ulama. Whilst 
M oraweji deems that looking at images of unknown women on screen without the 
intention of pleasure is permitted, Azari-Qomi adjudges it as forbidden.
Interestingly, even though these discussions are rooted in fiqh , they are not too far 
removed from current Western theories, such as feminist film theory. According to 
psychoanalytic discourses in the study of film, one of the pleasures offered by 
cinema is scopophilia (pleasure in looking): ‘In a world ordered by sexual 
imbalance’, this pleasure is ‘split between active/male and passive/female’ and the 
‘determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled 
accordingly’ (Mulvey, 1999: 62). Thus, in both feminist film theory and fiqh, one of 
the main criticisms against including the female body in film is the fact that it is 
usually constructed to satisfy the male gaze and pleasure.
Considering that his treatise on cinema and fiqh  was published two decades after the 
Revolution, it might strike us as surprising that M oraweji goes to such great lengths 
solely to approve an already permitted practice. Moreover, from very early on in his 
text, he makes it clear that he is addressing Iranian audiences. Iranians, however, 
already know that cinemas operate throughout the country and that filmmaking is an 
acceptable profession if practised within the set rules. Thus, Moravveji’s conclusion
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that ‘Filmmaking and acting by themselves do not necessitate any forbidden act, and 
as long as they do not include any forbidden intentions and actions, they are 
unproblematic’ (1999: 156) might appear only too obvious. However, his detailed 
examination of the Quranic verses and hadith can be read in a different light -  one 
that sees this exercise as more than simply an attempt to decree cinema as a 
permitted industry.
For many decades the clergy had strongly condemned cinema and decreed it to be 
religiously forbidden (haram). Treatises such as M oraw eji’s provide the space to 
employ the same religious vocabulary to justify the acceptance of a formerly 
forbidden activity. Thus, contrary to the common view, fiqh  is not always a closed 
corpus. Rather, it could be seen as a resource that allows for a flexible interpretation 
o f the divine law, in order to incorporate new circumstances within the life of the 
believer. Mir-Hosseini explains Ayatollah Azari-Qomi’s contradictory views on 
gender issues by his wish to ‘keep the old interpretations and yet have women 
participate in political life’ (2000: 78). M oraw eji’s writings can also similarly be 
seen as an attempt to marry the traditional theoretical positions to the laws of the 
state as well as to current social practices.
Cinema has been one o f the most controversial media in Iran. As a western product 
imported into a Muslim society, it aroused many a debate regarding its place within 
society and a Muslim’s life. The Islamic Republic’s acceptance of cinema did not 
end these debates. However, the subject of the discussion did diverge from the initial 
arguments of the acceptability o f the medium to focusing on the content of the films. 
Cinema, therefore, did manage to obtain religious approval and sanction. Provided
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that it followed the rules set by the Islamic Republic’s code o f practice, it was an 
acceptable form of entertainment and or an educational tool in society. However, 
cinema’s ability to engage seriously with religion and to join in the debates within 
the country on religion and spirituality remained an important arena in which 
scholars, intellectuals and traditionalists continue to debate.
The Paradox of Cinema as a Technological Art
Before the introduction of the Spiritual Cinema category at the FIFF, scholarship on 
the treatment of religion and spirituality in Iranian cinema was scarce. Indeed, it 
consisted primarily of discussions about the early attempts of the Islamic Revolution 
to create an ‘Islamic Cinema’ and their subsequent failure, rather than the 
examination o f this medium in its encounter with religion and spirituality. O f the few 
early studies of the treatment of religion and spirituality in film there are only two 
serious works, written by authors with diametrically opposed perspectives. 
Interestingly, however, they both employed the same analytical tools in their 
arguments. One is Maddadpur, from the centre of Islamic Republic o f Iran’s Islamist 
ideology and the other Dabashi, from an adamant secularist stance in opposition to 
the Islamic Republic. Both Maddadpur (1997) and Dabashi (2002) base their 
arguments on Heidegger’s theory of technology. Among more recent works, authors 
such as Mir-Ehsan (2005) also employ Heidegger’s philosophy in their analysis of 
the treatment of religion and spirituality in film. These authors’ heavy reliance on 
Heidegger’s framework is in fact a reflection of a generation of Iranian intellectuals 
who were fascinated by Heidegger.
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The influence of Heidegger amongst Iranian intellectuals goes back to Ahmad Fardid
(1912-1994). Fardid introduced Heidegger to Iranian intellectuals throughout the
60s, 70s and even 80s. These intellectuals who comprised the country’s leading
philosophers, translators and social thinkers ‘used to deliberate on oriental and
occidental philosophical questions’ (Boroujerdi, 1996: 63). It was through Heidegger
that they sought to understand and provide a philosophical understanding o f their
disenchantment with modernity and its rapid implementation through the Pahlavi
Shahs’ modernising projects. Fardid, it appeared, had taken upon himself ‘the task of
introducing Heidegger’s antimodem philosophy into the intellectual circles in Iran’
(Vahdat, 2002: 114). Boroujerdi elaborates that the Iranian intellectuals’ appeal to
Heidegger’s ideas and his like ‘should not be compared as counter intuitive’. Rather,
it was ‘through the eyes of this latter group that the Iranian intellectuals castigate[d]
the West and the age of modernity’ (Boroujerdi, 1996: 176). By drawing an analogy
between nativism and ‘orientalism proper’ Boroujerdi states:
The fondness of many Iranian intellectuals for Heideggerian thought emanated from 
this yearning for wholeness. These intellectuals could easily relate to Heidegger’s 
redolent romanticism and daring antimodemism because they themselves were 
affronted by and contemptuous of the modem age (1996: 179).
It is within this context that one can look at Dabashi, Maddadpur and Mir-Ehsan’s 
fascination with Heidegger’s philosophy in discussing the question of religion and 
spirituality in Iranian cinema.
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Incongruity o f technology and art
In the Seyr va suluk-e sinamayi (Cinematic Spiritual Journey, 1997), Maddadpur 
attempts to locate cinema’s position within the discourse of religion, spirituality and 
technology.10 Maddadpur (1955-2005) held a doctorate in the Philosophy of Art 
from University o f Heidelberg and was a student in Fardid’s circle. He held various 
academic positions in Iran, including Head o f Religious Research of Islamic Arts 
and Culture o f the Islamic Development Organisation. According to Maddadpur, 
cinema is an intrinsically Western art, whose origins differentiate it from all other 
forms of art such as painting, music, architecture or poetry. Whilst the latter 
originated independently from within various civilisations and cultures, cinema was 
essentially a Western art imported into other countries; it is, in fact, a manifestation 
of the ‘technique system’. As a technological product, cinema is rooted in modem 
Western thought and philosophy, inherent in which is a reductionist view of religion. 
Consequently, it would be impossible for cinema to depict any religious tmth 
(Maddadpur, 1997: 22).
Maddadpur examines the incongruities between cinema and religion from various 
angles. These may be summarised as follows: First, religious narrations and themes 
possess an otherworldly tmth that is discordant with the technical and this-worldly 
aspect of cinema (Maddadpur, 1997: 31-32). Cinema, therefore, can only address the 
worldly side of human beings, which is carnal, nervous and erotic. Thus, 
transforming religious narratives and themes into films erodes their divine, sacred 
and profound characteristics, leaving them as mere entertainment. Secondly, a
10 All quotations from Maddadpur are my own translations from the Persian.
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filmmaker with an impious soul preoccupied with this-worldly life cannot transcend 
to other-worldly status. In fact, individuals looking for perfection do not engage in 
cinematic presentation and consequently become prisoners o f the snare of 
imagination and illusion by giving to it their hearts and souls and forgetting the truth 
about themselves (Maddadpur, 1997: 56). Finally, it is impossible to have an Islamic 
Cinema, for cinema can be only as Islamic as a camera or machine can be Islamic 
(Maddadpur, 1997: 24).
Indeed, Maddadpur employs Heidegger’s ideas on technology to refute the notion of
cinema as a true art. He parallels cinematic technique with Heidegger’s definition of
techne. According to Heidegger, the word ‘technology’
stems from the Greek. Technikon means that which belongs to techne. We must 
observe two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that techne is the 
name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the 
mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis, it is something 
poetic. The other thing that we should observe with regard to techne is even more 
important. From earliest times until Plato the word techne is linked with the word 
episteme. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be 
entirely at home in something to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing 
provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing (Heidegger, 1993: 318- 
319).
According to Maddadpur, true art is a way of truth gained through the unveiling of 
the physical world. The ‘unveiling’ that Maddadpur refers to is in fact derived from 
Heidegger’s definition of techne. Heidegger states that ‘what is decisive in techne 
does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor in the using of the means, but 
rather in the revealing, not manufacturing, that techne is bringing-forth’ (Heidegger, 
1993: 319). True art is achieved through the ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ struggle (jihad-e
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akbar and jihad-e asghar), the inner struggle and outer struggle respectively
(Maddadpur, 1997: 61). In Islamic theology the jihad-e akbar, or ‘greater’ struggle,
is against one’s ego, and the jihad-e asghar, or ‘lesser’ struggle, is against
unbelievers. Maddadpur asserts that if  filmmakers try to impose themselves on the
cinematic technique, this will result in chaos ruling over the film (1997: 76).
Interestingly, he positions Iranian film critics and filmmakers much lower than their
Western equivalents by stating that:
The Western sciences and philosophy such as that of [Neil] Postman11 and MacLuhan 
have arrived at a kind of self-awareness... However, this experience even in its lower 
form is rarely seen amongst our intellectuals and their cinema is also suffering from 
this chaos (Maddadpur, 1997: 76).
Having explored the incongruence between religion and cinema in general, 
Maddadpur turns to Iranian cinema in particular, which he refers to as a 
‘Westoxicated Eastern art’ (Maddadpur, 1997: 134), and situates within the larger 
history of Iran. He draws parallels between Reza Shah’s modernising projects and 
the pioneers of cinema in Iran. He asserts that the first two founders of cinema in 
Iran -  Sepanta, a Zoroastrian, and Oganians, a Christian -  were pursuing the 
modernising project in the same way as Reza Shah. Indeed, their eagerness to do so 
far exceeded that of Reza Shah, evident in the fact that they anticipated him in 
introducing the unveiling of women (Maddadpur, 1997: 137). This is most likely a 
reference to the first Iranian film Abi and Rabi (Oganians, 1930), which was made 
before Reza Shah’s forced unveiling of women in 1936. Maddadpur continues that 
up until the mid 1940s, Iranian cinema lacked any claims to intellectualism and had
11 American media theorist and cultural critic.
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no place in film festivals. Yet, he says, this did not stop Iranian cinema leaping out in 
the late 40s and 50s to test Western post-modern art.
Post-Revolution cinema does not fare any better in Maddadpur’s estimation. He 
argues that while cinema during the Pahlavi period was based mostly on ‘erotic 
images’, after the Revolution it drew from the heritage of so-called abstract art. 
Although he does not give any examples to support this claim, he goes on to assert 
that this was only an imitation of Western artists such as Gauguin or Kandinsky. For 
Maddadpur, trying to force religious forms onto Western art was a fruitless effort. 
When faced with egoistic art, Iranian artists, who lack the real spiritual journey, feel 
compelled to imitate Western artists. Thus, they resort to poets such as Rumi, Hafiz, 
Attar, and/or the Sufi paths in order to conceal this void, in the same fashion that 
Gauguin resorted to Eastern and African art without having attained real imagination 
or presence. Maddadpur then concludes that the present avant-garde Iranian cinema, 
with its semi-religious mysticism and complete lack of a spiritual journey, has in fact 
replaced the ‘roguery’ (lutigari) and eroticism of pre-Revolutionary cinema 
(Maddadpur, 1997: 133).
Having refuted the notion of cinema as true art, rejected the possibility of exploring 
religion and spirituality in film, and briefly repudiated the works o f Iranian 
filmmakers who attempt to do so, Maddadpur does, surprisingly, allow some hope 
for the future o f Iranian cinema. He appears to accept one filmmaker as having 
attained true art: Avini, the war-documentary filmmaker who filmed the Iranian 
frontlines during the Iran-Iraq war. His programmes, according to Maddadpur, were
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the way of the Illuminationist (shive-ye ishraqi),n  and of the proximity to the holy 
truth, for the veil o f technique and technology were tom apart and the tmth disclosed 
(Maddadpur, 1997: 109). However, we are left to accept this view without further 
explanation of precisely how Avini’s way was that of the Illuminationist or if, by 
proximity to the holy tmth, he is referring to Avini’s presence in the battlegrounds of 
the sacred war. In fact, it is clear that he is borrowing Heidegger’s terms to state the 
disclosure of tmth. Heidegger asserts that techne is ‘a dimension of tmth (aletheia): 
unconcealment, unhiddeness, disclosedness. Techne reveals in advance what does 
not yet show itself and thus does not stand forth’ (Zimmerman, 1990: 232). 
Maddadpur ultimately concedes that, even though so far no one other than Avini has 
managed to achieve tme art, Iranian cinema today is somehow finding a way out of 
its Westoxicated orbit, though it has a long way to go.
Poetry through technology
In a much shorter work, Dabashi, like Maddadpur, finds Heideggerian theories 
relevant to the discussion of arts and technology in Iran. Although, like Maddadpur, 
Dabashi is also educated in the West (he received a dual Ph.D. in Sociology of 
Culture and Islamic Studies from the University o f Pennsylvania), he is, however, an 
emphatic opponent of the Islamic Republic and an anti-war activist. He has held 
various academic positions in the United States and authored numerous books and 
articles on a range o f topics relating to Iran. In Dabashi’s view, the state of art in Iran 
can be explained with a slight modification of the Eurocentric definition of the crisis 
of technological modernity (2002: 117). Colonialism, he states, is the essence of
12 This is a reference to Sohravardi’s School o f Illumination
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technology and as Heidegger had mentioned, the confrontation with technology is 
only possible in the realm of art. Like all other colonised territories standing at the 
peripheries o f technological modernity, for Iran too, technology is mysterious and 
doubly problematic. Not only are these territories at the mercy o f the technological, 
but also, it is the colonisers riding these technologies (Dabashi, 2002: 118-119). 
However, in a colonial site13 such as Iran, it is not the traditional that responds to 
technology but an ideological resistance, namely Islamism. Ironically, Islamism 
itself is a political and ideological resistance to colonialism and, therefore, a colonial 
product rooted in it (Dabashi, 2002: 122). Thus, ‘Islamic art, the perturbed spirit of 
our moral resistance to colonial subjection, is nothing but a further Islamization of 
ideological resistance to colonialism as the extended arm o f Technological 
Modernity’ (Dabashi, 2002: 122).
M akhmalbafs films become Dabashi’s field for exploring both the site of 
ideological resistance to colonialism and the artistic endeavour to find a saving 
power. Dabashi draws from M akhmalbafs interesting and varied background as a 
Muslim ideologue who turned into an artist, to draw parallels with Heideggerian 
thought and, therefore, demonstrate its relevance to Iranian cinema. In his view, 
M akhmalbafs generation (Makhmalbaf was about 22 years old during the 1979 
Revolution), was interested neither in the Islam conducive to Pahlavi rule, nor in the 
‘Orientalist production of subjectivity on behalf of colonialism’ (Dabashi, 2002: 
122). Instead, they resorted to Islamic art as a resistance against Capitalist 
Modernity. In a period lacking a theory on the nature of an Islamic art, Makhmalbaf
13 Dabashi is of course aware that Iran was never officially colonised. For a detailed 
account of how he uses the terms ‘colonial’ and ‘post/colonial’ see Dabashi, 2002: 
152.
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sought to create one through which he could reflect the truth and philosophy of 
Islam. His early cinematic career, which began soon after the Revolution, was 
entirely committed to the ideas of the Islamic Revolution. However, ‘when a 
post/colonial subject, the Muslim ideologue turns into an artist, initially he cannot do 
anything but further cultivate the site o f resistance to colonialism in what he now 
considers to be ‘artistic’ terms’ (Dabashi, 2002: 123). Dabashi’s arguments can be 
paralleled with the ideological approach discussed in Chapter 1. As mentioned there, 
Martin (1995) argues that the ideological approach is to understand how a specific 
cultural expression undermines the structure o f power relations in a given society at 
a particular time. Similarly, Dabashi’s reading of M akhmalbaf s early films as a 
form of resistance towards a capitalist modernity may be seen as being in line with 
an ideological approach.
However, M akhmalbafs films move from a ‘quintessentially colonial nature’ in 
resistance against colonialism to that of ‘systematically exorcizing his ideological 
demons’ (2002: 133). Thus, according to Dabashi, from the films, and the danger in 
which Makhmalbaf and his nation were living, emerged the ‘saving power’ as a 
therapeutic antidote. Once again Dabashi employs Heidegger’s view that ‘The closer 
we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to 
shine’ (Heidegger, 1993: 341). This is a notion that Heidegger himself had taken 
from the poet, Freidrich Holderlin: ‘But where danger is, also grows the saving 
power’. Thus, according to Dabashi, the saving power in M akhmalbaf s work lies in 
the transformation of the site of resistance from the merely political to the poetic 
(2002: 135). Whilst cinematic mysticism is a universal trap into which many 
accomplished filmmakers such as Dariush Mehrjui or Stanley Kubrick have fallen,
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M akhmalbafs achievement was to recover from it (Dabashi, 2002: 133-135). 
Dabashi concludes that ‘Makhmalbaf is a spectacular example of relentless honesty, 
with the real literally pulling the artist out of the mystifying misery o f casting a 
metaphysical gaze on an already bmtalized world’ (Dabashi, 2002: 135).
M akhmalbafs films have also generated discussions on cinema and religion among 
Western scholars. Considering the scarcity of Western literature on religion in 
Iranian cinema, it is important to mention them here, even if  only briefly. Lloyd 
Ridgeon examines the Iranian-Islamic apocalyptic tradition and studies its 
representation in one of M akhmalbafs films. Analysing The Moment o f  Innocence 
(Nun va goldun, 1995), Ridgeon asserts that it is a film in which ‘M akhmalbafs 
disillusionment with politics and religion is revealed most graphically’ (2003: 152). 
The film is a re-creation of the incident in 1974 in which a 17-year-old Makhmalbaf 
stabbed a policeman in order to carry out his revolutionary plans. However, the 
actors who re-enact Makhmalbaf and the policeman respectively are unwilling to 
resort to violence. Instead of stabbing the policeman and shooting Makhmalbaf 
respectively, the ‘young’ Makhmalbaf offers bread and the ‘young’ policeman offers 
a flower-pot. Thus, Ridgeon states, ‘the old generation is redeemed: The expectation 
of the Mahdi is to be undertaken in a more poetic fashion’ (2003: 154). The signs, 
according to Ridgeon, are not explicit references to the Mahdi or to the Apocalypse, 
but subtle references that ‘lead the viewer to the conclusion that the film indeed is a 
spiritual, Islamic perspective of the apocalypse’ (2003: 155).
Michael Fischer, on the other hand, suggests that M akhmalbafs Once Upon a Time, 
Cinema (1992)— a filmic genealogy of Iranian filmmaking— reflects a ‘good-
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humoured self-assurance that Iran will be able to incorporate new technologies 
without losing cultural focus’ (Fischer, 2001: 480). In Fischer’s view, even though 
Iranian cinema hires the genre formats and cinematic borrowings and conventions, 
its discourse is still one that constitutes an ‘evolving moral discourse parallel to the 
older poetic, quranic, epic, literary or theatrical one’ (Fischer, 2001: 460)
In fact, in sounding his views on understanding Islam through a different form such
as film, Fischer states:
Film is among the most revelatory—critiquing, contesting, negotiating the religious 
and ethical ideals of Islam and the Islamic revolution arguably more effectively than 
the philosophers or religious scholars to whom most in the West often turn for 
pronouncements on what Islam is or means for Muslim populations (Fischer, 2001: 
485)
Fischer himself had gone to the religious scholars during his fieldwork as an 
anthropologist in Iran in 1975, in order to understand and study Shi‘a Islam. Then, 
he had emphasised appreciation of the internal ‘symbolic structure’ as one of the key 
elements required in understanding a cultural form (1980: 8). Two decades later, he 
proposes film instead as central to understanding what Islam is or means to the 
Muslims, a point that is further elaborated in my study of the films in the following 
chapters.
Turning back to Iranian articulations, Maddadpur and Dabashi have employed the 
technological framework of Heidegger to discuss the treatment of religion and 
spirituality in cinema. Both have dismissed the efforts of most filmmakers who have 
attempted to deal with religion and spirituality through film, leaving little room for 
films that qualify as engaging with religion and spirituality. However, putting
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Heideggerian thought in the service o f discussions on religion and spirituality in film 
still continues. In the first series of Farabi’s publications on Spiritual Cinema in 
2005, the only Iranian work was Mir-Ehsan’s Padidar va m a‘na dar sinama-ye Iran 
(Phenomenon and Meaning in Iranian Cinema).14 Interestingly, Mir-Ehsan also sets 
out to discuss film and spirituality within a Heideggerian framework of modernity 
and the technological imagination that dominates the modem world. An academic, 
literary critic and documentary filmmaker based in Iran, Mir-Ehsan is also familiar 
with Fardid’s ideas— as evident in his writings about him— and it is, therefore, not 
surprising that he, too, employs Heideggerian ideas in his analysis and definition of 
Spiritual Cinema.
Mir-Ehsan employs Heidegger’s philosophy to demonstrate the possibility of 
overcoming the limits of technology within cinema. He argues that cinema is the 
most essential mirror of modem technology and best demonstrates Heidegger’s 
technological horizon (Mir-Ehsan, 2005: 23). Heidegger, he suggests, overcomes the 
separation of the physical and metaphysical worlds proposed throughout the history 
of Western philosophy. The idea of the disunion of these two worlds is rooted in 
Greek philosophy. However, when cinema as a technological art turns to a poetic 
understanding, it overcomes this disjunction. Thus, even though the image might 
appear harrowing and a serious impediment at first, in fact, it can call us from the 
essence. If we relinquish the Greek understanding of metaphysics, we are able to 
demonstrate how the essence exists within the language of image, which in turn can 
lead us to contemplation (Mir-Ehsan, 2005: 30-31).
14 All quotations from Mir-Ehsan are my own translations from the Persian.
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The poetic approach is thus contrasted with the scientific approach. The scientific 
approach, Mir-Ehsan argues, begins with itself and ends within itself without 
extending beyond the senses. The Heideggerian method of the poetic approach will 
liberate cinema from the cul-de-sac created by the scientific approach. By employing 
the Heideggerian approach we can have a cinema that asks contemplative and 
fundamental questions about existence. Cinema as a technological art can therefore 
have a non-technological essence and remain faithful to the origins of the artwork 
(Mir-Ehsan, 2005: 31-32). Through cinema, art can overcome technology and 
therefore lead us on a spiritual journey (Mir-Ehsan, 2005: 32). It is not just any 
filmmaker, however, who attains this. Rather, it is only an artist who has experienced 
the Hidden with all his soul and follows the Sacred Command, who can establish the 
compound semiotics through the images. These images can then represent that desire 
of being called by the Hidden and asking questions from the Hidden (Mir-Ehsan, 
2005: 33). Mir-Ehsan proceeds to clarify his position regarding cinema, modernity 
and spirituality in his later works, which I will discuss shortly. Here, however, it 
sufficed to examine only his Heideggerian approach to the question of religion and 
spirituality in film.
It is clear that all of the initial attempts of Iranian film critics and scholars to 
understand cinema as a vehicle for discussing religion and spirituality have relied 
heavily on Heidegger. More importantly, Heidegger’s philosophy is employed in 
contradictory approaches, to refute (Maddadpur) as well as support (Dabashi, Mir- 
Ehsan) the notion that cinema is able to seriously engage with religion, spirituality, 
the metaphysical world or the Sacred. However, in all these cases, they unanimously 
employ Heidegger’s theory of the ‘aletheia: unconcealment, unhiddeness,
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disclosedness’ to allow for the possibility of cinema’s treatment of religion and 
spirituality. Where they remain divided is on the process by which cinema is able to 
achieve this ‘aletheia’ and those films or filmmakers who have succeeded in 
achieving it through their films.
However, limiting the study of religion and spirituality in film to the Heideggerian 
approach can be very narrow and is insufficient. Recently, the Farabi Cinema 
Foundation has attempted to articulate definitions and characteristics o f spiritual and 
religious films through other approaches, which I will discuss next.
Cinema as a Domain for Religious and Spiritual Discourse15
In 2005, The Farabi Foundation set up the Spiritual Cinema Centre and included 
‘Spiritual Cinema’ as a category in the Fajr International Film Festival. This was a 
clear seal of approval on cinema’s ability to deal with religion and spirituality. The 
inclusion o f this new category was also followed by an wave of discussions of the 
subject in the press, which debated, welcomed or rejected this new approach to 
films. The Spiritual Cinema Centre also published and translated many books on the 
topic in order to clarify and justify the relevance of this newly-introduced category, 
and by its second year it appeared to have a clearer idea of its aims and purposes. 
Thus, the arguments were no longer as much about cinema’s ability to engage with 
religion and spirituality, rather they focused on what constitutes a religious and, 
particularly, ‘spiritual cinema’.
15 Unless otherwise stated, all of the sources referred to in this section are my own 
translations from Persian.
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The official definition
Rezadad’s attempts to define Spiritual Cinema in the first issue of the 2005 
Jashnvareh daily newsletter did not end disputes among the critics. They continued 
to debate the appropriateness of the term sinama-ye ma ‘nagara, and pointed to its 
ambiguity. The publications of Farabi’s Spiritual Cinema Centre were in turn an 
attempt to clarify the ambiguities. More importantly, these works forced Farabi to 
articulate, not only to the critics but also to themselves, a clearer definition of 
Spiritual Cinema and its characteristics. This was achieved mainly through Iranian 
works, some o f which will be discussed below, rather than Western sources in 
translation. Although translated works provided an interesting introduction to the 
field, they focused largely on Western films, with references to Christianity and 
Judaism. More importantly, of course, these works did not originate in a response to 
the creation of a category within a national film industry. Instead, they explored the 
religious or spiritual in films with a broader approach. The Iranian case was 
different.
Before Farabi could begin to explore the religious and spiritual in films, it had to 
define what it meant by sinama~ye ma'nagara. Clearly, this task could not be 
achieved by relying solely on external sources. Indeed, there was an indisputable 
need for an Iranian articulation that drew upon the complex social, cultural and 
religious system of the country.
The official Farabi Cinema Foundation website defines Spiritual Cinema as one that:
considers the current realities of mankind life in reference to its esotericism. This
means that this cinema tries to find its path from ‘image to meaning’, ‘exterior to
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interior’, ‘substance to spirit’ and ‘presence to absence’. And as the meaning of 
existence tends to go towards completion, the Spiritual Cinema pays attention to the 
mysterious reality of existence through tending towards completion. Thus we can say 
the nature and essence of the stable values of mankind, accepted by worldwide 
civilizations, is the main subject of Spiritual Cinema...the satanic aspects and 
obstacles of human exaltation are reviewed in this cinema as well. ... Paying attention 
to the enigmas and mysteries of existence and mankind life in the Spiritual Cinema 
does not necessarily lead to solving the mysteries because the mysteries of existence 
cannot be solved easily and thus indicating and pointing out the current mysteries of 
mankind life and the daily realities of the world are actually attending to the inner and 
spiritual meaning of the world, (http://www.fcf.ir/english/cultural_maanagara.htm, 
visited 5 July 2006). □ □
This short introduction, followed by a list of the aims and activities of the Spiritual 
Cinema Centre, is a recent addition to the Farabi Cinema Foundation’s website. 
Farabi’s publications, however, provide a more varied and detailed analysis of the 
topic. Numerous authors approach ma ‘nagara cinema from different angles, often 
offering opposing views and definitions . In this part, I will present these recent 
articulations of the authorities in regard to ma ‘nagara cinema and what they list as 
its aims and scope. These discussions include the views of Abdullah Esfandiyari, 
head of the Spiritual Cinema Centre at the Farabi Cinema Foundation; Hasan 
Bolkhari16, cultural consultant to the minister of education who also headed the jury 
of the ma ‘nagara cinema entries at the 10th international short film festival; as well
16Bolkhari teaches philosophy of art at al-Zahra and Tabataba’i Universities in Tehran and 
has held various posts including cultural consultant to the Minister of Education and Council 
Member of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. His analysis of the children’s cartoon 
series ‘Tom and Jerry’ made news nationally and abroad. He stated that the cartoon was a 
project to change Europe’s views of mice and subsequently of Jews from being dirty and sly 
to cute and clever creatures. With his craftiness and cunning abilities, Jerry the mouse causes 
much pain and misery for Tom. However, despite all the suffering and pain inflicted on 
Tom, the viewer does not hate Jerry for his acts. Instead, the film depicts Jerry as a clever 
and adorable character. It is in the same vein, Bolkhari asserts, that the cunning and worldly 
Jews are not to be hated for the havoc they play on Palestine.
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as the more recent writings of the film and literary critic, Mir Ahmad Mir-Ehsan 
whose first work on this topic was discussed earlier.
The authorities could not but address those critics who criticised ma ‘nagara as an 
inappropriate term immediately after the announcement o f the new category. 
lMa ‘na’ in Persian means ‘meaning’ and, therefore, the term ma ‘nagara implied that 
films outside this category were meaningless. Therefore, there was an immediate 
need to justify the choice of the term. In his attempt to do so, Bolkhari compares 
ma ‘nagara films and other meaningful films. He states that there are some films that 
have meaning but there are yet others which are seekers and therefore possessors of 
meaning. It is this second group of films that are ma ‘nagara (2006: 4). Esfandiyari, 
head of the Spiritual Cinema Centre at the Farabi Cinema Foundation, states that it 
was Mohammad Mehdi Heydariyan, the Deputy Minister o f Culture and Islamic 
Guidance, who first suggested the notion of m a‘nagara cinema. Esfandiyari then 
explains the problems of finding a suitable term for this cinema and their concern 
that inappropriate and limiting terms such as ‘religious’ (sinama~ye dini), ‘mystical’ 
(sinama-ye ‘irfani), or ‘intellectual’ {sinama-ye andishe) would be (and, indeed, still 
are) attributed to these films (2006: 35). ‘RowhanV, another term for ‘spiritual’, 
which is also an honorific reference to the clergy, was another alternative. 
Esfandiyari admits that this was the closest term to the notion they had in mind, 
since it encompassed films that were about both this world and the other, body and 
soul, form and meaning as well as transcendence and harmony with religion and 
religious aims. However, it was not felt to be comprehensive enough and might have 
excluded parts of transcendental or intellectual cinema (Esfandiyari, 2006: 37).
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Even though all of Farabi’s English literature referred to ‘Spiritual Cinema’ as the 
equivalent for m a ‘nagara cinema, it was not regarded as the best rendition. 
According to Esfandiyari although ‘spiritual’ is the closest translation o f m a ‘nagara, 
m a ‘nagara is more than just spiritual (Esfandiyari, 2006: 51). However, as evident 
from the discussions below, this objection is based on a very narrow definition o f the 
English word ‘spiritual’. Bolkhari (2006: 1) states that ‘spiritual’ refers only to 
‘ghosts’ and ‘the afterworld’, and is only used when the human soul leaves the body. 
It is, therefore, a term that refers to the time of death. However, in ‘Iranian-Islamic 
thought’, the term ‘m a'na’ has a far deeper and wider meaning than soul, ghost or 
death. In this worldview, ‘m a'na’ is not the equivalent of death, but rather its 
opposite -  for ‘m a'na’ is life itself, and the truth that human beings seek in their 
struggle for perfection during their lifetime. In this sense, the English translation 
‘Spiritual Cinema’ reduces ma'na to death and is, therefore, inappropriate. Ma'na, 
however, Bolkhari continues, is one o f the key concepts of our Islamic, Eastern and 
humanistic wisdom. Bolkhari then locates the term within the thought of Iranian 
philosophers. In the philosophy of the 12th-century Sohravardi, founder o f the 
School of Illumination— one of the most important schools in Islamic philosophy—  
ma'na is a degree of light. According to Mulla Sadra, the 17th century philosopher, 
ma'na is one o f the degrees of existence. In the works of the 13th century 
philosopher and poet, Rumi, ma ‘na is the opposite of form and image. Bolkhari then 
concludes that ma ‘na is a profound term and ma 'nagara cinema is one that invites 
its viewer to think (Bolkhari, 2006: 1-3). In fact, in his narrow approach to the term 
‘spiritual’, Bolkhari’s translation of the term ma‘na in all its senses is highly 
appropriate; nonetheless he appears to confuse it with the very specific popular 
concept of ‘spiritualism’.
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Bolkhari also argues that m a‘nagara cinema is a production not solely of the 
filmmaker but also of the audience. He states that it is the auteur filmmakers and the 
ma 7?tf-seeking audiences who make m a ‘nagara cinema. M a ‘nagara cinema is, 
therefore, not a movement that can be produced or given a specific direction; rather, 
it is a cinema that only cinema itself creates, not the people in the industry nor the 
authorities of a state (Bolkhari, 2006: 6-7). According to Esfandiyari, m a‘nagara 
cinema deals with the reality of the world and man, whilst referring to their esoteric 
aspects. M a ‘nagara cinema seeks the secrets that exist behind these realities. It 
deals with the mysteries of the world without necessarily trying to resolve them, 
instead referring to these enigmas and the signs surrounding them. It, therefore, 
strives to advance from the attributes of a phenomenon to its essence, from form to 
meaning, from exoteric to esoteric, from outer to inner, from material to essence, 
from body to soul and from obvious to hidden. Consequently, ma ‘nagara cinema 
does not dissociate any of these binary sides of the real world from each other 
(Esfandiyari, 2006: 37-38).
The official definition broadens the domain o f ma ‘nagara cinema to include popular 
films. Bolkhari refers to Pinocchio (Roberto Benigni, 2002) as an example of a 
ma ‘nagara film that demonstrates how seeking a life of pure pleasure leads to the 
life of an absolute ignoramus or donkey. The film, in fact, invites us to reflect upon 
the real meaning of life (Bolkhari, 2006: 4-5). Esfandiyari states that ma'nagara 
cinema is not a ‘genre’ or ‘type’ o f cinema, but a contextual phenomenon that can 
occur in any kind of cinema (Esfandiyari, 2006: 40). He lists 12 topics that provide 
the context for ma ‘nagara cinema, without entering into an analysis of how they
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constitute ma ‘nagara cinema. It remains unclear, therefore, whether the inclusion of 
any one of these topics would be necessary and sufficient to interpret a film as 
m a ‘nagara. In some instances he briefly compares the filmic references to Qur’anic 
verses and hadith. These parallels may be compared to the theological approach 
discussed in Chapter 1. Here are the topics he lists, with examples:
1) Soul, such as Ghost (Zucker, 1990), Flatliners (Schumacher 1990)
2) Hereafter, such as What Dreams May Come (Ward, 1998)
3) Mind and Eyes, such as The Sixth Sense (Shyamalan, 1999), A Beautiful 
Mind (Howard, 2001)
4) Unusual human power, such as Carrie (Carson, 2002)
5) Healing powers, such as Indigo (Simon, 2003)
6) Discovery and grace (those with the powers o f knowing and seeing), such as 
Final Destination (Wong, 2000)
7) Dreams and Nightmares, such as Leily is with Me (Tabrizi, 1996).
8) Miracles and Divine grace, such as O Brother, Where Art Thou? (Coen,
2000), The Ten Commandments (DeMille, 1956), Ben-Hur (Wyler, 1959) and 
The Passion o f  the Christ (Gibson, 2004).
9) Satan and Angels, such as Der Himmel uber Berlin, or Wings o f Desire 
(Wenders, 1987)
10) Jin (Devil), such as The Exorcist (Friedkin, 1973).
11) Lyrical and Intuition, such as films by Tarkovsky and Kiarostami.
12) Relationship with the dead, such as Dragonfly (Shadyac, 2002) and White 
Noise (Sax, 2006).
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Similarly, Mir-Ehsan asserts that ma'nagara cinema can be found in both 
intellectual art films and popular films. More interestingly, he explores spirituality in 
the often-condemned filmfarsi genre o f pre-Revolutionary Iranian cinema. The 
populist filmfarsi, despite erotic scenes and song and dance sequences, did  support 
the traditional and ethical values o f faithfulness, integrity and belief in halal and 
haram (the permissible and forbidden), all of which are rooted in religion (Mir- 
Ehsan, 2006: 11). As discussed earlier, Maddadpur condemned early Iranian 
filmmakers, including Oganians, as pioneers of the Westernisation and 
modernisation project in Iran. Mir-Ehsan, however, hails Oganians’ Haji Aqa, the 
Cinema Actor (Haji Aqa, actor-e sinama, 1932) as the best and most intelligent film 
on the opposition of tradition and modernity. He reads the film within the framework 
of the Heideggerian approach to modernity and spirituality, arguing that it 
demonstrates the coexistence o f the two. Modernity has continuously defended its 
spiritual values and meanings, even as they differ from the traditional world. Haji 
Aqa , he argues, displays the new spirituality in modernity and shows that not 
everything which is new is unethical (Mir-Ehsan, 2006: 10-12). Mir-Ehsan’s 
approach and his inclusion of the ethical and traditional values in reading religion 
and spirituality in films may also be compared to the theological approach discussed 
in Chapter 1.
The film critic’s approach
There were various responses to the ma ‘nagara category amongst film critics. Some 
endorsed the Farabi approach, others were not so convinced. I will first outline the 
discussions of those who looked upon the ma'nagara category favourably before
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examining the views o f those who are still sceptical. Like Bolkhari, mentioned 
above, Abulfazl Horri and Chista Yathribi both emphasise the role of the audience in 
m a‘nagara films. This may be compared to Lyden’s approach o f ‘film as religion’. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Lyden, too, emphasises the role of the form and its 
reception rather than the content o f the film as an important factor in the religious 
function of film. Horri, a Quranic researcher and film critic, states that it is the 
audience who read a film as spiritual or religious (2006: 57). The viewer’s 
engagement with ma'nagara film can become a religious experience. Indeed, the 
film can act as a medium between the audience and the sacred. If  this is achieved, it 
is as though the viewer has participated in a religious ritual (Horri, 2006: 58). 
Similarly, Yathribi, a film critic, editor and university lecturer, argues that 
m a‘nagara films are dependent on the viewers; how they read a m a ‘nagara film 
depends on how their consciousness encounters it (Yathribi, 2006: 79). She also 
asserts that, like worship, the experience of watching a ma'nagara film should 
recreate the experience of inner wisdom and faith. Muslims believe that it is 
important to picture the infinite and immortal essence of God in a mortal framework. 
Thus, the outward form o f the sacred is represented in ritual ceremonies, images and 
buildings. The inner form, however, is esoteric, and lives in every creature and 
should never be illustrated. Eastern religious cinema does not illustrate the essence 
of the Sacred, the prophets or the imams. Instead, it provides us with an illustration 
to imagine their glory in different affairs (Yathribi, 2006: 71). However, Yathribi 
fails to elaborate what exactly constitutes ‘the outer form’, ‘the inner form’, ‘the 
essence of the Sacred’ and ‘imagining the glory’ in cinema.
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The distinction between the spiritual (ma'nagara) and religious films remains 
uncertain. Whilst the authorities were adamant that ma'nagara films were not 
religious films,17 some critics seem to have conflated the two into one category. 
Yathribi begins her discussion by using the terms ma'nagara and dini (religious) 
interchangeably, but finally settles on dini. She contrasts what she calls Eastern and 
Western religious films, and lists a series of differences between them. Western 
religious cinema, such as the works of Ingmar Bergman, attempt to find answers to 
man’s despair and search for meaning. Eastern religious cinema, on the other hand, 
is not about man’s quest for hope or faith, because he already possesses it. Rather, 
this cinema expresses his understanding of the world and his worshipful attitude. 
Western religious cinema, like the Existentialist philosophers, states Yathribi, 
expresses fear and anxiety. It approaches contemporary human circumstances with 
an apocalyptic gaze. The films are, therefore, a search for a glimmer of love, faith 
and the salvation of the soul. Eastern religious films, however, look at the world with 
love and without any Existentialist anxiety. Western religious films have a specific 
time and space whereas their Eastern counterparts do not belong to any real time or 
space and are, in fact, beyond both. Western filmmakers, Yathribi continues, use 
everything in their films for practical reasons alone and not for aesthetics. Eastern 
filmmakers, such as Iranian filmmakers, Kobayashi (Japan), Satyajit Ray, Vijaya 
Mehta, Shaji N. Karun (India), Parajanov and Tarkovsky (Russia) turn every 
ordinary and living thing into religious signs and creations. In addition, Yathribi 
states, Western religious cinema separates art from life, thus the films have a direct 
missionary approach and are propagandist, such as The Ten Commandments
17 See Esfandiyari’s concern that ma'nagara films would be referred to as ‘religious’ 
films (2006: 35) discussed above.
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(DeMille, 1956) and Moses the Lawgiver (de Bosio, 1974). Eastern religious cinema, 
by contrast, depicts the life and customs of ordinary people and their rituals. Yathribi 
states that this cinema does not necessarily have apparent religious symbols, figures 
or epics, but nonetheless, without referring to religious issues, reflects the primacy of 
the spiritual world over the material world. Thus, in the works of Tarkovsky and 
Bergman, there is a fresh approach to the depiction of faith, salvation and 
forgiveness. The subject of Western religious cinema, she continues, is man’s 
relationship with God and his creation from beginning to eternity. The subject of 
Eastern religious cinema, on the other hand, is people’s relationships with each other 
in a world that is constantly observed by God (Yathribi, 2006: 67-71).
Yathribi’s list of comparisons, however, does not provide a better understanding of 
m a‘nagara cinema or, in fact, the differences between Eastern and Western religious 
films. Her arguments are instead sweeping generalisations about each of these 
categories, and her selection of examples of films or filmmakers is often 
inconsistent. Ingmar Bergman, for instance, is initially categorised as a Western 
filmmaker, only to move into the Eastern category a little later, where he fits better 
within the framework of that particular discussion. Moreover, she draws a narrow 
boundary around Western religious films, confining them to the depiction of 
explicitly religious themes, such as religious figures or events (Yathribi, 2006: 69). 
The boundaries for the Eastern category, however, are wider and more fluid and 
include all films that ‘reflect the primacy of the spiritual world over the material 
world’. Moreover, drawing a crude distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ 
religious films does not achieve the complex task of deciding whether a cinema is 
‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’. Rather, the determining factors of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’
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cinema remain unclear in Yathribi’s arguments. Is it the nationality o f the filmmaker, 
the setting of the film, or the philosophy and worldview that the film endorses, 
which classify a film as ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’? For instance, Tarkovsky’s films are 
consistently used as examples of ‘Eastern’ religious films. However, most o f his 
notable works not only were made and set in Europe and in European languages, but 
also bore significant Christian themes and metaphors. Therefore, one can argue that 
there are far more ‘Western’ elements than ‘Eastern’ in his films.
Defining a certain category of films by dividing world cinema into two loose 
geographical zones is clearly o f no avail. Putting films from India, Japan, Russia and 
Iran into one homogeneous group, and films from the ‘West’ into an opposite group, 
does little to tell us about their different approaches to the treatment of religion. Yet 
another problem with Yathribi’s groupings is that her examples of Western religious 
cinema are confined to Hollywood films, overlooking cinema in Europe and 
America (e.g. the works of Lars von Trier and Robert Bresson). Moreover, even 
though she refers to Hollywood religious films as propagandist, she fails to 
acknowledge the many ‘Eastern’ films that follow the same Hollywood conventions, 
and are by the same token then also ‘propagandist’.
Another approach in analysing films as ma'nagara is to contextualise them within 
the sacred texts of the Qur’an and hadith. The film director, scriptwriter and critic, 
Farokh Ansari-Basir, for example, states that m a'nagara’i (ma'nagara-ism) is 
recognising the symbols o f the hidden world’s effect on the material world (2006: 
86). He argues that the following Quranic verse will help us understand the roots of 
this kind of understanding:
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Behold! In the creation of the heavens and the earth; in the alternation of the night and 
the day; in the sailing of the ships through the ocean for the profit of mankind; in the 
rain which Allah sends down from the skies, and the life which He gives therewith to 
an earth that is dead; in the beasts of all kinds that He scatters through the earth; in the 
change of the winds, and the clouds which they trail like their slaves between the sky 
and the earth—(Here) indeed are Signs for a people that are wise 0(2: 164).
Thus, according to Ansari-Basir, filmmakers who know their Qur’an attempt to base 
the semiotics of their films on the Qur’anic interpretation of the world, for example 
Tabrizi’s One Piece o f  Bread {Yek tekkeh nan, 2005). The world of this film is a 
world with God’s direct involvement. Ansari-Basir says that even though there are 
weaknesses in the selection of some of the symbols in One Piece o f  Bread, the 
overall result is impressive, for the film succeeds in depicting God’s constant 
presence in the world and His miracles (2006: 87-88). However, he does not limit 
the Qur’anic context to Iranian films. In his analysis of Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (1968) and Alejandro Amenabar’s Others (2001), he locates these 
Western films within the framework of the Qur’anic worldview. The life cycle of the 
astronaut in 2001: A Space Odyssey does not end with old age and death. Rather, it 
continues after death into a foetus-like being. He then compares this continuation of 
life, albeit this time from a far more advanced terminus a quo, to Qur’an 84: 19, 
which states: ‘Ye shall surely travel from stage to stage’ (Ansari-Basir, 2006: 93-98).
Unlike Yathribi, Ansari-Basir does not divide the films into Western or Eastern. 
Rather, he looks at themes in film that can be paralleled with the sacred Islamic 
texts, and thereby enables the categorisation of these films as m a ‘nagara. This is 
similar to the theological approach discussed earlier in the Western discourses to 
religion and spiritiuality in film. The problem with this approach, however, is that it
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is almost impossible not to force a certain interpretation onto films that are highly 
unlikely to have been inspired by the Islamic texts. Ansari-Basir is aware of this and 
tries to justify his approach: ‘I am not saying that these films are indebted to the 
Holy Books such as the Qur’an. Instead, I want to emphasise that if  a film is truly 
ma ‘nagara, it can be compared to the teachings o f the Sacred Books. These Sacred 
sources should be the yardstick to distinguish between real ma ‘nagara metaphors 
and those that feign spiritual meanings in the film’ (Ansari-Basir, 2006: 99).
Opponents o f  (ma *nagara ’
Not all critics, however, endorsed the Farabi definitions o f ma ‘nagara cinema and
many remained unconvinced by Farabi’s reasoning. In an interview with Mehr News
(18 February 2006), Javad Shamghadri, art advisor to the President, stated that 80
percent of all the Iranians films that participated in the 24th FIFF did not conform to
the political ideas of President Ahmadi-Nejad’s government. The fact that a
significant number of them depicted the breakdown of family life and ethical values
was, in his view, a conspiracy by outside (i.e. Western) forces, to destroy the local
culture from within. Shamghadri refers to some participating Iranian films as vulgar
depictions, without specifying exactly what he means by this. In the same interview,
he objects to ma ‘nagara cinema, stating:
I am opposed to the title of m a‘nagara proposed by the Farabi Cinema Foundation. 
Had Iranian cinema ever worked outside the realm of meaning that it intends to do so 
now? Had [post-Revolution] Iranian cinema ever gone towards vulgarity? Have we 
ever produced films that had anything but spiritual outlook and values? Overall, I feel 
that this grouping is not appropriate. Our Revolution was ma ‘nagara and our art and 
cultural products have also been in line with these values (Shamghadri, 2006)
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He then goes on to argue that since Iran already had religious cinema, there was no 
need to replace it with m a ‘nagara cinema. When one hears the word ‘religious 
cinema’, he says, the audience undoubtedly expects films with divine and spiritual 
concepts. However, the introduction of the new category of ma ‘nagara has paved 
the way for various philosophies, ideas and even inappropriate concepts to easily be 
imported in the name of cinema. This is, in fact, extremely dangerous (Shamghadri, 
2006).
Nasir Bakideh, the director of the Iranian Young Cinema Society, is another critic of 
the category of ma ‘nagara Cinema. Like most others, he begins by criticising the 
term lm a‘nagara’ itself. He states that every cinematic work has a specific meaning 
and value and that these are indivisible. It is wrong to assume that ma ‘nagara films 
are religious films. For Bakideh, all Iranian films have a particular approach to the 
rich Iranian and Islamic culture and with this approach it is possible to create 
meaningful works. Thus, ma ‘nagara cinema as a separate entity does not really exist 
(Bakideh, 2006).
The creation and general acceptance of the new category proved far more 
complicated than the Farabi Foundation had initially anticipated. The need to 
articulate a definition of m a ‘nagara cinema opened up interesting debates and 
resulted in a gamut of theories that included vague classifications, contradictory 
views and debatable comparisons. Some laid emphasis on the filmmaker, others on 
the audience and yet others on the medium of film itself. The opponents of the 
m a ‘nagara category do not fare any better in their argumentations. Their
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articulations, too, are weak and at times contradictory. Nevertheless, there was a 
consensus, among opponents as well as proponents of the ma ‘nagara category, that 
cinema was a proper domain for religious and spiritual discourse.
Conclusions
Cinema’s eventful history in Iran provides a colourful picture. It has always 
remained entwined with both the religious authorities and the state (whether in its 
secular or its religious manifestation). Reza Shah used it as a tool in his modernising 
project. The clergy and traditionalists, on the other hand, strongly opposed it in the 
beginning, but ultimately, with Khomeini’s blessing, it became regarded as an ideal 
educational tool for society. The Islamic Republic, which merged religious and 
political powers, was no longer concerned whether cinema was acceptable or 
relevant to Muslim Iranian society. Indeed, M oraw eji’s treatise on Islamic 
jurisprudence and cinema was no more than an exercise in aligning the traditional 
theoretical positions with state laws and contemporary social practices. The question 
instead was cinema’s ability to seriously engage with religion and spirituality. A few 
such as Maddadpur still lingered on what they saw as a contradiction between a 
Western medium and Islamic religious values. The compatibility of these two, 
however, was no longer an issue for most. Iranians had embraced the modem 
Western medium and succeeded in making it their own.
The launch of the ma'nagara category in the 2005 Fajr International Film Festival 
and the formal endorsement of ‘spiritual’ films resulted in heated debates. The 
various attempts at defining ma'nagara cinema by the Farabi Foundation,
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academics, journalists, filmmakers and others have widened its scope of 
interpretation. However, from reviewing these views, it also becomes clear that there 
is no one comprehensive definition. As in the Western exploration of religion in 
cinema discussed in Chapter 1, no one approach can do justice to the numerous 
possibilities for studying religion or spirituality in film. What is significant is the 
recognition of cinema’s legitimate participation in discourses on religion and 
spirituality, and more importantly its ability to articulate its own religious or spiritual 
discourse. This has opened up a new avenue that employs a completely modem 
medium to express religious and spiritual ideas, to retell in a new dimension the 
truths o f the fifteen-centuries-old religion and the numerous facets of its expressions 
and experiences.
Prescriptive approaches and checklists of items that would constitute religious or 
spiritual films are far more limiting than illuminating. Thus, having pointed to the 
dilemmas facing those who have tried to articulate ‘religious’ and/or ‘spiritual’ 
films, I do not attempt to resolve them. Instead, in the following chapters I intend to 
explore the various ways in which the Iranian Shi‘i discourse -  in its various 
mystical, theological and ritual forms -  emerges on the silver screen. These filmic 
discourses are, therefore, a new entry to the rich corpus of Shi‘i expressions such as 
literature, poetry, art and architecture.
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Chapter 5: Filmic Discourses on the Role of the Clergy in Iran
In some Muslim traditions, a man who has divorced his wife three times can only 
remarry her after she has married and divorced another man. And only after this 
second marriage is consummated can the second husband divorce her so that it is 
permissible for her to remarry her original husband. This second husband is referred 
to as muhallil, literally meaning “‘someone who makes a thing legal, legaliser, 
legitimator”, the figure who, in classical Islamic law acts as something like a dummy 
or a “man of straw”, in order to authenticate or make permissible some legal process 
otherwise of doubtful legality or in fact prohibited’ (Bosworth, 2008). The title of the 
fimfarsi comedy, Muhallil (Nosratollah Karimi, 1971), is a telling reference to the 
story of the film, which surrounds the ‘triple divorce’ of a wife whose husband, Haj 
Agha, wants to remarry her.
Haj Agha is a jealous husband who holds very strict views on women’s modesty and 
chastity. When he mistakenly assumes that his wife is having an affair, in his rage he 
consents to the mullah’s suggestion o f a triple divorce. However, after all is revealed 
he regrets his hurried decision and becomes desperate to remarry his now ex-wife. 
To his utter dismay he finds out the full consequences of a triple divorce and the 
attendant need of a muhallil if  he wants his wife back. The husband’s efforts at 
finding a muhallil whom he can trust, and his obsession with watching over his wife 
when she is finally married to this muhallil, make for some comical scenes in the 
film.
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The film contrasts the Shah’s modernised legal system with the traditional one. In 
the former, the husband is not legally allowed to divorce his wife without first 
referring to the secular courts, and triple divorce is in any case forbidden by the law. 
Nonetheless the cleric, representing the Sharia law, pronounces the divorce decree. 
Consequently, even though the divorce has not been formally registered and Haj 
Agha is still legally married to his wife, the obligations of Sharia do not allow him to 
continue their marital relationship, and husband and wife become forbidden to each 
other. The film depicts the cleric, with his comic appearance and accent, as 
shortsighted and stubborn. He stresses that the ‘the law of God is justice itself. 
However, he is at the core of the problems that arise in the film, as he insists on a 
blind following of what he refers to as the Prophet’s tradition, even as it ruins the 
lives of a happy family. As well as criticising some traditional attitudes such as 
patriarchy and the ideals o f masculinity, the film is a satire on the clergy.
In fact, there have been very few satires on the clergy in the history o f Iranian 
cinema. In post-Revolutionary Iran, until recently there were only deferential 
references to the clergy in cinema. Other than leading ritual acts such as prayers, 
marriages, deaths and sermons, these men of God were removed from the quotidian 
concerns o f ordinary people, and remained largely peripheral to the main characters 
of the films. This is unsurprising, considering the sensitivity of the topic and the 
strict codes set down by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which bans 
all films and videos that ‘blaspheme against the values and personalities held sacred 
by Islam and other religions mentioned in the Constitution’ (Naficy, 2002b: 36).
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However, the new millennium saw a resurgence o f films with clergy as their 
protagonists. These included Mirkarimi’s Under the Moonlight (Zir-e nur-e mah,
2001) and Tabrizi’s The Lizard  (2004), both o f which opened to general release in 
Iran. Reza Mirkarimi, a graduate o f graphics from Tehran University, was bom in 
1966. His initial experiences of filmmaking were in short films and television series. 
Under the Moonlight was his second feature film, after his debut The Boy and the 
Soldier (2000). Most of his films carry a religious theme; his latest work, So Close, 
So Far (2005), an entry in the ‘Spiritual Cinema’ category of the 23rd Fajr 
International Film Festival, won the Best Film award of the festival.
Kamal Tabrizi was bom in 1959 and graduated from the Art University in Tehran. 
After a series o f short films and working with the cultural sections o f the Islamic 
Republic o f Iran Broadcast Television, he made his first feature film, The Passage 
( 'Obur), in 1989. Amongst his other works, before the making o f The Lizard, the 
comedy Leyli is with Me (Leyli ba man ast, 1995) was a notable success. A satire on 
the Iran-Iraq war, Leyli is with Me employs the same lead actor as The Lizard, Parviz 
Parastooyi; he plays a television cameraman who, despite desperate efforts to stay 
well away from the war zone, finds himself in the frontline and then is inadvertently 
taken for a hero. Many of Tabrizi’s films deal with religious themes, a reflection of 
his own religious background. His latest film, One Piece o f  Bread (Yek tekkeh nan, 
2005), is a distinct departure from The Lizard, with references to the metaphysical 
world. The screenwriter of this film, Mohammad-Reza Gohari, is the co-screenwriter 
of Mirkarimi’s So Close, So far. One Piece o f Bread was also entered into the 
‘Spiritual Cinema’ category of the 23rd FIFF, but it was not received well. Some 
reviewers criticised it as a ‘letter of repentance’, a film made to appease those he had
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upset with his earlier film The Lizard (Talebi-Nejad, 2006). During the 2005 
presidential elections, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who ultimately lost to Mahmoud 
Ahmadi-Nejad, employed Tabrizi as his campaign manager. Some Iranians, 
therefore, sarcastically referred to the campaign film he made for Rafsanjani as 
M arm ulakll [The LizardII].
Each of these films, Under the Moonlight and The Lizard, articulates a discourse that 
differs from previous representations of the clergy. They not only propose a different 
engagement of the clergy with the public, but also critically examine the lofty 
positions they enjoy in society, which in turn serves only to further emphasise their 
hierarchical relationship with the laity.
This chapter examines Under the Moonlight and The Lizard, and draws parallels 
with recent discourses on the Iranian clergy. I argue that these filmic narratives 
provide a space for the articulation of debates on the role of the clergy within 
society, including some of the more contentious issues that have otherwise been 
difficult to discuss publicly inside Iran. I demonstrate how these filmmakers have 
creatively employed the medium of film to actively engage in some o f these debates. 
This chapter, therefore, argues that the films do not merely reflect these debates, but 
are themselves part of them and of a larger discourse within Iranian society. Whilst 
the published discourses of intellectuals such as Soroush are accredited texts that are 
recognised both within and outside o f Iran, these parallel filmic discourses have not 
yet received such recognition.
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This oversight does injustice to the potential o f a medium that can be more effective 
than its written or oral equivalents, particularly in the context of Iran. First, the 
metaphorical language of film provides a space for discourses that might otherwise 
face harsh censorship. Even when films are banned, the filmmakers are not punished 
with the severity reserved for authors or lecturers propagating similar ideas through 
their own media. Moreover, a ban on an Iranian film usually turns it into a highly 
popular commodity, with considerable demand for pirated copies. Indeed, 
filmmakers are sometimes accused of deliberately stirring up contentious debates 
around their films in order to ensure high sales upon final release. Secondly, the 
accessibility of the medium has enabled these films to engage very effectively with a 
wider audience, even if  the level of engagement varies according to the background 
of each individual.
I begin with a brief review o f debates that have questioned the legitimacy o f the 
clergy’s power over the laity. I will then critically examine the current role of the 
clergy through Under the Moonlight and The Lizard  and locate these filmic 
discourses within the wider discussions propounded by Iranian intellectuals. Finally, 
I will demonstrate how these films subtly compare not only the institutionalised 
morals and ideals of society with the ethical values of individuals, but also the 
relevance o f religious injunctions to their everyday modem life.
Resistance to monopolising Islam
The clergy’s rise to power began with the establishment of the Shi‘i Safavid State 
discussed in Chapter 2. The subsequent history of Shi‘i Iran witnessed many events
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that contributed to this power, reaching a pinnacle during the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. By the 17th century, the right to the direct collection of religious taxes gave 
the clergy economic independence. The 19th century victory of the Usulis over the 
Akhbaris endowed the clergy with the power to act as intermediaries between man 
and God. The clergy therefore became a necessity in the lives of the believers, for, in 
the absence of the hidden Imam, it was only from amongst the ulama that a source of 
emulation (marja‘-e taqlid) could be sought. The believers had to follow the 
religious opinions of their source of emulation; and the clergy were placed in a 
hierarchical position above the laity. Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the concept of 
velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, and the 1979 Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic named him as the Supreme Leader for Life and entrusted him with 
the duty to rule.
Another aspect of formal Shi‘i expression is the madrasa. These started off as private
institutions in early Islamic history, but gradually developed into institutions of
learning supported by rulers and other men of power, gaining a political shade. In
fact, as discussed in Chapter Two, they evolved to become not only religious, but
also powerful political centres that actively engaged with developments of state and
society. Indeed, the Safavids built the Shi‘i madrasas to help propagate the new
faith. In the 20th century they played a crucial role in the 1905 Constitutional
Revolution and in the overthrow of the Pahlavi Shah in 1979. The ijtihad (effort to
ascertain correct doctrine) practised by Shi‘i ulama gives them more flexibility in
dealing with contemporary issues. As Zubaida states:
The craft of the law remains central to religious learning and practice for the Shi'a as 
much as for the Sunni world. Yet, Shi‘i learning seems to have retained more of the 
philosophical, reflective and even mystical elements of medieval Islam that its Sunni
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counterpart, which has been more inclined to legalistic and textual limitations on 
reflection (Zubaida, 2003: 184).
It is this very ‘philosophical and reflective’ element within Shi‘ism that allows for a 
critical approach. The growth of the clergy’s power has not always been accepted 
without debate, even within clerical and religious circles. Here, I will discuss some 
contemporary debates on the role of the clergy, before turning to filmic discourses 
on the topic.
It was not just opponents of the Revolution who criticised the clergy for arrogating 
to themselves the power to rule. Rather, from very early on, when the notion of a 
ruling cleric was first introduced there were those within the clergy who disagreed 
with the idea, maintaining that it was better to leave the running of the state to kings. 
As Keddie observes, ‘many o f the disagreements now found amongst scholars in the 
West concerning the role of the ulama at various times have their roots in the fact 
that there was almost never a single line followed by all the ulama, and hence it is 
often possible to quote ulama, even during one period, on several sides of the same 
issue’ (Keddie, 1995: 164). As Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, a reformist cleric in Iran 
explains, ‘It cannot be said that the clergy collectively are coterminous with the 
Islamic Republic’ (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 119).
Difficult as it was to criticise the religious establishment in the political climate of 
the Islamic Republic, it did not remain unchallenged. For instance, Ayatollah 
Shariat-madari was the first marja ‘ to criticise the doctrine of velciyat-e faqih, which 
resulted in his defrocking in 1982 and subsequent house arrest until his death in 
1986. After the Revolution, even those who had proposed the idea of a ruling clergy
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came, in time, to revise their views, for example on the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. 
As this notion developed over the years, differences of opinion arose even among 
those clerics who had initially supported it. Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini’s 
designated heir, is yet another example. Even though he ‘played an instrumental role 
in inserting the velayat-e faqih  into the constitution’ he was later dismissed for being 
critical of governmental policies and practices as well as being unwilling to ‘keep 
silent in the face of what [he] saw to be contrary to his religious beliefs’ (Mir- 
Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 20-21).
Moreover, a new religious modernist movement emerged from ‘within the same 
ideological circles that shaped the revolution’ (Jahanbakhsh, 2001: 140). This 
intellectual movement, headed by Abdolkarim Soroush, questioned the religious 
establishment and the power that the clergy had given themselves. Mir-Hosseini 
(2006: 27) discusses the influence o f Soroush’s theory of the relativity of religious 
knowledge on numerous intellectuals who came to form the foundation of New 
Religious Thinking in Iran. These included Mashallah Shams olvaezin and Shahla 
Sherkat, editors of Kiyan and Zanan respectively. Both these monthly journals were 
established in 1991 and became a platform for Islamic dissent within Iran. Kiyan 
published many of Soroush’s articles and speeches, including his article, ‘Horriyat 
va rowhaniyat’ [Freedom and the Clerical Establishment], which questioned the 
clerical monopoly o f religious truth and refuted the clergy’s claims to be the sole 
interpreters of religious knowledge.18 Soroush, a close ally of the Islamic Republic 
during its conception and early years, turned into one of its most outspoken critics.
18 For a detailed list o f Soroush’s speeches and articles in both Persian and English 
see his website www.drsoroush.com
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He has since been disfavoured for his criticism of the theological, philosophical and 
political underpinnings of the regime. He subsequently lost his job, was barred from 
teaching, and received numerous death-threats. His public lectures were violently 
disrupted on many occasions and he ultimately left Iran in the mid 90s to write and 
lecture in Europe and North America. His current visits to Iran are brief and he has 
refrained from public speeches.
Soroush criticised the clerics’ monopoly of Islam and voiced his concerns over the
power of the religious seminaries, or howzehs, and their close connection with the
centre of power. In a talk he gave in 1992 at the University o f Isfahan, he said:
After the revolution the clergy took over the nation’s management and formulated its 
governing political theory (the guardianship of the juriconsult), which requires a 
Hawzeh-trained clergyman with the rank of the grand juriconsult to be the supreme 
leader of the country...it is self-evident that the religious government entails the 
empowerment of the clergy and the Hawzeh; the religious disciples actually empower 
those who possess them (Soroush, 2000: 174).
Soroush argues that historically this empowerment of the clergy and their claim to be 
the sole interpreters of religion have been one of the main areas of contention 
between the clergy and the philosophers, mystics and poets who did accept this 
claim. He goes on to state the numerous instances in which the latter group have 
denounced the power alliances of the juriconsults, and the associated dangers of 
corruption and abuse (Soroush, 2000: 174-175).
More recently, in October 2000, another cleric, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, was 
charged with ‘apostasy, waging war against God, and other offences resulting from 
his participation in the [2000 Berlin] conference’ (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006:
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38). From 6th-9th April 2000 Eshkevari along with a number of prominent 
reformists attended the Berlin Conference titled ‘Iran after the Elections, and the 
Dynamics of Reform in the Islamic Republic’. The conference was disrupted by two 
groups of exiled Iranian opposition groups abroad and as Mir-Hosseini and Tapper 
state, the conference ‘became notorious in Iran for two things: disruptions by 
“naked” men and women, and the outspokenness of some o f the panellists from Iran’ 
both o f which were filmed by the Iranian Television (IRIB) crew, under the 
conservatives’ control (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 37). The carefully edited 
film was broadcast in Iran, to bring the reformists into disrepute. Many of the 
participants, including Eshkevari, were arrested upon their return to Iran.
Eshkevari’s outspoken views on the mutability of social rulings brought him a death 
sentence, later commuted to five years in prison. Eshkevari identifies three problems 
with the Islamic Republic’s current form. First, it broke its promise to the people and 
instead of being an Islamic Republic, it is now a clerical Republic. The second is that 
the Islamic government became a fiqhi and, therefore, sectarian government for it 
relied solely on the Shi‘i school of thought. This, he stated, is different from a 
religious government that is not solely confined to the Shi‘i fiqh  in all its affairs, 
including ‘decision-making in the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers’ 
(Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 115), for which there is not always an answer in 
fiqh. It also excludes the four schools of Sunni thought and the possibility of their 
co-existence, for it deems them irrelevant to a society which in fact does include 
Sunni Muslims. The third problem was that, for the first time in history, the Shi‘a 
institution of marja ‘iyat became a governmental institution. As a result, the marja ‘s 
lost their independence from the government and subsequently their independence
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from the political development of the state. Instead, he asserts, the marja's, who 
were subjects until recently, have become rulers (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 
111- 119).
The clergy’s growth o f authority over the years made them powerful as never before. 
However, historically, not all clerics endorsed the idea of endowing the clergy with 
various religious or political powers. The differences between the usuli and akhbari 
schools of thought in the 19th century were one example o f disagreement on the 
religious empowerment of the clergy. In fact, the clergy were never unanimous in 
their views, particularly when their right to rule was concerned. Thus, not only did 
the Islamic Republic develop the most nuanced arguments on the legitimacy of the 
doctrine of velayat-e faqih , it also unwittingly produced some of its finest 
intellectuals, who critically engaged with the doctrine. These critics were not limited 
to a small group of secular intellectuals but, more strikingly, extended to many who 
arose from within the allies of the regime, including some of the clergy.
The relative freedom of expression attained during the initial years of Khatami’s 
presidency (1997-2005) provided the space for a more open debate. Arjomand 
(2000) states that the reconstitution of the Expediency Council in early 1997 and its 
role as an advisory board on major policies of the regime, was in fact a demotion of 
the president, who subsequently lost his power to determine state policies. Despite 
the difficulty of implementing new legislation, Khatami succeeded in reopening 
discussion of constitutional principles, and his Government Spokesman and Minister 
of Culture at the time, Ataollah Mohajerani, withdrew many of the restrictions on the 
press. This provided space for open debate and ‘most importantly o f all, the taboo on
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the discussion and questioning of the principle of theocratic government in the press, 
was broken for good’ (Aijomand, 2000: 288).
However, any criticism of clerical power and its legitimacy was forcefully 
suppressed. Nevertheless, the harsh clampdown on publications that disseminated 
such ‘seditious’ views, and the arrest and intimidation of their authors, did little to 
suppress the ideas. Shahidi refers to the period between 1997-2000 as a time during 
which the greatest achievement of the Iranian press was to introduce ‘concepts such 
as “citizenship”, “civil society”, “pluralism”, “transparency”, “accountability”, and 
“the rights of women, children, and minorities” into the country’s political 
vocabulary’ (Shahidi, 2006: 24). It is in this context of larger intellectual debates 
about the current role of the clergy in Iran that we must locate The Lizard and Under 
the Moonlight and study their significance
Parable on the World of the Clergy
Both Under the Moonlight and The Lizard function as parables. They not only depict 
the world of the clergy in its current form within Iranian society, but also include a 
moral vision of how it ought to be. The analysis I use here is similar to the 
mythological approach outlined in Chapter One. Through Seyyed’s eyes in Under 
the Moonlight and Reza’s in The Lizard' we enter these two worlds and are at once 
presented with the contradictions between the two. In examining the current role of 
the clergy, these filmic discourses evoke the debates of intellectuals who have 
critically engaged with the doctrines that empower the clergy. Interestingly, even 
though both films discuss many similar issues, Under the Moonlight was screened
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without much controversy whereas The Lizard was forced to pull out of cinemas 
within a month.
Religion serving the clergy
Under the Moonlight is the first post-Revolutionary film that critically examines the 
status of the clergy within society. It is about a young seminarian, Seyyed Hasan, 
who is approaching the end of his studies at the seminary and preparing to don 
clerical attire. He appears hesitant to take on the clerical role, and only half-heartedly 
proceeds with the preparations because of persistent pressures from his father and 
teachers. However, a street urchin, Joojeh, steals his supplies and Seyyed’s pursuit of 
the boy leads him to an unfamiliar world of social outcasts who have set up a 
makeshift camp under a highway bridge in Tehran.
Under the Moonlight begins with a contrast between the life o f the clergy and that of 
the public. As Seyyed, the seminarian student, looks out o f the window of an over­
crowded, hot, public bus, he sees a cleric on the highway waiting for his driver to 
finish a tyre-change. Such comparative sequences are scattered throughout the film 
and illustrate the difference between the upper world of the seminary in which 
Seyyed resides and the lower world of the under-bridge camp where the outcasts 
live. The sheltered life of the seminarian students, within the confines of an elegant 
edifice replete with beautiful gardens and ponds, is in stark contrast to the rough 
lives of the homeless. This is particularly evident in the case o f the child character 
Joojeh who, in the guise of a street vendor, steals and traffics in drugs in order to 
earn a living. We also see some of the clerics acting against what they preach. The
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hypocrisy o f the senior cleric is emphasised by the juxtaposition o f his complaints 
about the seminary’s electricity bill as a waste of money and, therefore, against the 
ethical principles o f Islam, with his desire to obtain a mobile phone despite its extra 
cost. He is depicted in various scenes throughout the film either going through 
invoices and bills, or being constantly on his mobile phone arranging or closing 
deals.
Soroush has variously criticised the clergy’s dependence on religion as a source of
income. He states that the clergy ‘are not defined by their erudition or their virtues
but their dependency on religion for their livelihood’ (Soroush, 2000: 19). For him,
being a cleric must not constitute a job or profession, for religion then becomes a
means to an end. Consequently, instead of defending and pursuing religious
knowledge, the clergy are in danger o f defending their professional interests to
maximise their income. He thus argues that
individuals who represent the greatest potential for corruption are those who, after 
receiving their religious education, base their livelihood on the cultivation and defense 
of a particular notion of Islam. Their livelihood depends upon the successful 
advancement of this religious interpretation, and to maximize the former they may 
compromise the latter (Vakili, 1997: 17).
In Under the Moonlight, the clergy seem to be more concerned to maintain their 
facade than to strive towards the value systems they preach. The senior cleric, for 
example, complains about seminarian students who drink Coke on the streets 
together or grow their hair long, and asserts that this is unbecoming for a cleric in 
robe. However, when faced with the suffering of people such as the homeless, he 
prefers to close his eyes. In the senior cleric’s view, it is the times that have changed 
and Seyyed should not feel responsible for any of it. He says, ‘It was not supposed to
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be this way. I don’t know where we went wrong or which sin we are paying off.’ In 
fact, he exempts himself from taking any action by delegating these social problems 
to Divine Will and reading them as acts of punishment. The film, therefore, subtly 
depicts the deviation of the clergy’s concern from the wellbeing o f society to a self- 
centred preservation of their status.
The clergy thus appear to have forgotten an important part o f their duty. They have 
failed to look out for those in need. The homeless living under the bridge are a 
‘collection’ as they call themselves. They have both the physically and mentally 
disabled amongst themselves, and a leader figure called Rostam. As his name 
indicates, Rostam acts as a javanmard in the group, a man of integrity, honour and 
chivalry. As Adelkhah states in her detailed analysis of the social and ethical code of 
javanmardi in modern-day Iran, one o f the older references o f javanmard  is to a 
selfless man ‘possessing fully the quality of a man (mardanegi), referring to his 
courage, honour, modesty, humility and rectitude’ (1999: 30). Rostam evokes the 
physical strength and championship of his namesake in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, the 
10th-century Persian epic. The Rostam of Shahnameh is one of its best-known 
heroes, a great warrior and champion. The Rostam of Under the Moonlight was a 
wrestler in his younger days, around whom crowds would gather to watch him break 
free from heavy chains. His self-effacement, another important component of a 
javanmard, is also evident in the way he looks out for the welfare of his friends and 
shares what little he has with them. In fact, despite their miserable conditions, the 
people in the group care for each other deeply. Indeed, the love and care shown by 
and amongst these outcasts by far exceeds that of the world of the seminary. Many 
other Iranian films have also highlighted the plight of the underprivileged. However,
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Under the Moonlight differs from them in that the destitute conditions o f the poor 
are contrasted, not with the affluent living in the north of Tehran, but with the clergy 
in the seminary.
This contrast can also be read as a subtle reference to the unrealised dream of social 
justice promised by Khomeini before and during the early days of the Revolution. 
Khomeini had pledged to defend the rights of the oppressed classes {mostaza‘fin) by 
bringing in social justice and narrowing the social gap between the rich and poor. 
Even though proposals on the welfare of the oppressed were drafted and put to the 
first parliament of the Islamic Republic, they remained ultimately unsustainable in 
the social and political climate of the Revolution.19 However, the social and financial 
status o f close allies of the regime, including some clergy, continued to improve 
noticeably.
Under the Moonlight thus highlights the marginalisation and alienation o f the very 
same people who were promised a just rule by the Islamic Republic. Not only have 
the rights of these people not been defended, but their living conditions have also 
deteriorated -  a point evident from their nostalgic references to the past. Their 
presence in the film is, therefore, a reference to the dark reality of the conditions of 
the marginalised and the failure of the Revolution to fulfil its promise of social 
justice.
19 For a comprehensive account of the economic situation during the early years of 
the Revolution, see Ehteshami (1995: 88-99).
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Clergy serving the public
Even though Under the Moonlight is critical of the current position of the clergy in 
Iran, it does not in any way attempt to denounce the religious institutions or the 
clergy per se. Instead it reflects on the purpose and role of the clergy in society, 
which appear to have been misunderstood not only by the public but also by some of 
the clergy themselves. Seyyed’s grandfather serves as an example of the noble role 
of the clergy. He, and not the seminarian teachers, remains an inspiration to Seyyed. 
We learn that the grandfather was a simple man who lived in the village and earned 
his living by working on the fields. He practiced what he preached and was, 
therefore, a trusted member of the community in which he lived. For him, the good 
of society took precedence over his personal interests. As Seyyed himself puts it, his 
reluctance to don clerical robes stems from a fear of not deserving the honour. It is 
clear that for him, the honour lies in humbly serving the people, and he fears being 
incapable of fulfilling this noble calling.
Most importantly, this film revolves around Seyyed’s search. As such, he interprets 
the unfolding o f events as a Divine sign. Thus, when Joojeh steals his supplies, he 
initially considers it as God’s way of telling him not to proceed with finalising his 
education as a cleric. However, his search for Joojeh turns into the spiritual journey 
through which he finally realises his purpose in life. Interestingly, this is achieved 
after Rostam includes Seyyed in his letter to God asking Him to answer their pleas. 
Seyyed wakes up the next morning under the open-topped dome of the mosque with 
a white dove flying out into the light.
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When Seyyed fails to appear at the donning ceremony, his roommate, who has 
already worn the clerical robes, hurries to try and persuade Seyyed to join him. He 
dismisses Seyyed’s justifications and sounds the real reason: it is clear that Seyyed is 
hesitant because he has become suspicious of the clergy. As his roommate says, ‘Do 
you think they are royal robes? No! They are working clothes! There are good and 
bad people in all types of work, why don’t you try and be one of the good ones? You 
used to say that even if  you are able to guide one person, then you must wear the 
robe!’
The phrase ‘royal robes’, can be read as a reference to the dissident clerics who 
criticise those within the clergy who have taken on royal lifestyles. Ayatollah 
Montazeri had also voiced his concerns on the royal robes of the vali-ye faqih.20 
Breaking nearly ten years of political silence in November 1997, a few months after 
Khatami’s landslide victory in the presidential elections, he gave a sermon in Qom 
criticising the corruption of the velayat-e faqih  and the justifications for its 
authoritarian rule. In his words, ‘ Velayat-e faqih  does not mean having a royal 
organisation and ceremonial travels that cost billions and the like. These things are 
not compatible with the vali-ye faq ih ’ (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 105).
Kadivar, another dissident cleric and a senior student of Montazeri, who spent a few 
years in the prisons of the Islamic Republic for his criticism of the doctrine of vali-ye 
faqih, compares the Islamic Republic with the absolute monarchy they had intended
20 Menashri (2001: 13-41) discusses the debates over m arjalyat, particularly the 
opposition of clerical and lay intellectuals that followed Khamene’i’s appointment as 
supreme leader after Khomeini.
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to end.21 The Islamic Republic, he states, failed to eliminate monarchical oppression 
and instead ‘succeeded in transforming the face of monarchy in Iran; autocratic rule 
and monarchical relations have remained intact, and are reproduced in the form of 
the absolute velaycit-e fa q ih ' (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 109). In comparing 
democratic rule with that of the velayat-e faqih, he states that the rule o f the faqih  
does not provide the public with equal access to power within the public domain and 
subsequently alienates them within this sphere (Kadivar, 2002).
The parable o f  The Lizard
Even though The Lizard  is a different film to Under the Moonlight, in both genre and 
approach, the issues it raises are very similar. The Lizard is about a convicted thief, 
Reza, known as Reza Marmulak or Reza the Lizard. When he is taken to hospital 
after an attempted suicide in prison, he succeeds in stealing the robes of a cleric 
hospitalised next to him. The rest of the film is about Reza’s attempts to escape the 
country and being trapped in the role of a cleric. Like Under the Moonlight, The 
Lizard  functions as a parable. It also examines the relevance of theological reasoning 
to everyday real life. In addition, it explores the role of the clergy, their relationship 
with laity, and the notion o f forced religious morals.
The storyline of The Lizard is a familiar comedy plot of the incongruity of 
displacement. A criminal dressed as a cleric and forced to act as one had been 
depicted in various earlier films, going as far back as Charlie Chaplin’s 1923 film
21 Kadivar (1998, 1999a and 1999b). On Kadivar, see Vahdat (2005). For a detailed 
list of Kadivar’s speeches and summary of articles in Persian visit 
www.Kadivar.com
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The Pilgrim, which, like The Lizard, told a very similar story o f an escaped convict 
grabbing the clothes of a bathing clergyman and subsequently assuming his identity. 
However, as Butler states, during its time it was received with a ‘shocked 
indignation’ in some parts (1969: 181). Over 80 years later, this storyline still 
caused heated reactions amongst audiences, authorities and particularly the clergy, in 
Iran.
The Lizard  was never officially banned but the stir it caused was enough for its 
creators to decide to take it off the screens. However, this did not entail defeat. The 
film had already succeeded on so many different levels that its withdrawal from the 
cinema screens did little to damage it. Financially, the film had already made a 
significant profit. It also won several awards in the 22nd FIFF (2004): the audience 
award for the most popular film, the best screenplay, and the special jury award for 
its lead character, Parviz Parastooyi, as well as the Interfaith Juries award.23 It 
successfully spoke to the largest-ever Iranian audience on a sensitive issue such as 
the clergy. Additionally, even though it was aimed at domestic audiences, it 
succeeded in transcending national and cultural borders, becoming the first Iranian 
comedy to participate in some of the best-known international film festivals.24 It also
22 The BBC NEWS reports that by the time The Lizard opened in America, it had 
already made $1 million in Iran, with cinemas being forced to schedule extra 
screenings to meet the huge demand. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/2/hi/entertainment/3786905.stm, visited 9 June 2004.
23 For a list of the awards of the 22nd Fajr International Film Festival, see the official 
website: http://www.fajrfestival.ir/english/fajr/asp/awards.asp?f_number=22.
24 Including The Times BFI 48th London Film Festival (2004). Parviz Parastooyi, 
the lead character o f the film, was the 4th runner-up for best actor in the Seattle 
International Film Festival (19 May -  12 June 2005), the biggest international film 
festival in the US:
http://www.seattlefilm.org/festival/film/detail.aspx?id=5222&fid=:5, The film was
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introduced a different style of Iranian films to foreign audiences. As some non- 
Iranian audiences commented, they were pleased to finally see an Iranian film which 
not only had a tight narrative but also was not depressing!25
The Lizard became the first post-Revolutionary film to position a cleric as the 
subject of a comedy. Even though it went on screen only for a month, it became the 
biggest box-office hit in the history of Iranian cinema.26 The real audience of this 
film, however, exceeded the box-office figures. Very soon pirated copies were 
circulating and almost everyone in the country had seen it. The images of an 
irreligious convict pretending to be a man of God and leading the faithful made for 
some of the most humorous moments in film. However, the film aroused such fury 
amongst the clerics that they refused to acknowledge even its redemptive side, which 
allowed for a more favourable view o f the clergy. Tabrizi, the director, narrates that 
in his attempts to gain the clergy’s approval he arranged a private screening for them 
and their families.27 He wanted them to see for themselves that the film was not 
hostile to the clergy. They were not convinced. Even though their families found it 
funny and were laughing heartily during the screening, the clerics seated on the other 
side failed to see the humour.
also screened in the Asia 2004 Fukuoka International Film Festival (10 - 20 
September 2004), see http://www.focus-on-asia.eom/e/report/2004/The-Lizard.html
25 The author spoke with some non-Iranian members of the audience after the 
screening of the film at the London Film Festival.
26 “It has now become the most successful Iranian film ever following its release in 
the US” (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/entertainment/3786905.stm, visited 9 
June 2004.)
27Interview with the author in Iran on February 2005.
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Like Under the Moonlight, The Lizard is also a social commentary critical of the 
clergy’s position within society. It is, however, more daring in its approach. The film 
is filled with bold references that criticise the current approach to religion and its 
enforcement within society. Reza the lizard had become Reza the cleric. In Persian, 
‘lizard’ has many connotations. Even though it appears to be a reference to Reza’s 
artistry in climbing up walls, one cannot miss its other overtones. Lizard also refers 
to a sly, scheming person who can easily change colours. This reference in the film 
could be easily stretched to the clergy.
The creators of The Lizard employed film to step on uncharted territory. As King 
puts it, ‘Comedy, by definition, is not usually taken seriously, a fact that sometimes 
gives it licence to tread in areas that might otherwise be off-limits’ (2002: 2). As 
mentioned earlier, the film functions as a parable and through Reza’s eyes we enter 
both the ideal and the real worlds of the clergy. In the world as it is, Reza benefits 
from a privileged status within society. He is easily exempted from paying a fine for 
driving in the wrong direction, and he enjoys special treatment on the train. 
Nevertheless, this status is also accompanied by public contempt for the clergy. For 
example, when dressed in clerical robes Reza finds it difficult to get a taxi to stop for 
him.
The world as it ought to be, however, is one that places the clergy and laity on level 
ground. Reza demonstrates this through his interaction with the people around him. 
Even if  unwittingly, he succeeds in drawing people back to the mosque and gaining 
their respect. We see a world in which the clergy inspire and lead people to 
participate in the good of society, defending the helpless and weak against injustice,
177
and tolerating human faults and weakness. Reza Marmulak, forced to act as the 
cleric of the village, is unable to get in touch with Motazedi, the underground 
criminal who is supposed to deliver his fake passport for him to cross the border. 
Thus, during the day he dresses as a cleric and at night, ‘disguised’ in ordinary 
clothes, he looks for Motazedi. When Reza finally finds Motazedi’s house, he finds 
that Motazedi has been arrested and imprisoned. The inquisitive Gholamali and his 
friend secretly follow Marmulak and witness not only his various visits to houses in 
the deprived areas but also the prayers of Motazedi’s mother, who thanks him for his 
generosity. They interpret this ‘disguised’ nocturnal roaming as charitable work to 
help the needy. This also alludes to following the example o f ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i 
Imam, and his charitable acts. Indeed, ‘Ali would roam the city at night in disguise 
and take food and sustenance to the orphans and needy. When Gholamali and his 
friends spread the word, the village people are so moved that they implore Marmulak 
to allow them to participate in his good deeds. Thus, every night they visit the poor, 
sick and needy and provide them with gifts and company.
Reza also displays an acute sense of justice and chivalry. He is furious with the 
village thugs who harass the village shopkeeper and vandalise his property, but feels 
it inappropriate to fight off the thugs whilst in his robes. However, he can no longer 
hold his peace when he finds out that the leader of the local gang of thugs has locked 
himself in with his ex-wife, Faezeh, to try and bully her into getting back together. 
To the villagers’ astonishment he climbs the walls to the second floor and lets 
himself into the house. The villagers are then faced with a bleeding ex-husband who, 
despite his mass, has been clearly beaten up by the cleric. This wins Reza an even
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further popularity, for now even the thugs and their leader develop a great respect for 
him.
In this visionary world, the cleric earns respect and achieves leadership not through 
preaching about punishment and fear, or by legal enforcement, but rather by setting 
an example himself. In fact, towards the end of the film, Reza ceases even to sit on 
the pulpit. Instead, he sits on its lowest step and suggests that together they should 
think about the meaning of the plural ways of reaching God. In his sermons, he 
invites people to enjoy the pleasures of life. His teachings are not in opposition to 
human desire but he does advise a more careful handling of such instinctual desire. 
Thus, in contrast to Gholamali’s father, who is concerned that singing in the mosque 
or interaction with the opposite sex constitute impermissible acts, Reza decrees them 
as permissible.
The visionary world is not limited to Reza acting as a man of God. As illustrated at 
the beginning of the film, his short interaction with the cleric in the hospital, also 
called Reza, provides an image of the clergy as it ought to be. This cleric does not 
arrogate to himself special privileges, evident in that he has been hospitalised in a 
public hospital and the fact that he earns a living through craftsmanship. As 
discussed earlier, Soroush emphasises the need for the clergy to earn their living 
through sources other than religious activity in order to maintain their integrity with 
the faith. The cleric in the hospital does not distance himself from Reza the Lizard, 
nor does he scorn the latter’s contempt for the clergy. The inspirational passages he 
reads are not from Islamic sources but from Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s The Little
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Prince. Truth, he says, is not found only in one source, but experienced through 
multiple interpretations.
In a theocratic state endorsing an exclusivist and official interpretation of Islam, The 
Lizard proposed a pluralistic approach -  an argument comparable to Soroush’s ideas 
of multiple interpretations of Islam. In a speech given at London’s Centre for the 
Study of Democracy in November 2006, Soroush asserted that Islam is nothing but a 
series of interpretations, and interpretations are intrinsically pluralistic. However, 
those who have based their power on a particular interpretation of Islam are reluctant 
to allow other interpretations, and reject them as heresy. The pluralism of 
interpretation is, nevertheless, inevitable and he argues that the clerics need to 
engage with this aspect of Islam. Since there is no ‘True’ interpretation, one can 
correct and modify the existing ones but it is then logically impossible to possess the 
best interpretation. As such, Soroush proposed a plurality o f ‘right paths’ rather than 
‘One Right Path’.
Both Under the Moonlight and The Lizard are social commentaries protesting not the 
relevance of the clergy in a believer’s life, but rather criticising the role that some of 
them have currently undertaken in society. What Mirkarimi and Tabrizi, the two 
filmmakers, achieve in their respective films is to raise many of these controversial 
issues and question the positions held by the clergy. As demonstrated in the 
discussion above, these discourses fall into the larger body of works that question the 
legitimacy of clerical power and role in society. The ideas these filmmakers propose 
draw from the thought of intellectuals such as Soroush, Kadivar and Eshkevari, but 
are expressed through the medium of film.
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Morals and Values
Seyyed’s spiritual search and his hesitation at taking on the role of the clergy is 
depicted beautifully in Under the Moonlight. When he wakes up under the dome o f 
the mosque, the white dove flying into the light and the satisfaction on his face 
suggest a search about to be fulfilled. That day Seyyed sells his books to feed the 
homeless, a symbolic act of carrying out the instructions in these books, rather than 
merely reading them in the confines of his seminary. A few days later, when the city 
cleaners are commissioned to clear the camp under the bridge, a heart-broken 
Seyyed complains to God, cries to him and sings to him, in a manner reminiscent of 
Rostam’s unsophisticated and informal conversation with God.
Relevance o f seminarian teachings
Another important point that both films raise is the relevance of seminarian teaching 
and the Sharia to real-life situations. In Under the Moonlight, having witnessed the 
desperate situation of the street urchin, Joojeh, and his friends, it is very difficult to 
empathise with the seminarians advocating strict adherence to the principle of 
chopping off the hands of thieves. The impossibility of following all the prescribed 
rules in daily life is further demonstrated amongst the seminarians themselves. In 
fact, the ideals of the new student at the seminary, who zealously follows the 
religious texts, provide the comic relief of the film. For example, when the fervid 
student reminds Seyyed and his roommate that the religious texts consider having 
eggs at night to be reprehensible (makruh), Seyyed’s friend adds some tomato sauce
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and supposedly removes the reprehension from the act, turning it into a permissible 
one.
The Lizard also questions the relevance of seminarian teachings to real life. This is 
depicted through the constant questioning of the keen young man shadowing Reza 
Marmulak. Most o f these questions are completely irrelevant to Iranians, such as 
daily prayers at the North Pole or the religious duties of a Muslim in Space. The film 
thus subtly implies that some o f the current religious discourses are far removed 
from the practical affairs o f life and are, therefore, of little use to society. The 
clergy’s engagement with these matters is thus seen as being not only pointless but 
also as distant from the laity as Iran is from the North Pole or Space. The film 
therefore suggests that people’s more immediate problems could be dealt with in a 
way that better bridges the gap between real life and the values and ideals held dear 
by society.
As mentioned before, among other ‘crimes’ for which Eshkevari was sentenced to 
death, was questioning the relevance of religious rulings within today’s context 
especially as they pertained to women. In fact he asserted that some social rulings 
were mutable, for they were Arab and tribal customs. Appropriated by the Prophet, 
they were, therefore, subject to review. Thus, they were no longer considered to be 
absolute and divine decrees incumbent on Muslims, but rather changeable laws that 
should be reviewed within their time and place. In the controversial Berlin Speech of 
2000, Eshkevari divided social rulings into two categories. He allocated the first to 
rulings about worship and classified them as irrevocable. On the second he said:
I would claim that these social mlings of Islam are mutable in essence and by their
very nature, even if parts of them come from the Koran...In Islamic jiqh  we have a
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principle that says that the ruling follows the subject matter...It means that when a 
subject matter changes, the rulings too will change. But if the subject matter remains 
unchanged, the ruling will not change (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, 2006: 165).
Eshkevari then goes on to propose a reconsideration of certain social laws from 
being irrevocable principles to becoming changeable laws. In this way, religious 
rules were not divine rules but rather social contracts that could be changed in line 
with the needs o f time and context. It was his specific proposal that these mutable 
rules included women’s rights and the choice to wear the hijab that the ruling clerics 
could not accept for ideological reasons.
In certain circumstances in the films, the very knowledge of the clergy is deemed 
irrelevant to the life of the laity. For example, on his first encounter with the 
homeless people, Seyyed is asked for the spelling of a word. He begins with 
providing the spelling, the etymology and root of the word, but the destitute man 
cuts him short. He is not interested. Seyyed’s learning is irrelevant to this man’s 
problems -  he just needs the spelling that any educated person should be able to 
provide.
God, however, remains a central part in the lives of both the seminarian and the 
homeless even though they differ drastically in their relationship with Him. The 
clergy employ a rigid and formal relationship with God in the form of prayers, 
worship, and praising o f His attributes. The homeless people on the other hand, 
employ a very casual vocabulary in speaking with Him. Rostam, who firmly believes 
in God and His kindness, is not afraid to use slang to protest against injustices 
inflicted upon the homeless. He dictates a letter to God and after complaining about
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His negligence of them, outlines a list of things they need from Him and includes 
Seyyed’s name in it. As discussed earlier, according to the dominant Shi‘i theology 
since the 19th century, the ulama had taken on the role o f intermediaries between 
God and the believers. In this case, however, Rostam demonstrates his free and 
direct relationship with God and ironically, he acts as an intermediary between God 
and Seyyed. Interestingly, Seyyed finds the answer to his search the very next 
morning. In The Lizard, Reza, the convict-acting-as-a-cleric, summarises the film’s 
view on the laity’s relationship with God in his sermon at the local prison. He states 
that God cannot be monopolised by good people. Instead, He is also the God of 
criminals, who does not differentiate amongst His men. Evil, in fact, occurs through 
the selfish acts of those who are unwilling to share their good fortunes with the less 
fortunate.
These two films as a whole advocate a definition o f God that is not bound to 
theological reasoning but rather, based on unconditional love and faith. One of the 
points of departure between mystics and the ulama has been the relationship of the 
believer with God. Rumi, the 13th-century Persian poet, and one of the greatest 
mystics of Islam, in his Mathnavi (verses 1727-1791) narrates the story of Moses 
and the Shepherd. Moses overhears an illiterate shepherd praying to God and 
imploring Him to come out of hiding so that he can demonstrate his love for him, 
and feed Him, massage His feet, comb His hair and mend His shoes. Moses rebukes 
the shepherd for using blasphemous language and the shepherd is devastated to 
realise that his expression of love and devotion are considered sacrilegious. But 
Moses receives a revelation reproaching him for distancing His sincere believer from 
Him and continuing: You were sent to join together, not to cause rift and disunion.
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Rumi endorses this sincere and direct relationship with God that is independent of 
the mediation o f the jurisprudents. As Soroush states, this recognition that there is an 
understanding beyond scholarly learning has long been a struggle between the 
mystics and the jurisconsults. ‘The quarrel of some philosophers, mystics, and poets 
with the jurisconsults has not been merely academic but has been based on real 
differences of perspective on religious issues’ (Soroush, 2000: 174).
One of the reasons for Reza’s success as a cleric in The Lizard is that he succeeds in 
communicating with people in their own language. Soroush highlights the 
importance of the seminary’s task in training effective speakers and states that the 
preachers must be:
able to guide the people using simple and accessible language, fables, examples and 
poems in order to convey moral commands, religious wisdom, and catechismic 
principles. There is now no faculty in the seminaries dedicated to the art of preaching 
even though this is one of the duties of the Hawzeh; this vocation falls to the talent 
and initiative of individuals (Soroush, 2000: 175)
Forced religious morals
From the outset, The Lizard  criticises the forced religious morals within Iranian 
society. This is depicted through the prison warden who wants to send his prisoners 
to heaven even if by force, as well as Gholamali’s father who constantly pressures 
his son to memorise the Qur’an. The thick glasses of the soldier who carries out the 
warden’s orders represent a blind following of the edicts. Interestingly, the new 
seminarian in Under the Moonlight, who is a strict observer of the literal 
interpretation of the religious law, also wears thick glasses. They both represent 
people with a narrow view of the world, one that is not gained, reasoned or drawn
185
from experience, but rather handed down to them. These are people who receive the 
prescribed orders without giving them any further thought, or considering their 
relevance to the real world. In short, they are unable to see for themselves.
The notion of serving the public is also studied critically within contemporary 
Iranian society. Serving is either interpreted as punishment or abused for personal 
interests. The prison warden in The Lizard, for example, serves the prisoners through 
his dictatorial regime, and the police officer defines his service to the public as 
catching thieves and putting them into prison. Punishment, therefore, is seen as a 
tool of service. The parliamentary candidate on the other hand indulges in acts of 
generosity and service only to facilitate the fulfilment of his ambitions. The film also 
questions those who totally engross themselves in religious learning and 
subsequently distance themselves from society and service to it. As evidenced by 
Gholamali’s father, it is more important that his son memorise the Qur’an than set 
out on nocturnal missions serving the people and helping the needy.
The films also compare the ethical values of the laity with the enforced and 
institutionalised moral standards of the state. For example, The Lizard humanises 
both the clergy and the criminals, but in different ways. The criminals are not evil 
but help out each other in times of difficulty. Jackson, the underworld criminal and 
Reza Marmulak’s friend, helps him to escape the borders. Motazedi, who fakes 
passports, honours his word. As his mother says, she has brought up her child with 
an appropriate understanding of the forbidden and permissible acts (halal and 
haram). He earns his money, even if  it is through unlawful work. The hospitalised 
cleric who helps Reza the Lizard and is an exemplar of the clergy as they ought to
186
be, does not believe in punishment as a solution and is in fact complicit in the 
Lizard’s escape. Later, when Reza Marmulak is forced to act as a cleric, his 
namesake, the cleric in the hospital, remains an important inspiration for him.
In Under the Moonlight, the God-fearing seminarians who have devoted their lives 
to the worship of God and study of the sacred texts, show little engagement with the 
laity outside and are almost oblivious to their suffering. The dwellers under the 
bridge, on the other hand, are compassionate despite being ‘sinners’, petty criminals, 
and drug-dealers. Joojeh’s sister, a prostitute who attempts suicide, has already 
committed two of the ‘great sins’. However, after being saved by Seyyed, who takes 
her to hospital, she in turn becomes an instrument o f his salvation. Just before the 
enrobing ceremony, which he is unwilling to attend, while his roommate is trying to 
persuade him otherwise, she delivers a parcel that contains his stolen garb -  a sign 
that alludes to his ability to save souls.
We then see Seyyed finally dressed in the clerical robes and on his way to save 
Joojeh. Seyyed, a humble man who is deeply concerned with the suffering o f the 
world around him, proceeds to take Joojeh out of the young offenders institution 
where he is imprisoned. Seyyed asks to read his hand, the same trick that Joojeh had 
used to rob him o f his supplies. This last sequence bears one o f the most powerful 
shots o f the film. He speaks in Joojeh’s vocabulary and affectionately tells him that 
he is going to take him out of the prison and to his village with him. There is no hint 
of preaching or use of theological jargon in Seyyed’s talk. Indeed, he believes in 
guiding Joojeh through love rather than disciplining him by cutting his hand off, an 
emphasis on saving the soul rather than punishing the body.
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In The Lizard , the robe is seen as a taming device, as Reza Marmulak refers to it at 
the end of the film. However, it does not so much transform Reza as give him an 
opportunity to bring to the surface the best o f his qualities. It does not in and of itself 
provide Reza with morals and values. In fact, from the very outset of the film it is 
clear that even though Reza is a criminal and has forgotten how to pray formally, he 
is not an immoral person or someone without values. Despite being convicted of 
armed robbery, he has never touched a weapon and considers bearing arms outside 
his principles. Even though he is not an outwardly practising Muslim, he has his own 
Islamic principles -  he does not steal during the holy months of Ramadan, 
Muharram and Safar. He does not endorse the unequal treatment of women or the 
hypocritical attitude of some men, who use religious sanctions to satisfy their sexual 
desires. In fact, he employs fiqh  terminology to strongly condemn these acts. He 
does really pay Motazedi’s mother out of kindness when he finds out that her son 
and sole bread-winner has been imprisoned. He does not abuse the trust o f Faezeh, 
the young woman, even though he is obviously very attracted to her. Instead, he 
gives up a golden opportunity for spending some time alone with her, to her ex- 
husband. He sacrifices his own desires to her best interests: Faezeh might have a 
future with her ex-husband, but not with him. In some instances, the robe is more an 
impediment to his values than a vehicle to serve. For example, when the thugs beat 
up the old shopkeeper, Reza mumbles, ‘If only Islam had not tied up my hands!’ In 
short, his involvement with religion had provided him with an opportunity to lead a 
more meaningful and purposeful life.
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Conclusions
Both Under the Moonlight and The Lizard critically examine the role and status of 
the clergy, but neither of them outrightly accept or reject the religious institutions. 
The filmic discourses are in fact a continuation of an ongoing debate in Iran. Like 
Soroush, Eshkevar and Kadivar, the filmmakers Mirkarimi and Tabrizi articulate 
their positions from a religious viewpoint. The films do not endorse the notion of 
clergy as men of power with unlimited authority over people’s private and public 
lives, nor do they deem the clergy irrelevant to modem day Iranian society. Instead, 
they are an invitation to review our understanding o f religion and its current role in 
society. In Under the Moonlight, Mirkarimi dares to break through the enclosed 
quarters o f the seminary, and with an unapologetic approach examines the 
relationship of the seminarians with each other and with the outside world, as well as 
the relevance of their theological understanding to the real world. The Lizard 
highlights the enforcement of one particular interpretation of Islam and contrasts it 
with a pluralistic approach to the understanding of Islam. They both propose a more 
fluid relationship between people, the clergy and the Divine that is not confined 
within the rigid boundaries of the seminarian debates. Even though the films, 
particularly The Lizard, are subversive in that they question the role of the clergy in 
society, they remain affirmative of the role of religion in one’s life.
As I have discussed earlier, ‘religion’ is an ambiguous term for it comprises a 
number of interrelated ideas and practices ranging from faith and belief in 
supernatural powers to organised religion with a hierarchy between specialists and 
ordinary participants, as well as ritual — collective and stereotyped formal
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behaviours, usually in reference to a faith, and often organised by religious 
specialists. Statements about what ‘religion’ is or does may be true of only one or 
two o f these three interrelated ideas and practices. Since they form an integrated 
system, all these various aspects need to be studied in order to arrive at a fuller 
understanding of ‘religion’. Having explored the formalistic approach to religion in 
this chapter, the next chapter will examine how filmmakers employ film to discuss 
mystical concepts in a more personal approach to religion.
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Chapter 6: Sight, Sound and Sufism: Mystical Islam in Majidi’s
Films
The energy and buzz of the annual Fajr International Film Festival at the cinema 
exclusively designated for film critics and journalists is palpable from its very 
crowded entrance. Frequented by established as well as aspiring film stars, directors, 
journalists and critics the cinema is a hotbed of gossip and information. Every year, 
therefore, I took the opportunity to make as many contacts as I could. My efforts also 
meant that I sometimes had to listen to the running commentary of my new friend 
sitting next to me during the screenings, whilst desperately trying to concentrate on 
the film. Distracting as this was, I obtained some of the most interesting information 
during these interrupted film viewings and the smoggy cafe breaks. It was during 
one of these episodes in FIFF 2006 that I learnt about the funding of Majid Majidi’s 
latest feature film The Willow Tree (Bid-e majnun, 2005).
Majidi is one of Iran’s most successful directors and his films have been well 
received both inside and outside of Iran. He has won numerous national and 
international awards, with his Children o f Heaven (Bcicheha-ye aseman, 1997) and 
The Colour o f  Paradise (Rang-e Khoda, 1999) turning him into a globally acclaimed 
director. A quick glance at the numerous pages of comments on the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb), reveal the popularity of his films in the West. His films often 
depict man’s struggle in the face of adversity. Many of the reviews speak of his films 
as having ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ overtones. Even without entering into the 
definitions of these two highly debatable terms one can easily see why Majidi made
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a highly suitable candidate to receive funding from Farabi’s Spiritual Cinema 
Centre.
Despite its funding source, The Willow Tree appeared in the Iranian Cinema section 
o f the 23rd FIFF, not Spiritual Cinema. I learnt from my informant -  a Farabi insider 
-  that Majidi had refused to enter the film in the latter section because he feared the 
loss of his Iranian audiences at the box office. The label im a ‘nagara>, he believed, 
would discourage his viewers from seeing the film, and therefore, jeopardise the 
work. This nugget o f information spoke volumes about the dynamics of Iranian 
cinema and Iranian society at large. It demonstrated how just the branding of a 
product that reflected the aspirations of the Islamic Republic might lead to public 
rejection. The threat was serious enough for Majidi, a popular and well-established 
filmmaker, not to take the risk.
The Willow Tree was nominated in 10 categories in the Festival and won four 
awards, including Best Director, Best Actor, Best Sound Recording and Audience 
Choice. Ironically, however, the highest number of awards that year went to one of 
only two Iranian films in the Spiritual Cinema category -  Mirkarimi’s So Far, So 
Close {Kheyli dur, kheyli nazdik, 2005), which was nominated in 13 categories, won 
six awards and was the runner-up for the Audience Choice award. It also did well at 
the box office during general release. Majidi’s fears may well have been unfounded.
Regardless of the categories in which they are grouped, Majidi’s films are deeply 
engaged with religious notions and themes. These references, however, are not 
explicitly religious. Rather, they are filmic depictions of man’s struggle towards
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spiritual attainment, a discourse that reflects an aspect of Islamic mysticism or Sufi 
teachings.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the mystical approach to Islam provides an alternative 
discourse that allows for a more personal approach than the Islam o f the clerics and 
lawmen. It is misleading to talk about a ‘spiritual essence’ of Suflsm as though this 
were a trans-historical concept. In fact, such concepts have evolved over time and 
have been articulated variously by different Sufi masters. With the early expansion 
of Islam beyond its original Arabian context, Muslims faced various intellectual and 
social upheavals. Sufism was one such response to these challenges, one that 
dialogued with new ideas, practices and ways of thought. After the fall of the 
Mongol Ilkhanids in Iran in the 14th century and the political upheavals that 
followed, Iran witnessed a spread of Shi‘ism and Sufism. The development of Sufi 
iariqas, or paths, gave rise to popular piety in the veneration o f saints and saint cults 
as well as the hierarchically organised Sufi institutions with special chains of 
transmission from master to disciple.
There is an array of views on what exactly constitutes mysticism in Islam and 
whether Sufism is connected to Islam at all. In discussing the difficulties of defining 
the term ‘mysticism’, Schimmel recalls the famous story in Rumi’s Mathnawi about 
the blind men who were asked to describe what they were touching, without 
knowing that it was an elephant. Just as each one of them described it differently 
according to the part of the body that they had touched so, too, has Sufism, the 
generally accepted name for Islamic mysticism, been defined in different ways 
(1975; 3). Chittick also argues that one cannot find a consensus within the Islamic
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texts as to the definition of the word sufi and that ‘authors commonly argued about 
both its meaning and its legitimacy’ (2000: 2).
According to Schimmel, mysticism can be defined as ‘love of the Absolute -  for the 
power that separates true mysticism from mere asceticism is love. Divine love makes 
the seeker capable of bearing, even of enjoying, all the pains and afflictions that God 
showers upon him in order to test him and to purify his soul’ (1975: 4). The mystic 
emphasises the role of the heart in understanding the ineffable reality, which neither 
reason nor philosophy can reveal (ibid.). Indeed, the Qur’anic verse 53: 11 ‘The 
heart did not lie in what it saw’ is often invoked as proof ‘that the locus of spiritual 
vision and mystical knowledge is the heart’ (Sells, 2007: 45).
In explaining the appeal of Islamic mysticism from the early period of Islam,
Mottahedeh states that Muslim mystics
had created a vivid form of spirituality that grasped the imagination not only of 
Muslims but also of non-Muslims; and conversion to Islam both within the lands ruled 
by Muslims and in lands far beyond, whether in Central Asia, Central Africa, or 
elsewhere, took place more often through the efforts of Sufis than through those of 
any other representatives of Islam (Mottahedeh, 1985: 146)
As Lings (1996) observes, however, there are those who regard Sufism as 
independent of Islam, arguing that it has borrowed from other non-Islamic traditions 
such as Buddhism and Hinduism, or because the Sufi beliefs and practices, 
regardless of their origins, do not necessarily fit into their particular definition of 
Islam. And there are yet others, more recently, who consider themselves to be Sufis 
but not connected to any religion, let alone Islam. Lings points to thousands in the 
Western world ‘who, while claiming to be ‘Sufis’, maintain that Sufism is
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independent of any particular religion and that it has always existed.’ Lings asserts 
that in doing so, ‘they unwittingly reduce i t ... [and] ... fail to notice that by robbing 
it o f its particularity and therefore its originality, they also deprive it o f all impetus’ 
(1993: 16). For him, therefore, it is quite clear that ‘Sufism is nothing other than 
Islamic mysticism, which means that it is the central and most powerful current of 
that tidal wave that constitutes the Revelation of Islam’ (Lings, 1993: 15).
The authorities of the Islamic Republic, even today, highly disapprove of the term 
Sufism, condemning its institutions and practices as unlslamic. In order to reconcile 
with the undeniable existence o f esoteric perspectives in Islam—which form an 
essential part o f Persian culture and literature, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3 -  
the term ‘irfan, loosely translated as gnosis -  has become the preferred term in the 
Islamic Republic. This might be because gnosis does not denote a separate school of 
thought or institution, and thus does not pose a potential, rival threat to the Islamic 
Republic’s interpretation of Islam and its authority. Rather, it alludes to an 
independent understanding attained through personal search and practice. Whilst 
poets such as Rumi and Hafez are renowned, especially in the West, as Sufis, the 
Islamic Republic refers to them as gnostics ( 'urafa, sing. £arij). Without delving into 
detail about which is the more accurate term, it is nevertheless important to note the 
significance of these mystical approaches to the understanding and practices of 
Iranians, regardless of whether they are labelled as gnostic or Sufi.
In one o f my interviews in 2004 with Abdullah Esfandiyari, head of the Spiritual 
Centre of the Farabi Foundation, he mentioned the increased appeal o f darvishi, a 
Persian term also used to refer to Sufism, particularly since the victory of the Islamic
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Republic. He went on to say how these Sufi groups have misled many, abusing their 
positions and robbing people of their money, with some Sufi masters entering 
unlawful relations with their female disciples. He said he had seen a documentary 
where the adherents of these groups had talked about their misfortunes, warning 
people about the dangers of following Sufi groups. Yet he recognised the appeal of 
Sufism in the quest for inner meaning. Ma 'nagara cinema, he said, was an attempt to 
look at that which is beyond the surface and at the mysteries of the world.
As we have seen, it is almost impossible to be definitive about this. I have used 
Sufism here to refer to a mystical dimension within Islam that seeks a direct personal 
experience of the Divine. I will particularly explore some of the Iranian expressions 
of Sufism as discussed at length in Chapter 3. Here, I examine how Majidi employs 
the medium of film to articulate mystical concepts such as love, God, suffering and 
annihilation, and their relevance to the modern-day lives of ordinary people.
Majid Majidi was bom in Tehran in 1959, where he studied at the Institute of 
Dramatic Arts. After the Revolution, he began his career in the performing arts as an 
actor in the Centre for Islamic Art and Thought (Howzeh andisheh va honar-e 
Islami) and the Art Centre of the Islamic Development (Propaganda) Organisation 
(Howzeh honari sazman-e tablighat-e Islami). In 1981 he began his cinematic career 
by acting in Manouchehr Haqani’s Justification (Towjih, 1981) and by 1989 he had 
acted in nine films, including three by Mohsen Makhmalbaf: Two Blind Eyes {Do 
cheshm-e bisu, 1984), Fleeing from  Evil to God (E ste‘azeh, 1984) and Boycott 
{Baycot, 1986). He made his own first feature film, Baduk, in 1992. This was 
followed by Father {Pedar, 1996), Children o f  Heaven (Bacheha-ye aseman, 1997),
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The Colour o f  Paradise (Rang-e Khoda, 1999), The Willow Tree (.Bid-e majnoon, 
2005), and The Song o f  Sparrows {Avaz-e gonjeshkha, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, many of Majidi’s films are depictions o f man’s spiritual
attainment. In these films, Majidi depicts the abstract Sufi stations (maqam) and
states (ahwal) through the characters of his films. He employs the modem medium
of cinema to concretise mystical concepts. The poetic language of his films could be
read as continuing in the long line o f symbolic Persian literature and poetry, in which
mystics, Sufis and Muslim philosophers have written much about love, God and self-
annihilation. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are interesting parallels between poetry
and mysticism (Knysh, 2000). The open-endedness of poetic language allows
readers to create meaning, even if the poem was written in distant times. Indeed the
inherent characteristics of poetry make it the natural choice for the expression of
mystical experiences. Majidi himself highlights the significance o f Persian literature
and the relevance of Iranian cultural history to contemporary Iranians:
Iran is an old country with a significant cultural history. Our literature is very rich 
with poets such as Hafiz, Saadi, Rumi. In their writings, these poets have always 
given a [sic] great importance to the human being. Contemporary cultural subjects are 
stemming from this tradition as well as the rituals associated with them. The manner 
[in which] these subjects are dealt with is influenced by the particular beliefs of the 
Iranians that existed and continue to exist nowadays. These days, the world, and in 
particular the Western world, is in a period of disruption with the past. Human 
being[s] and traditional moral values, dear to people, seem to have been lost in the 
process. (May 2003, http://www.cinemajidi.com/).
Thus, his filmic discourses, though modem in form, are deeply rooted in medieval 
Iranian mystical discourse, and particularly its poetry. They are also a reminder that 
Shi‘i Iranian religious expressions are not solely limited to sacred texts, but also
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draw from Persian mystical literature. In this chapter I will examine Majidi’s The 
Colour o f  Paradise, Baran and The Willow Tree, each of which are filmic discourses 
that reflect some of the key mystical teachings in Islam. To this end, I will explore 
the Sufi theme o f pain and suffering in The Colour o f  Paradise and The Willow Tree. 
In the section that follows, I will look specifically at Baran, drawing out its depiction 
of the various stages of the Sufi state of ‘love’ that culminates in self-annihilation. I 
will analyse how Majidi’s films poetically engage with the Sufi stations and states as 
ways of spiritual attainment.
Pain and Suffering
Suffering is one of the main topics in Majidi’s films. His lead characters, who are 
mostly children, are afflicted either by poverty, disability or both. His debut feature 
Baduk (1992), concerns the slavery of two lonely, impoverished and orphaned young 
siblings. The film depicts the struggles of these two children against kidnappers and 
drug-traffickers, who rob them of their freedom, childhood, and finally each other. In 
Majidi’s later films, the bad-guy figures blur. Instead of having the good protagonist 
against the evil antagonist, his heroes are ordinary people who fight the challenges of 
life in extraordinary ways.
In 1998, his Children o f Heaven (1997) was the first Iranian film to be nominated for 
an Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film. Children o f Heaven is also 
about a brother and sister living in poverty, but this time the siblings live with a 
loving and caring family in the urban setting of Tehran. These two children, ‘Ali and 
Zahra, fight their poverty with remarkable courage and maturity. The film looks at
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this daily struggle, which turns into ‘ Ali’s quest with constant searching and running 
throughout the film. Initially, ‘Ali runs to find his sister’s shoes. The film then 
proceeds with both o f them running to share ‘A li’s only pair of worn-out shoes to 
school. The chase then concludes with ‘All’s attempt to win third prize in the 
running competition— a pair of trainers— for his sister. Through the film’s simple 
narrative, Majidi relates the greatness and strength of human spirit, determination, 
humility and sacrifice that manifests itself through the acts of these small children. In 
his later films, Majidi explores the themes of pain and suffering further: the lead 
characters in both The Colour o f  Paradise and The Willow Tree deal with physical 
disability and through them, the films demonstrate man’s suffering in a mystical and 
Sufi context.
The Colour o f  Paradise
The Colour o f  Paradise (1999) is about the struggles of Mohammad Reza, a blind 
eleven-year-old, deprived of paternal love. Having lost his mother when he was six, 
he lives far away from his village, at a boarding school for the visually impaired in 
Tehran. When the school closes for the summer holidays his father, Hashem, 
reluctantly takes him back to the village. There, his two young sisters and paternal 
grandmother shower him with much love and affection. His father, however, appears 
to be ashamed of him and considers him to be the major obstacle to his remarriage to 
the young woman he desires, and is therefore desperate to get rid of him.
The Colour o f  Paradise depicts Mohammad Reza’s acute sense of awareness of the 
world around him and its beauties and contrasts it with his father’s obliviousness and
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‘blindness’ to the same. The film, therefore, is as much about the inner blindness and 
struggles of the father as the struggles of his son. Mohammad Reza’s greatest 
challenge, however, is not overcoming his handicap, but securing the love of a father 
who cannot come to terms with his son’s disability or, in fact, the miseries of his life. 
Thus, the colourful surroundings of Mohammad Reza as opposed to the dull, grey 
setting of the father’s workplace also indicate the contrastingly different worlds in 
which they live.
Mohammad Reza’s blindness has not cut him off from the world. Instead, through 
touch and hearing he has developed a remarkably keen sensitivity. More importantly, 
he has the ability to temporarily detach himself from worldly affairs, and to listen to 
and contemplate nature and his surroundings. Throughout the film, Mohammad Reza 
hears the sounds of birds and nature when everyone else around him seems to be 
unconscious of them. He can sense the trouble of a chick fallen from its nest by its 
chirping. When his father negotiates the price o f the small carpet he wants to sell to 
the merchant, Mohammad Reza easily blocks off the men’s voices and the classical 
music playing in the store to listen to the pigeons and doves singing above. Once 
back in his village, he listens to the woodpeckers in the forest and tries to decipher 
the notes of their chirping. At school, he listens to granny’s voice on the recorded 
tape and connects with her through the recording. He hears what most people 
around him fail to hear.
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In many classical Sufi texts the sense of hearing precedes the sense of seeing.28 The
Prophet Muhammad, for example, received the Revelation through hearing. When
asked about the experience he likened it to the sounds of the caravan bells. Bukhari
documents the following hadith from Ayesha, the Prophet’s wife:
Al-Harith bin Hisham asked Allah's Apostle "O Allah's Apostle! How is the Divine 
Inspiration revealed to you?" Allah's Apostle replied, "Sometimes it is (revealed) like 
the ringing of a bell, this form of Inspiration is the hardest of all and then this state 
passes off after I have grasped what is inspired. Sometimes the Angel comes in the 
form of a man and talks to me and I grasp whatever he says." 'Aisha added: Verily I 
saw the Prophet being inspired Divinely on a very cold day and noticed the sweat 
dropping from his forehead (as the Inspiration was over). (Bukhari, 2007-2008).
Mohammad Reza and his father have both suffered in various ways. However, each 
of them deals with their afflictions in a different manner, which also informs their 
different approaches to life. The implied shortsightedness of the father has allowed 
him to focus only on his miseries, turning him into an embittered soul. He is afraid 
that Mohammad Reza’s blindness might hinder his own marriage prospects and his 
only chance of attaining happiness. Thus, his initial reluctance to let Mohammad 
Reza appear publicly in the village, and later his eagerness to get rid of him, are not 
really out of shame for his son’s disability. In fact, he does not express the same 
concerns outside the village setting, when Mohammad Reza is present at his 
workplace with his co-workers or when they are travelling in Tehran. Mohammad
28 For example, Knysh (2009) explains how the Sufi exegete, Samnani, spoke of the 
four hierarchical levels of human understanding of the Qur’an. These understandings 
in the ascending order are through hearing, divine inspiration, righteous acts and 
direct witness. The very fact that the Qur’an itself was and remains an aural 
experience amongst Muslims is also of significant importance. In fact Graham 
(2009) provides a recent example of the modem Iranian scholar, Muhammad Taqi 
Shari‘ati-Mazinani: ‘The Qur’an was a light that extended through the opening of the 
ears into the soul; it transformed this soul and as a consequence of that, the world’.
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Reza, however, is capable of surviving the society in which he lives despite its 
occasional hostility. Even though initially teased by the village children, Mohammad 
Reza succeeds in amazing and impressing them when he attends the village school 
and reads out the school text fluently in Braille. Other than with his father, he enjoys 
a very close and loving relationship with his family. He participates in village life 
with his grandmother and two sisters who are only too happy to have him around.
Hashem, however, seems incapable of seeing all the love and beauty that already
exists in his own life. Whilst all other members o f his family bring great joy and
happiness to one other, the father has totally deprived himself of it, choosing only to
see his loss. His outburst at the grandmother when she leaves home because he had
taken Mohammad Reza away is very telling:
You want me to get stuck with taking care of a blind child? Why does that God of 
yours, who is Great, not help me out of this misery? What should I be grateful to Him 
for? For things that I do not have? For my miseries? For a blind child? For a lost 
wife? I lost my father when I was young. Who cared for me? Who loved me?
This complaint against God is also voiced by Mohammad Reza. When he is tricked
by his father and is left with the blind carpenter in a place far away from the village,
the distraught boy opens up his heart to the carpenter:
Nobody loves me, not even granny, because I’m blind. Everyone wants to run away 
from me. All other village children go to the village school except for me, who has to 
go to the special school for blind people at the other end of the world... our teacher 
says that God loves blind people more, but I said if He did so, He wouldn’t make us 
blind so that we couldn’t see Him. He said God is not visible, He is everywhere, you 
can see Him everywhere, you can see Him through your fingertips. Now I look for 
Him everywhere, so that one day my hands might touch Him and I can tell Him 
everything - even all the secrets in my heart.
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Human suffering is one o f the important themes discussed in Sufi literature. As an
aspect of human life, various people respond to suffering differently. In Sufism,
suffering is welcomed as a process through which the human soul is purified; it is the
precursor to a greater joy. Rumi’s famous poem about the chickpeas cooking in the
pot of boiling water is a metaphor for the suffering of the human soul that matures
through the process. The uncooked chickpeas keep jumping up in the pot trying to
evade the fire, but the woman keeps pushing them back down in with her ladle. They
ask her why did she keep torturing them, since she had already shown her
appreciation by buying them. She responds:
I do not cook you because I dislike you: I want you to gain taste and savor.
You will become food and then mix with the spirit. You do not suffer tribulation 
because you are despicable (Mathnavi, III 4163-4164, translated in Chittick, 1983: 
80).
Even though Mohammad Reza also complains about God and not being loved, his
approach to his suffering differs greatly from that of his father. Mohammad Reza
searches for God everywhere, to talk to Him and share his secrets with Him. A man
does not become fortunate or unfortunate because he is spared or burdened with
suffering; rather it is his response to suffering that makes him fortunate or
unfortunate and shows his worth.
God makes an unfortunate man suffer and he flees from Him in ingratitude,
But when He sends suffering to a fortunate man, he moves closer to Him. (M IV 
2915-2916 translated in Chittick, 1983: 115).
The father, by contrast, gets further and further away from God and can only see 
what he has lost. The greatest torture, however, is to be far from God.
The cruelty of Time and of every suffering that exists is easier than distance from God 
and heedlessness.
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For that cruelty will pass, but distance from Him will not. No one possesses good 
fortune but he who takes to Him an aware spirit (M VI 1756-57, translated in Chittick, 
1983: 58).
Analysing Rumi’s body of literature, Chittick maintains that in the tribulations that 
man faces, his attachment to self results in suffering. These afflictions however are 
‘all Mercy hidden in the guise of Wrath’. They provide man with the opportunity to 
separate himself from the self and get closer to God. ‘The fundamental problem of 
most men is that they do not realize that every hardship and pain they undergo is 
only a shadow o f their separation from God’ (Chittick, 1983: 237). These sufferings 
provide man with the necessary rituals o f purification through which he is liberated 
from his self and the world. Trying to avoid suffering is in fact an attempt to flee 
God. One ‘must not flee pain and heartache—which come to him from God—but his 
own self. The only way to flee from suffering is to seek refuge from one’s own ego 
with God’ (Chittick, 1983: 238).
Hashem can no longer appreciate what he does have, but rather allows things that he 
does not have to overshadow his life. Eventually he starts to lose all that he did have 
but refused to see. As Rumi says, TSTo one has ever fled from suffering without 
finding something worse in return’ (Rumi, D 123, translated in Chittick, 1983: 297). 
Indeed, the Grandmother dies more from grief than from her illness, and Hashem’s 
fiancee’s family breaks off the engagement, considering the marriage inauspicious. 
The sudden burden of these new afflictions awakens Hashem. He goes back to the 
carpenter and after much hesitation finally asks to take Mohammad Reza back home. 
On their way, Mohammad Reza falls into the river while crossing the bridge. 
Hashem pauses for a long time— as though momentarily welcoming the situation
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that would rid him of this unwanted encumbrance—before plunging into the river to 
save his son. This delayed reaction, however, means that the strong river currents 
have swiftly taken Mohammad Reza out of reach.
When Hashem regains consciousness and finds Mohammad Reza washed up on the 
seashore, it is the first time that we see him hold his son. This last scene of 
Mohammad Reza and Hashem is similar to one of the most famous epic tableaus of 
Rostam and Sohrab, immortalized in the Shahnameh. As in the Persian tragedy of 
Rostam and Sohrab, the father’s attempt to make reparations is too late. Rostam, not 
knowing that his opponent Sohrab is his own son, strikes the fatal wound, only to 
immediately realise the truth. His desperate attempts to save his son and the remedy 
with which he returns to heal his wound are all too late. Sohrab dies just before his 
father brings the remedy. Thus, the famous Persian proverb of ‘the remedy after 
Sohrab’s death’ (noosh daroo ba'd-e marg-e Sohrab), which refers to a belated and 
lutile attempt to make amends, can be read in Hashem’s belated expression of love 
for his son. Indeed, even though Hashem throws himself into the water and 
endangers his own life to save that of his son, this act o f selflessness comes to 
naught. Mohammad Reza’s illuminated hand, even though understood by many 
reviewers as a happy ending, is read more plausibly as union with the Divine when 
he finally touches/sees God.
In fact, most of Majidi’s films do not have a happy ending in the conventional style 
of the protagonist achieving his desires. Rather, in most cases the ‘vague’ endings 
could be read as the higher spiritual attainment of the protagonist. Thus, even though 
‘ Ali does not win the trainers in Children o f  Heaven, and Mohammad Reza does not
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gain his father’s love and acceptance, their experiences transform them in the path to 
a higher level of being in the ascending stages of human perfection.
The Willow Tree
Majidi’s Willow Tree (2005)29 also has a blind protagonist, this time Yusef, a 
middle-aged professor o f literature and mysticism in Tehran. The lead character is 
married and enjoys the love and support of his family, particularly that of his wife, 
Roya. Their calm and happy life is threatened when he is diagnosed with a tumour. 
Yusuf travels to France for an operation and in a twist of fate learns not only that the 
tumour is benign, but also that he is regaining his eyesight after almost 38 years. He 
returns to Tehran, but this new experience changes everything in his life.
Some Western reviews o f The Willow Tree have read the film as a philosophical 
journey of existentialism (Boutilier, 2005), to which Majidi responds:
We were very aware of Existentialism when we wrote it. It was core for what the film 
is about. But also, because the philosophy of Iran is linked to the Metaphysical and 
Spirituality the film has two sides (interview with Boutilier, 2005).
29 On his official website Majidi (2005b) narrates how he came across someone a 
few years ago who had lost and then regained his sight, and that this encounter was 
the inspiration for The Willow Tree. Some Iranian media have reported that Majidi 
met this man when he was researching The Colour o f Paradise, but abused his trust 
and his story. The man, Yaqub Abdipoor from Tehran, was blinded in an explosion 
when he was six and later regained his sight. However, Abdipoor claims that the film 
has no similarity to his life and states that he regrets having shared his story with 
Majidi. The media have also criticised Majidi for not crediting Abdipoor in the film, 
(see for example, http://www.aftab.ir/news/2005/sep/21/
c5cl 127318899_art_culture_cinemajmajid_majidi.php, visited 12 June 2007). The 
film’s departure from the real story might in fact explain Majidi’s decision to remove 
the credits to Abdipoor.
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The Willow Tree makes intertextual references to The Colour o f  Paradise. In a way,
Mohammad Reza’s unanswered question about God’s love in The Colour o f
Paradise is addressed in The Willow Tree. Before his trip to France, Yusef writes a
letter to God, pleading with Him to show mercy and to cure his tumour. He reminds
God how he had not complained about suffering from the darkness of sight and says:
I want to say a few words to you, or have you forgotten me? The one whom You 
deprived of Your beauties and he didn’t complain. Instead of light and brightness I 
sank in darkness and did not complain. I was content with this little paradise of mine 
and was enjoying it. Were all these years of suffering and difficulty not enough that 
You want to add to my suffering? I do not know whether or not I will ever make it 
back to my family. I do not know whether or not this illness will put me down. I do 
not know who to take my complaint against You. But I beseech You to show me some 
of Your kindness. Do not take away the opportunity of this life from me.
After the operation he is blessed with more than he asks for. Not only is his life 
spared, but there is also a possibility of regaining his sight. Once again he implores 
God for yet another opportunity:
I know I made a mistake, and my first mistake was that I did not know you well 
enough. Now I know that you haven’t erased my name from your book of kindness, 
that you haven’t forgotten me, that you are with me and looking after me. But I so 
wish that you would complete your kindness. Now that you’ve been there for me and 
brought me halfway, I beg of you to finish it well. Trust me! I appreciate light more 
than others. If I come out of darkness, I will be with you until the end.
One more time Y usef s prayers are answered. However, he fails his test miserably 
and God’s ‘act o f kindness’, therefore, turns out to become his suffering. His heart 
begins to desire what his eyes see, and his enlightened heart quickly sinks into 
darkness. He begins to lose his love and respect for things that he had held sacred 
before his trip. At the beginning of the film Yusef compares his wife Roya to the 
heavenly angels. Her unconditional love for him is compared to Rumi’s
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unquestioning love for Shams. After regaining his sight, however, he lusts after a 
much younger and more beautiful woman and loses all his appreciation for his 
family and the happy and respectful life that he had enjoyed so far.
The world and all its distractions overwhelm Yusef. He allows his hungry eyes to 
dictate his life and the course they take. As he tells his mother in an outburst, he no 
longer needs anyone. He spends many long hours exploring the city and its gleaming 
consumerism. The glitter eventually overpowers his divine spark, turning him into a 
lost soul. He disregards his years of research and study on philosophy and 
mysticism as a pile of rubbish and resigns his occupation as a respected professor. 
Roya, his wife, can no longer take his unkind behaviour towards her. She leaves him, 
taking their daughter with her. Y usufs mother falls critically ill with worry about 
her son’s transformation and is hospitalised. And the home, which he had once 
imagined as a little paradise, now makes him sick. The image o f his house, covered 
with the ashes o f books and pictures that he bums in his garden towards the end of 
the film, is reminiscent of a hell that he has created with his own hands. Most 
importantly, he loses his closeness to God, and his ‘fortunate’ recovery results in 
great loneliness.
The film compares sufferings that are beyond man’s control and, therefore, attributed 
to God, with self-inflicted afflictions, such as those that Yusef experiences after he 
regains his sight. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the real suffering in the Sufi 
context is attachment to self and the further the distance between man and God, the 
more his suffering. Y usef s blessed eyesight increases his separation from God and 
his obedience to his ego. His heart, which had once been home to the love of God, is
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instead filled with the emptiness and desires o f the outside world. Only when God 
withdraws his mercy, and Yusef begins to once again lose his eyesight, does he 
return to God, talking to him, repenting and pleading for one more opportunity in 
life. As Rumi states, ‘separation is to suffer His absence, majesty and severity 
(qahr). But mercy prevails over wrath, so every cruelty (jafa ’) o f the Beloved is in 
fact an act of faithfulness (w a fa f  In showing their sincerity, God’s lovers welcome 
the pain (dard) o f the dregs (durd) along with the joy o f the wine’ (Lewisohn, 2007).
Mohammad Reza’s puzzle in The Colour o f  Paradise ~  that ‘if  God loved us, he 
wouldn’t make us blind’ -  is addressed in The Willow Tree. It turns out that Y usef s 
blindness was a blessing in the disguise of suffering. As a blind man, he had been a 
respected professor who had dedicated his life to the study of mysticism and enjoyed 
the support of a loving family. God’s love for him far outweighed his loss o f 
physical sight. He enjoyed inner sight and peace as well as love and respect within 
both his private and social life. God’s love for him however, did not stop during the 
period o f his separation from Him. When he loses his eyesight for the second time 
and begs God for another opportunity in life, he seeks not just the recovery of his 
sight, but an opportunity for repentance. As mentioned earlier, repentance is the first 
station in the Sufi path which, Hujwiri states, is followed by other stations such as 
conversion, renunciation and trust in God. The film ends with Yusef effectively at 
the beginning of the Sufi path.
Self-Sacrifice and the Alchemy of Love
The Sufi stations and states on the mystical path culminate in self-sacrifice and love. 
There are abundant references to these themes in Persian literature, and particularly
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in poetry. Rumi, Attar, Sa‘di, Jami and Hafez’s compositions are just a few examples 
of poetry filled with themes of love, sacrifice and self-annihilation. These poetic 
metaphors do not just refer to divine love. Jami’s poetic rendition of the love story of 
Leyli and Majnun, for example, transforms human love into a vehicle and symbol of 
divine love (Nasr and Matini, 1991: 344). Majidi explores these concepts through the 
vocabulary o f love in modem times. His poetic discourse in Baran is a beautiful 
depiction of the various stages of the Sufi state of ‘love’.
Baran is about a young Azeri man, Latif, who works on a building site in Tehran. 
His relatively easy job catering and shopping for the labourers allows him to avoid 
the more arduous manual labour. When Najaf, an illegal Afghan labourer, falls from 
the second floor o f the building and injures his leg, his young son, Rahmat, tries to 
replace his father to earn a living for the family. However, Rahmat proves too weak 
and incompetent. Subsequently, Memar, the construction supervisor, swaps Latif and 
Rahmat’s jobs, forcing Latif to take on the hard labour he had so far managed to 
avoid.
Latif is furious at this new arrangement and takes all his anger out on Rahmat, who 
never utters a word. He gmdgingly shows Rahmat the ropes and introduces him to 
the shop from which he used to buy groceries for the workers. The shopkeeper keeps 
L atif s birth certificate to guarantee the goods sold to him on credit. Latif takes the 
opportunity o f being away from the site to slap Rahmat hard on the face on their way 
to the shop. Rahmat’s only response is to pick up a stone and aim it at Latif but not 
throw it at him. To L atif s great disappointment, Rahmat’s tea and lunch spreads are 
very soon welcomed enthusiastically by the men, and he is the only one who dines
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alone. In a fit, Latif goes to the tiny pantry where Rahmat is based and smashes 
everything, creating a huge mess. Rahmat, as usual, does not utter a word; a position 
he maintains consistently throughout the movie. Instead, L atif s outrage allows him 
to clean up and rearrange the room from inside out, turning it into his own space. 
Latif, increasingly consumed by hatred for Rahmat and not satiated with these acts 
o f revenge, waits one early morning on the rooftop in ambush for Rahmat and Soltan 
(an old Afghan worker, who introduced Rahmat) and throws wet stucco at them. 
Later that day, when Latif is working from across the pantry, the wind blows aside 
the curtain at the entrance of the pantry and in the dim reflection of the mirror, he 
sees the image of a girl combing her long hair and tying it up. He creeps up behind 
the curtain to get a closer look and only then realises that Rahmat is, in fact, a girl 
disguised as a boy.
Latif is overwhelmed and bewildered when faced with the truth of Rahmat’s identity. 
The unveiling of truth, and in this case, the two layers of unveiling— of the curtain 
lifted at the pantry entrance because of the wind and Rahmat’s unveiling o f her 
headcover— enables him to see the beauty hidden from him. His subsequent attempts 
to make amends do not simply arise from the shame and pain he feels for his 
previous selfish behaviour. Rather, he falls in love with Baran, which is Rahmat’s 
real name. His blind and selfish acts were, therefore, a result of his ignorance, 
through which he failed to appreciate real beauty and truth. As Hujwiri states, ‘All 
veils come from ignorance; when ignorance has passed away, the veils vanish and 
this life, by means of gnosis becomes one with the life to come’ (Hujwiri, quoted in 
Smith, 1995: 210). Once having entered the path, the Sufi undergoes a process of 
inward transformation. Similarly, this revelatory incident becomes the beginning of
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L atif s inward transformation. The following day, we see Latif breaking a wall in the
construction site and making holes into it, like two eyes that let in light, a symbolic
reference to L atif s newly acquired ability to see. As Smith argues, gnosis,
means the Vision, for when the eye of the soul is stripped of ail the veils which 
hindered it from seeing God, then it beholds the reality of the Divine attributes by its 
own inner light, which goes far beyond the light which is given to perfect faith, for 
gnosis, as we have seen, belongs to a sphere quite other than of faith (Smith, 1995: 
211).
The film follows L atif s inner journey, with various stages analogous to the Sufi 
states discussed above. At the beginning of the film Latif gave the impression of 
boyish insouciance and hot-temperedness; now he turns into a considerate man who 
channels all his anger into protecting Baran. When a worker throws back at her the 
cigarette she has bought for him, demanding a different brand, Latif jumps in and 
has a fight with him. When another worker walks into the pantry demanding tea 
outside break-time, L atif s blood boils and forces the man to leave the pantry. When 
the government inspectors, alerted about Memar’s employment of illegal Afghan 
workers, chase Baran in the street, Latif gets involved and takes the beating to give 
Baran enough time to escape. Interestingly this appears to happen on the very same 
street on which he had slapped her earlier. Latif is arrested and later bailed out of jail 
by Memar.
Discussing Rumi’s philosophy of ‘attainment’ to God, Chittick argues that once the 
disciple has entered the Way, this third dimension of spiritual realisation is not a 
simple, one-step process. Tt can be said that this third dimension of Sufi teaching 
deals with all the inner experiences undergone by the traveler on his journey’ (1983: 
11). In this way, ‘once having actualized wakefulness, the traveler moves on to
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repentance and then to self-examination; or once having achieved humility, he 
ascends to chivalry and then to expansion’ (Chittick, 1983: 12). L a tif s acts clearly 
demonstrate these various stages of his inner journey, including wakefulness, 
repentance, humility and chivalry. Thus, when Latif takes the beating and 
imprisonment for Baran’s sake, he takes the first steps in Rumi’s terms, in chivalry 
and expansion.
However, these acts of redemption and sacrifice only prove to be the beginning of 
his long ordeal in loving Baran. Even though he is awakened from his ignorance and 
succeeds in overcoming many of his selfish desires, the greatest test still remains—  
the ability to overcome his ego. In Sufism, the ego is the final and most opaque veil 
that stands between man and his Beloved. ‘[The] Veil between man and God is not 
heaven and earth, but your assumptions and ego are your veil. Remove that from the 
way and you shall reach God’ (Abul-Khayr, Asrar al-Tawhid p. 229 quoted in 
Nurbaksh, 1982-1988: 8). This annihilation of self is also an essential aspect of 
Rumi’s philosophy. He asserts that it is only through the annihilation of selfhood that 
one can attain ‘his true self, which is existence and “subsistence” within God’ 
(Chittick, 1983: 179).
After Baran’s near arrest, Memar can no longer risk employing Afghans. Baran, 
along with all the other Afghan workers, is dismissed. This becomes the beginning 
of L atif s restlessness in his separation from his beloved. Not knowing where to find 
her and unable to share his pain with anyone, he distances himself further and further 
from the world around him. The only trace of her left behind is a hairpin with a few 
strands of her hair caught in it, which he finds on the rooftop where she used to feed
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the pigeons. He treasures the hairpin like dear life and carries it with him 
everywhere. Again, this echoes a verse from Attar:
From her tresses, if I were to get a tip of her hair
I would treasure it like my eyes and attend to it like my life (quoted in Nurbakhsh,
1982: 64)
Latif begins searching for her in the secluded area outside the city where many 
Afghan families dwell. Despite being very close to her, he fails to see her even 
though she sees him. During his search he finds Soltan, the Afghan friend who had 
brought Baran to the construction site. He finds out from him that Rahmat works as a 
‘rock collector’, removing heavy rocks from the river. After witnessing the extreme 
conditions under which Baran works, Latif becomes even more restless. He is 
desperate to save Baran from the arduous conditions in which she lives. After much 
pleading with Memar, he collects his pending salary for a year from Memar and 
takes it to Soltan. He asks Soltan to give the money to Najaf, Baran’s father, without 
mentioning its source. Najaf, however, decides to gift the money back to Soltan so 
that he can return to Afghanistan and the family awaiting him.
Latif is devastated when he finds this out, not because he has lost all his earnings but 
because he seems unable to make a difference to Baran’s difficult life. His acts of 
self-annihilation and non-existence are evident through this generous and selfless 
giving of all his material wealth for Baran. Latif takes the note that Soltan had left 
for him pledging to pay him back as soon as possible, and casts it into a stream. He 
had never considered the money’s return and willingly accepted poverty for his love. 
The concept of poverty and giving away of one’s material wealth is repeatedly 
employed in many Sufi teachings. As Chittick states:
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Rumi often employs the term ‘poverty’ in a context showing that it is synonymous 
with ‘annihilation’ and ‘non-existence’, the dervish is he who is ‘poor’ because he has 
nothing of ‘his own’. He is totally empty of selfhood. The true ‘poor man’ is in truth 
the richest of all men, since not existing himself, he subsists through the Self. This 
then is the significance of the Prophet’s saying, ‘Poverty is my pride’ (Chittick, 1983: 
187).
In Sufi teachings, love leads to man’s annihilation, which is a necessary step in 
union with God. ‘As long as man continues to live under the illusion of the real 
existence of his own ego, his own selfhood, he is far from God. Only through 
negation of himself can he attain to union with Him’ (Chittick, 1983: 232). L atif s 
self annihilation culminates in doing away with his identity. With no money left 
except for a few notes o f his pocket cash, he buys wooden crutches for Najaf and 
leaves them by their house door. He overhears Najaf sobbing for the death of his 
brother, killed in the war in Afghanistan, and his desire to return to help his brother’s 
family.
When Memar refuses N ajaf s request for a loan, Latif takes matters into his own
hands. With nothing left, Latif sells his national Identity Card—the most important
document an Iranian needs to hold to be recognised as a legal entity by the state— to
the black-market traffickers. With this act, therefore, he gives up the last trace of his
identity, a metaphor that can be read as a complete annihilation of the self. On true
love, Smith quotes the tenth century al-Qurashi:
‘True Love,’ said Abu Abdallah al-Qurashi (ob. A.D. 941), ‘means to give all that 
thou hast to Him Whom thou lovest, so that nothing remains to thee of thine own’. 
And this meant not only the sacrifice of personal possessions, which might be a cause 
of separation between the lover and his Beloved, and the giving up of the personal 
will, but a complete self-surrender. Only the lover who is emptied of self can hope to 
be the dwelling-place of the Divine (Smith, 1995: 207).
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Latif hands over to Najaf the money he receives from selling his identity, and
pretends it was sent by Memar. Najaf is overjoyed and plans to leave for Afghanistan
the following day. In effect, he uses this last belonging of Latif to separate him
forever from his beloved. Latif runs aimlessly around the town and ends up at the
local shrine. He leaves his cap, with Baran’s hairpin on it by the pond and is drawn
inside the shrine. It is as though the divine has called for him. As mentioned earlier,
unlike the Sufi stations, which require man’s concerted efforts, the Sufi states are
‘usually said to consist of spiritual graces bestowed directly by God and outside of
man’s power of acquisition’ (Chittick, 1983: 12). L atif s acts o f selflessness thus far
can be read as ascending the hierarchical Sufi stations. His experience in the shrine,
however, tells of the grace o f having entered the Sufi state, reflected in the
contentment in his face as he sees his beloved off the next day. He kneels in front of
her to help her pick up the vegetables she has dropped on the ground just before she
is to leave. And it is at this moment that he finally, even if briefly, succeeds in fully
gazing upon the face o f his beloved. As Smith argues, pure love guides the mystic
from one station to another
until he comes to the end of the first stage of the Way, when the mirror of the soul has 
become as pure from self as flame from smoke, and is fitted to reflect the Light of 
God, by which it is illuminated in the second stage, that of ecstasy; and now the 
mystic enters upon that third stage of attainment, which is indeed the end of his 
journey. There he receives that mystic knowledge of the Divine, the gnosis (ma ’rifa), 
which will enable him to see God face to face, and in seeing Him, to become one with 
Him (Smith, 1995:209).
Through this film Majidi demonstrates Latif s inner journey and maturity from 
nonchalant boy to selfless lover. According to Rumi, ‘because Love pertains to the 
experiential dimension of Sufism, not the theoretical, it must be experienced to be
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understood. It cannot be explained in words, any more than the true nature of one’s 
attachment to a beloved of this world can be set down on paper’ (Chittick, 1983: 
194). Similarly, Majidi’s narrative provides us with a glimpse of this transformative 
experience, and allows us to see that which cannot be articulated through the narrow 
confines o f words.
Conclusions
Sufism’s early appearance within Islamic history, the vast amount o f literature it has 
produced over the centuries as well as its significant influence on Muslim culture 
and society, makes it an undeniably significant approach within Islam. Persian 
literature, and particularly its poetry, played a significant role in the expression of 
Sufi ideas. Numerous works explore the Sufi states and stations, and the mastery 
with which many o f them have been composed has rendered their authors immortal. 
As diverse as these approaches can be, man’s spiritual attainment and his proximity 
to God remain at the core of any Sufi teaching. One can write volumes on Sufism, 
but this chapter focused selectively on those arguments that have been expressed in 
the works o f Majidi in order to show their filmic expressions.
Majidi’s films are a reflection o f Iranian-Shi‘i religious expressions, which are not 
limited to the sacred texts, but also draw from the works of great mystical masters. 
Majidi demonstrates how the Shi‘i and particularly Iranian Shi‘i expression of 
religion is deeply rooted not only in its sacred texts but also in the artistic and 
cultural expression of the people. With their poetic language, Majidi’s works are 
filmic discourses on man’s journey to spiritual attainment and his proximity to God.
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The four Sufi postulates in Chapter 3 -  intuition, inward light, going beyond self and 
love -  are all explored in Majidi’s three films discussed above. In The Colour o f  
Paradise, Mohammad Reza’s intuition and inward light is contrasted with his 
father’s inward blindness and lack of intuition. They live in different worlds even as 
they share the same time and space. This leads to the very different ways in which 
each of them approaches pain and suffering. In The Willow Tree, Y usef s intuition 
and inward light during the long period of his blindness had allowed him to live in a 
paradise of peace and happiness, a state which he rapidly loses after the gleam of the 
outside world blinds his inward light. Baran is a filmic discourse on the various Sufi 
stations and states in which love becomes the guide to the soul’s journey and its 
ascent to God. Baran’s narrative relates the various Sufi stages: drawing the curtains 
of ignorance and stripping off the veils of selfishness and sensuality to see the 
Divine Vision. In all these films, spiritual attainment requires no special rank or 
distinction, or indeed, any understanding and study of the sources, and includes the 
ordinary man. In fact, none of the characters, except for Yusef, are formally 
educated in mystical knowledge. Most of Majidi’s protagonists undergoing these 
spiritual journeys are either children or barely-educated adults from an impoverished 
social class.
Majidi’s works bring these age-old mystical notions to the silver screen and apply 
them to the modern-day lives of ordinary people. Just as Rumi, Attar, Sa‘di and 
Jami’s works are not a mere collection of stories and poetry but imbued and 
embedded with Sufi teachings and meanings, Majidi’s films are similarly not just 
simple stories o f destitute or disabled people. Instead, they are layered with Sufi 
concepts that allow his viewers to share the spiritual experiences of his characters.
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He reifies these abstract concepts through the medium of film and draws their 
relevance to today’s modem world much as they were at the time of their articulation 
many centuries ago. The modern-day focus on the Muslim interpretation of self- 
annihilation is often understood in terms o f violent acts of terror and destruction such 
as suicide attacks. In the Sufi context of Islam, sacrificing oneself, however, was not 
defined as dogmatic reactions seeking to wreak havoc on lives and livelihoods at the 
touch of a button. It is, in fact, a long and challenging process o f sacrificing one’s 
desires for the betterment of another, o f practising patience, forgiveness and love. 
What Majidi succeeds in doing is to produce a modem discourse which is rooted in 
the medieval Iranian mystical discourse of Islam and acts as a reminder of Sufi 
notions. Like the stories of Leyli and Majnun, the Simurgh and the Mathnavi, Majidi 
also narrates stories, but through the medium of film and with contemporary and 
ordinary Iranians as his heroes.
Having explored formalistic approaches to religion through film in the previous 
chapter, and mystical and personal approaches in this chapter, in the next chapter I 
examine the works o f another filmmaker whose films, I argue, are philosophical 
texts that, among other things, deliberate upon the question of religion, including 
both formalistic and Sufi approaches.
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Chapter 7: Thinking Films: Kiarostami, a Poetic Philosopher
I presented a paper at the three-day conference entitled Abbas Kiarostami: Image, 
Voice and Vision at the Victoria & Albert Museum, part of a London-wide series of 
events held in 2005 in Kiarostami’s honour, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Having 
made an ethno-documentary film on Iranian asylum seekers in Turkey in 2002,1 was 
keen also to attend the nine-day intensive film workshop at the French Institute that 
was part of this series of events. To my dismay, my application to the workshop was 
declined. At the end of the conference, all the speakers were invited to an Italian 
dinner with Kiarostami. He was seated at the far end o f the long table from where I 
was sitting, and I did not get a chance to speak with him. Later, one o f the organisers 
called me and said that Kiarostami was intrigued to hear that I had presented a paper 
on his films and religion, and that he would like to meet me.
My subsequent conversation with Kiarostami proved to be highly engaging. He was 
genuinely surprised to hear that someone was looking at religion in his films. As far 
as he was concerned, his films were not at all religious and he did not know if he 
would even label himself religious. I explained that I was not looking at his films as 
religious works, but rather that I was exploring his approach and references to 
religion. He found this very interesting and said that as far as he knew, no one else 
had looked at this aspect of his films. After this long and fruitful conversation, 
Kiarostami said that we would need more time to talk about his films and that it 
would be good if I could attend the workshop at the French Institute. I told him that I 
had already applied and been rejected. He advised me to just turn up on the day and 
say that I had an invitation from Kiarostami. And sure enough, I was admitted!
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Most of the students came from a filmmaking background, and very soon word was 
out that I, along with a couple of other invited students, were not part of the main 
pool. Kiarostami, however, treated us equally and expected the same from all of us, 
so much so that it was difficult to differentiate between the ‘proper’ students and the 
‘gate-crashers’ whilst doing the work. During these nine days, Kiarostami discussed 
his methods of filmmaking, such as the use of non-actors, the advantages and 
challenges o f these methods and the general difficulties of producing and distributing 
films. He also shared the experiences of his other students in previous workshops in 
Italy and Brazil. We were then asked to make a short film on digital video on the 
topic of lifts, using the techniques he had introduced to us. By the end of it I had a 
one-and-a-half minute short film and acted in two other shorts, all of which were 
screened at the Cine Lumiere on the last day. But more excitingly, these nine days 
gave me an opportunity to learn directly from him. The workshop proved to be a 
highly educational insight into his work and his approach. Before this, I had known 
Kiarostami only through his films, his poetry and his photographs. The workshop 
was a great opportunity to deepen my understanding of his work.
Kiarostami’s films are often studied for their humanistic, universal and sometimes 
spiritual and other idiosyncratic references (Saeed-vafa and Rosenbaum: 2003, 
Andrews, 2005), but they are seldom known for their treatment of religion. In my 
interviews with Iranian filmmakers, critics and authorities of the industry in Iran on 
the topic of religion and spirituality in cinema, many names were invoked but not 
once was Kiarostami mentioned in this regard. Even when I suggested his films as a 
possibility within this category, they were all very surprised. Most of them dismissed 
the idea immediately and others just responded: ‘REALLY?!’ They would then
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move on to other topics, not really seeing the point in discussing religion in 
Kiarostami’s films.
Kiarostami is certainly not known for his religious life or background. Moreover, if 
by religion and cinema we mean taking a theological approach that attempts to detect 
parallels between religious doctrines and the ideas conveyed in film, or depiction of 
the lives of saints and founders of religion, then Kiarostami’s work would obviously 
not fall within this category of study.
One could argue that if  Kiarostami himself was intrigued by my study of religion
and spirituality in his films, then the surprise this proposal aroused in others was
completely understandable. However, unlike the critics, Kiarostami’s surprise was
not because his works are far removed from religious references. It was simply that
no one had previously paid any serious attention to this aspect of his films. He
explained that the problem arises when religion is understood only as that which is
defined by a sole authority. Faith and belief, however, go beyond these limited
definitions. When asked in an interview with the Guardian whether or not he has
religious faith, Kiarostami stated:
I can’t answer this. I think religion is very personal and the tragedy for our country is 
that the personal aspect has been destroyed. It would be the easiest thing in the world 
for me to say that I am religious, but I won’t. This most personal aspect of our lives 
has become the tool of the government’s power. The value of people is equated with 
their religiosity (Jeffries, 2005).
It would be an overstatement to assert that religion is the main concern of 
Kiarostami’s films, but the premise that he avoids religious references altogether 
does not hold water either. Kiarostami does not shy away from referring to religion
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by touching on traditional belief systems, social taboos, and more importantly 
showing, as Bird states, ‘man’s struggle to discern the divine presence’ (Bird, 1982). 
Like some other Iranian filmmakers, such as Majidi, Kiarostami also employs the 
poetic style to explore man’s struggle towards spiritual attainment.
Many critics read Kiarostami’s works as alluding to the spiritual. However, these 
references are limited mainly to parallels drawn between Sufi concepts and certain 
imagery in the films, such as the zigzag path and the lone trees. I set out to examine 
the treatment of religion and spirituality in Kiarostami’s works not merely by 
outlining correspondences between the pictures and Sufism. Rather, Kiarostami, I 
argue, is a poetic philosopher. His films could be read as ‘poetic philosophies’ that 
resonate with Wittgenstein’s thought and the lyrical language of Iranian poets such 
as Sohrab Sepehry (d. 1980), Forugh Farrokhzad (d. 1967) and Omar Khayyam (d. 
1123/1124). In this chapter, I will study Kiarostami’s poetic celebration of life and 
its meaning, with a particular focus on the conflicts o f life and death in his films. 
Kiarostami questions the religious and scientific convictions about the world and 
proposes an alternative approach to looking at the world. His approach to these 
issues makes for interesting comparisons with Wittgenstein’s philosophy on the 
mystical.
Kiarostami, a ‘Poetic Philosopher*
It is not an exaggeration to say that Abbas Kiarostami is the most internationally 
acclaimed Iranian filmmaker. Bom in 1940 in Tehran, Kiarostami is also a poet and 
photographer. He studied graphic design and drawing at the University of Tehran. In
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1969, he joined the Centre for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young 
Adults in Tehran (Kanun parvaresh fekri koodakan va nojavanari), where he set up 
and ran the film department and made his first films. He has won many international 
awards including the prestigious Palme d’Or at the 1997 Cannes International Film 
Festival for Taste o f  Cherry. His international claim to fame began with Where is the 
Friend’s House? (.Khane-ye dust kojast?, 1987). The fact that these and all his more 
recent films are easily available from the main online retailers such as Amazon.com 
and other distributors, or media stores such as Virgin and HMV— a luxury not 
granted to most other Iranian filmmakers— speaks volumes about his credibility in 
the West. It is not just film festivals and critics that have been attracted to his works, 
but also academia, evident in numerous publications that discuss his films at great 
length. Academic publications seem to be so saturated with his works that editors of 
various academic journals who have otherwise shown interest in my work have 
inevitably hinted that there is already so much available on Kiarostami that they 
prefer to publish material on other filmmakers.
However, Kiarostami’s popularity outside his home country has not been shared 
inside it. In his own context, Kiarostami is often felt to have gained undeserved 
recognition. As Saeed-Vafa (2002) demonstrates, some Iranians criticise his rural 
depictions as an effort to exoticise Iran in order to cater to international tastes and 
film festivals. Others argue that his films are irrelevant to the concerns o f modem 
day Iran and overshadow the efforts of more deserving filmmakers such as Beyzaie. 
They argue that since the reading o f these latter films requires a deep knowledge of 
Iranian culture and mythology, they are labelled as inaccessible and undesirable for
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foreign audiences (Farahmand, 2002 and Dabashi, 2001). Kiarostami’s films, 
therefore, impede the exposure of more deserving fellow filmmakers.
Even Kiarostami’s 1997 success at Cannes received less attention in the Iranian 
media than his kiss on the cheek of Catherine Deneuve when receiving the Palme 
d’Or. Back in his homeland, this stirred great controversy among conservatives, who 
condemned his unlslamic gesture. Thus, instead of expecting a grand welcome and 
reception for having elevated his national cinema to the highest international 
recognition, he was forced to postpone his return until the waters settled. Some have 
argued that the Iranian state has been supportive of Kiarostami’s international 
appearances because of his films’ apolitical and non-critical stance. However, as he 
has often mentioned in his recent interviews, none of his films have actually been 
screened in Iran since 1996. It is only a small group of students and elites within Iran 
who remain attracted to his works and until recently could only watch his films 
through either private screenings or pirated copies, which are widely available in the 
country. Things seem to have improved slightly. For example, a conference on 
Barresi zaban-e Jilmha-ye Kiarostami (Examining the language of Kiarostami’s 
films), held at the University of Tehran in January 2006, screened many of his films 
and invited him to address the students. However, despite wide rejection in his home 
country, his influence on many Iranian filmmakers is indisputable, a fact that even 
his opponents admit, and which academic publications detail.
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Locating Kiarostami within the various discourses
I am aware o f the criticisms that may be raised against drawing parallels between a 
Western philosopher’s thinking and that of an Iranian filmmaker. In fact, 
comparisons of Kiarostami with modernists have often been opposed as an 
inappropriate exploration. It has been questioned whether we should ‘complacently 
analyse the works of such a genuinely Iranian filmmaker using a concept of 
‘modernity’ which is so markedly Western?’ (Rollet, quoted in Elena, 2005: 187). 
There are many problems inherent in the notion of a ‘genuinely Iranian filmmaker’ 
and, consequently, with the irrelevance o f modernity in this regard. To mention but a 
few, first it presumes that Iran, being a non-Western country, never experienced 
modernity, and, therefore, as Mir-Ehsan (2005) asserts, the only way of determining 
Kiarostami’s influences and roots would be through looking at Persian miniatures 
and the Iranian musical tradition. However, an argument that consistently positions 
Kiarostami, or for that matter any other Iranian filmmaker, solely within an Iranian 
tradition is untenable. Secondly, this approach overlooks the obvious: the nature of 
the medium of cinema itself as a Western import. Thirdly, in his various interviews, 
Kiarostami’s frequent references to Western philosophers such as Cioran, and to 
filmmakers like Bertolucci and Fellini, clearly indicate his familiarity and 
engagement with Western thought.
However, it is not only the Western/Iranian comparison that provokes 
dissatisfaction. As discussed above, criticisms in his own context vary from protests 
at his exoticisation o f Iran through rural settings catering to international tastes and 
film festivals, to impeding the exposure of more meritorious and fellow filmmakers.
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The appeal o f Kiarostami’s films, they argue, stems from the fact that the films are 
not rooted in Iranian culture, which in turn makes them easily accessible to foreign 
audiences. Farahmand, referring to filmmakers such as Kiarostami, argues that 
‘village themes and location shooting in rural landscapes not only take viewers away 
from urban politics, but also reinforce the exotic look of Iranian films -  and increase 
their marketability abroad’ (Farahmand, 2002: 100). A closer look at Kiarostami’s 
films, however, clearly shows this criticism to be unfounded and rather limited. 
What it suggests, in effect, is that for these critics, only a particular genre or 
cinematic style qualify as being deeply rooted in Iranian culture and tradition. I shall 
demonstrate, however, that Kiarostami’s aesthetic and poetic approach is indeed so 
rooted.
Many Iranian critics have also criticised Kiarostami’s works as lacking any 
intellectual bearings. Shahrukh Dulku asserts that they have an ‘overwhelming 
emphasis on the instinctual and not intellectual aspects of life’ (quoted in Elena, 
2005: 104). In my interview with Dulku in Tehran in January 2005, he was 
emphatic that the greatest weakness of Iranian filmmakers was their ignorance of 
both their tradition and of modernity. In his view, they are generally unfamiliar with 
the appropriate employment of technology and resort to superficial elements to 
convey meaning and content. This weakness results in films that suffer from a lack 
of harmony between form and content.
Maddadpur, another critic, whose views on spirituality and cinema were discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, is one of the few to refer to religion in Kiarostami’s films. In 
Seyr va suluk-e sinamayi (Cinematic Spiritual Journey, 1997), he attempts to locate
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cinema’s position within the discourses of religion, spirituality and technology. He 
denies the possibility of exploring religion or spirituality in film, and asserts that an 
impious soul preoccupied with this-worldly life cannot transcend to other-worldly 
status (1997: 56). He maintains that only the likes of the martyred Avini, who fought 
on the front lines in the ‘Sacred Defence’ during the Iran-Iraq war, are capable of 
depicting spirituality through film. The present avant-garde Iranian cinema, he states, 
has replaced the tough-guyism and eroticism of pre-revolutionary cinema with semi­
religious mysticism, lacking the slightest trace of a spiritual journey. Kiarostami, he 
says, is the greatest teacher and most disjunctive-minded of Iranian post-modern 
filmmakers. He states that Kiarostami sometimes takes on the role of the open- 
minded theologian (1997: 143). As though this were a final and self-explanatory 
decree, Maddadpur fails to analyse any of Kiarostami’s films and moves on to 
criticise other filmmakers without any further elaboration of his assertions.
Kiarostami’s films, however, are neither a demonstration of cinema techniques, as 
Dulku might put it, nor are they a means to engage in theology, contrary to 
Maddadpur’s belief. The problem with an approach such as Maddadpur’s lies in 
considering films as sermons and filmmakers as priests. It is the expectation that, 
like theologians, filmmakers, too, explore the nature of God and seek the truth.
Kiarostami does, nevertheless, employ cinema’s unique characteristics to make 
philosophical films. He is a ‘poetic philosopher’, a term already applied to him by 
Rapfogel (2001). However, other than the extract below, I have thus far found 
nothing by Rapfogel elaborating on this terminology in general or in reference to
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Kiarostami in particular. In comparing Kiarostami’s and Jafar Panahi’s films,
Rapfogel employs the term ‘poetic philosopher’ to describe Kiarostami:
Kiarostami’s vision is a broader, more panoramic one. It's Panahi who takes 
Kiarostami’s methods and innovations and directs them towards more specific, 
socially topical subjects. Panahi shares with Kiarostami a poetic sensibility, but he 
focuses it downwards, towards the street and the problems he finds there, rather than 
upwards and outwards—he’s a poetic journalist to Kiarostami’s poetic philosopher. 
The difference is clear from the titles of their films: And Life Goes On (1991) (more 
accurately translated as Life and Nothing More), Taste o f Cherry (1997), The Wind 
Will Carry Us (1999)—these are philosophical titles for philosophical films. There’s 
nothing pretentious or facile about them—there’s conviction and true wisdom at their 
heart, and they’re always rooted in particulars. But Kiarostami’s films are 
unmistakably the fruit of contemplation, of abstract meditation, whereas Panahi’s 
films spring more directly from observation (Rapfogel, 2001).
Rapfogel does not discuss further the philosophy in Kiarostami’s work. Here, I aim 
to demonstrate how some of his films are philosophical and how they resonate with 
Wittgenstein’s thought. The films’ lyrical language is influenced by Iranian poets 
such as Forugh Farrokhzad, Sohrab Sepehry and Omar Khayyam -  the titles Where 
is the Friend’s House and The Wind Will Carry Us {Bad ma ra khahad bord) come 
from poems by Sepehry and Farrokhzad respectively. It is not that Kiarostami 
provides a filmic version of the poetry of these masters or of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy; indeed, nothing in his films suggests Kiarostami’s familiarity with 
Wittgenstein’s thought. However, as Read suggests when discussing works of 
certain filmmakers, it is ‘perhaps increasingly obvious that films think, that films are 
no longer merely to be viewed as illustrative material for pre-existing philosophies ... 
nor as illustrative material for pre-existing ideologies or theories’ (2005: 31).
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Similarly, Kiarostami’s films could also be seen as films that think, not as depictions
o f pre-existing philosophies, but as re-thinking within the context of existing ideas,
thoughts and beliefs. As such, these films contain certain philosophical concerns that
parallel Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As Mulhall argues in discussing certain films as
philosophy, Kiarostami’s films could be read as ‘philosophy in action’:
I do not look to these films as handy or popular illustrations of views and arguments 
properly developed by philosophers; I see them rather as themselves reflecting on and 
evaluating such views and arguments, as thinking seriously and systematically about 
them in just the ways that philosophers do. Such films are not philosophy’s raw 
material, not a source for its ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, 
philosophy in action — film as philosophising (Mulhall, 2002: 2).
In studying the similarities between the approaches of Kiarostami and Wittgenstein, 
I have based most o f my readings on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I am aware how 
Wittgenstein moved away from his views on religion as articulated in the Tractatus. 
However, his subsequent change of position regarding religion has not made this 
important philosophical treatise irrelevant. The very fact that it remains a widely- 
studied reference within academia says much about its continuing validity and 
relevance. Interestingly, even Kiarostami’s works could be seen as evolving works 
that inform each other. He sometimes refers to a theme in one film and then picks it 
up again in another film to elaborate on and study it further. This could be regarded 
as a philosophy growing and evolving, with the films thinking and informing each 
other. The later films do not make his earlier approaches redundant or irrelevant. 
They remain as relevant and valid approaches to thinking about those particular 
themes.
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An alternative approach to religion
The engagement of modem philosophy with metaphysics involved two main trends. 
One, associated with Hume and Ayer, dismissed such beliefs in metaphysics as 
intellectually misguided, and the other, that of Kant and Wittgenstein, sought to 
restore a sense of its integrity and validity, but in terms different from those of 
medieval philosophy and theology. Ayer, a positivist, attacks metaphysics for being 
unverifiable and disqualifies it from sense (Ayer, 1950: 116). He does not claim it to 
be false, but makes a far more powerful claim by dismissing it totally as nonsensical. 
The narrowness of this philosophy is reflected in the equation of sense and 
verifiability. In this way it destroys the richness of living by failing to appreciate 
interpretations of reality that are outside the physical world. ‘Kant readily 
acknowledged the threat which a modem scientific worldview poses for morality and 
religion, yet ... he emphasised an individualism that affirmed human moral 
autonomy and freedom’ (Jasper, 2003: 291)
Wittgenstein dismisses the principle of verification as an all-encompassing tenet that 
could be applied to everything. According to the nature and limits of verification 
itself, only states of affairs are verifiable and anything beyond the facts cannot be 
subject to verification. Hence, claiming that the mystical is not verifiable and is 
therefore nonsensical is in itself a nonsensical claim. ‘Not how the world is, is the 
mystical, but that it is’ (Wittgenstein, 2001: 44). The certainty of belief is stronger 
than the certainty of a scientific prediction, yet the object of belief is not predictable.
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While Wittgenstein restores the validity of the mystical in metaphysics, which 
guides humans in their lives, he does not endorse medieval philosophy or theology. 
Human language, Wittgenstein asserts, is incapable of explaining the mystical. The 
religious, however, are tempted to make the mistake of explaining it, which only 
results in pseudo-explanations. The moment an explanation is offered, the mystery 
and wonder of the mystical is destroyed. Wittgenstein explains this as a problem of 
human language, inherent in which is the tendency to convert metaphysics into facts. 
Indeed, he states, ‘W hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2001: 7).
Wittgenstein explains religion as a double-edged knife, which is poetic with rich
culture on the one side, and full of danger and dogmatic on the other. Notions of
faith such as God, death and eternity can be talked about poetically, but cannot be
talked about as facts. In trying to explain God, religion sometimes turns Him into an
idol. What is mystical and can be spoken of poetically and symbolically, therefore,
becomes an idol. The unutterable has to be conveyed in a different way: it has to be
shown. In proposition 6.522 of his Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that ‘There is
indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical’ (2001) He does not
claim that the religious language is false or ‘waste time garnering evidence for the
falsity of religion. Rather, he focuses upon the discourses o f religion and shows how
it lacks the pictorial relation to the world essential for the possession of meaning’
(Clack, 1999: 28). It is not only religion that becomes irrelevant to the mystical:
Science is about empirical, contingent and verifiable matters. Metaphysics is not 
about contingent, empirical or verifiable matters. It is about what is absolute and 
necessary. But language is not geared to coping with the absolute and the necessary. 
As Wittgenstein puts it, certain signs in a metaphysical proposition lack 
meaning...But he did not conclude...that this rendered metaphysics inarticulate. It is
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just that the articulation is somewhat different from the statement of scientific and 
common-sense facts (Barrett, 1991: 74).
Thus, Wittgenstein aims at restoring the non-scientific form of understanding. 
‘Among those things that “show themselves are ethics, aesthetics, religion, the 
meaning of life, logic and philosophy”. In all these areas, Wittgenstein appears to 
believe, there are indeed truths, but none of these truths can be expressed in 
language; they all have to be shown, not said’ (Monk, 2005: 21). The realm of 
religion differs from that of the intellect. Clack mentions the two ways that 
Wittgenstein believed the mystical could be shown: ‘a particular way of living as 
well as artistic creation which can mediate what is higher’ (1999: 52). The fact that 
the faith view does not fall into the trap o f providing evidence renders it better than 
the religious view in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. ‘Religious belief is the upshot of a 
kind of life, a kind of upbringing, which culminates in a certain sort of belief 
(Vasiliou, 2001: 39).
It is this philosophical outlook on religion that makes for interesting comparisons 
with Kiarostami’s works. Kiarostami, too, as the analysis o f his films in this chapter 
will demonstrate, alludes to the mystical in a way that resonates with Wittgenstein’s 
thought. He does not avoid dealing with the religious view, as many of his critics 
claim he does. In fact, he presents an array of religious discourses without trying to 
prove them true or false, before proposing an alternative approach to religion. He 
also contemplates the relevance of scientific knowledge to the mystical in some of 
his films. In fact, Kiarostami’s films could be read as an endeavour towards the 
artistic creation that Wittgenstein refers to as being one of the ways of showing the
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mystical. When asked if  serious art creates a desire in the spectator for some other
reality, Kiarostami says:
Yes, I believe so, because otherwise art would have no purpose. Should religion not 
prove successful at accomplishing that mission, art always can attempt it. They both 
point in the same direction. Religion points to another world, whereas art points to a 
better existence. One is an invitation, an offering to a faraway place, the other to a 
place that is close (Walsh, 2000)
Reading Life and Death in Kiarostami’s Films
One o f the main philosophical concerns in a large proportion of Kiarostami’s recent 
films is death and life. A search for the friend that began in Where is the Friend’s 
House (Khane-ye doost kojast? 1987) continues in And Life Goes On (Zendegi va 
digar hich, 1992), only this time, the danger is no longer that o f the barking dogs and 
dark alleys o f Koker village but a catastrophe that has wiped out the friends and 
loved ones of many. Kiarostami’s subsequent film, Through the Olive Trees (Zir-e 
derakhtan-e zeytoon, 1994), also looks at the aftermath of the earthquake. These 
three films have been referred to as the Koker Trilogy in the West. The tens of 
thousands o f lives that were lost to the 1990 earthquake in Iran were the starting 
point for a series o f Kiarostami’s films that have death as a prominent underlying 
theme.
The traditional discourses
Natural disasters have usually led to the theist’s attempt to understand the reasons 
why God has afflicted people with such adversity. It is during such times that man’s 
reasoning about the question of evil is heightened. Ingmar Bergman depicts this
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quest in his Seventh Seal (1958) in which people try to understand why so many 
lives are lost to Black Death across Europe. Similarly, in And Life Goes On and 
Through the Olive Trees, the survivors and those witnessing the aftermath of the 
earthquake strive to make sense of the catastrophe. Kiarostami presents us with an 
array of ruminations about death, God and evil.
Kiarostami enables us to gain an insight into how the local people are trying to make 
sense of the tragedy in their own vocabulary. He does not strip them of their 
understanding nor does he force his own upon the viewer. When the truck driver 
caught up in the heavy traffic in And Life Goes On asks: ‘What sin has this nation 
committed to be punished by God like this?’ it is a question that assumes the 
earthquake to be the result of people’s wrongdoing. Similarly, Husayn, in Through 
the Olive Trees, calmly interprets the deaths as a direct result of the villainy of 
individuals. He had fallen in love with Tahereh when working as a mason in a 
building right across her house. However, when he approached her mother to ask for 
her hand in marriage, she not only rejected him but also made sure that he lost his 
job. In Husayn’s view, Tahereh’s parents and his employer were killed in the 
earthquake for conspiring against his wish to marry Tahereh— their deaths being a 
punishment for breaking his heart.
Death as God’s punishment for wrong-doing could be read within the context of 
traditional scripture and the subsequent interpretations of believers. Chapter 7 of the 
Qur’an, ‘The Heights’, forewarns the faithful about disbelief in God and His 
Messenger:
And if people of the townships had believed and kept from evil, surely We should
have opened for them blessings from the sky and from the earth. But (unto every
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messenger) they gave the lie, and so We seized them on account of what they used to 
earn.
Are the people of the townships then secure from the coming of Our wrath upon them 
as a night-raid while they sleep?’ (7: 96-97).
In fact, this Qur’anic chapter relates numerous accounts o f punishments inflicted on 
those who disobeyed God and His prophets. Thus, the people of Noah were drowned 
for not believing him (7: 60-64), the root of the tribe of Aad was cut down for 
disbelieving Hud (7: 65-72), the people of Thamud were destroyed by an earthquake 
for disobeying a prophet sent down to them (7: 73-78), the people of Lot destroyed 
by a heavenly rain poured upon them for their lewd acts (7: 80-84), the people of 
Midian were seized by an earthquake for disobeying Shuayb (7: 85-93 and 29: 36- 
37) and the Pharaoh’s folk who did not follow Moses were punished with flood, 
locusts, vermin, blood and the drowning sea. Even Moses’ own folk who were led 
astray were not spared and subsequently punished by an earthquake (7: 103-155). 
These are just some o f the examples of natural disasters described in the Qur’an as a 
consequence of people’s wrongdoing.
Inherent in suffering is the problem of evil, raised for centuries among the 
monotheistic religions. If God is omniscient, omnipotent and wholly good, why is 
there so much suffering in the world? In And Life Goes On, for the old Mr Ruhi, the 
earthquake is not a punishment sent down by God, rather it is like ‘a hungry wolf 
that attacked a flock o f sheep and ate some and spared others.’ It is an event that he 
believes will also result in a better appreciation of life by those who survived. Mr 
Ruhi sees the disaster as a result of the forces of nature rather than God’s intentions, 
endorsing the theodicy that good, and in this case a better appreciation of life, 
requires the existence of evil.
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Similarly, the woman who has lost her seven-year-old daughter attempts to come to 
terms with her loss and consoles herself by saying that it was what God willed. The 
young boy acting as Kiarostami’s son, on the other hand, is keen to retain God’s 
goodness. He draws from the various analogies he has come across to exempt God 
from intending to kill an innocent seven-year-old. These range from the analogy of 
the hungry wolf and a better appreciation of life espoused by Mr Ruhi, to the story of 
Abraham and Ishmael in his own history book. This is indicative of the transmission 
and reinforcement of a system of knowledge and beliefs through the generations 
ranging from the ancient narrative of Abraham’s sacrifice to what the young boy has 
heard from Mr Ruhi only moments before. Indeed, when the mother asks the boy 
where he has learnt all o f this from, he says: ‘half from Mr Ruhi, half from my 
history book and half from m yself, a response that alludes to the power of narrative 
and oral tradition in forming a worldview which transcends history.
Kiarostami thus presents us with a range of arguments on the issue of death, whilst 
he himself remains silent in the face o f these theistic debates. In fact when the truck 
driver asks him what sin the nation has committed to be punished by God in this 
way, he evades the question, saying instead, ‘Give me way so that I can escape by 
the side road’ implying his reluctance to engage in such theological reasoning. He is, 
perhaps, seeking a ‘side road’ in order to avoid the heavy traffic of the dominating 
religious debates. Kiarostami’s search for an alternative way is not an attempt to 
avoid contemplating issues of death and suffering. Rather, it is a provocative 
proposal to re-evaluate our preconceived beliefs. In his opinion, ‘Cinema and all
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other arts ought to be able to destroy the mind of their audience in order to reject the 
old values and make us susceptible to new values’ (quoted in Elena, 2005: 192).
A Kiarostami film is constituted not only by what is said or shown on screen, but
also, more often than not, by the unsaid and hidden, which is in fact of greater
significance. To use his own words, Kiarostami wants to ‘create the type o f cinema
that shows by not showing’ (quoted in Elena, 2005: 154). It is his approach of
‘showing by not showing’, ‘saying by not saying’ that makes interesting parallels
with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. When Wittgenstein sent the manuscript of his
Tractatus to Ficker to be considered for publication, he explained that his book
consisted o f two parts:
I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, 
which, however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted 
to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of 
everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important 
one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m 
convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I 
think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by 
remaining silent about it (Wittgenstein, 1979: 94-95)
Wittgenstein’s silence to ‘that o f which many are babbling today’ is echoed in 
Kiarostami’s refusal to explicitly comment on specific religious views, such as death 
and suffering. In fact, through the medium of cinema he materialises Wittgenstein’s 
great desire of showing that which the limits of language make impossible to talk 
about. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein suggests that a particular way of looking at the 
world constitutes ‘the mystical’ (Clack, 1999: 37):
6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
6.45 To view the world sub specie aetemi is to view it as a whole -  a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole -  it is this that is mystical.
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Like Wittgenstein, Kiarostami finds the world’s existence itself to be the mystical. 
Unlike the usual dead bodies and mourning relatives which constitute the main mise- 
en-scene of earthquake films, as seen for example, in Wake Up Arezu (Bidar show 
Arezu, Ayari, 2005)— a recent film based on the 2003 earthquake in Bam which was 
also filmed on location—in Kiarostami’s films, the beauties of nature provide the 
backdrop for life that strives to continue in face of all adversity. We see people 
digging, not in search of bodies, or to bury the dead, but to find the means of living, 
be it digging for a kettle, a carpet, a pillow, a lamp, or indeed setting up television 
antennas to follow the World Cup. Kiarostami’s camera does not avoid the 
destruction that the earthquake has left in its wake, rather he sees through it: the 
destroyed shells of windows and doors, standing empty in the rubble, frame a world 
of beauty. Instead of focusing his lens on death and suffering, Kiarostami redirects 
our gaze to man’s struggle for life, and the existence of the world itself becomes the 
object o f wonder and mystery. Commenting on And Life Goes On, Kiarostami 
remarks that what he needed to address was ‘life, the continuity of life itself, not 
individuals and their fate, though that is the starting point for the larger lesson’ 
(quoted in Nichols, 1994: 25).
Death as desire
In Taste o f  Cherry, death finds a new twist. It is turned on its head from being the 
cause of pain and suffering to being an object of desire. The film revolves around 
Badii, a middle-aged man who wants to commit suicide in a very particular way— by 
taking an overdose of sleeping pills at night and sleeping in a hole dug under a lone 
tree in the mountains outside Tehran. However, he wants someone to come and
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check on him the following morning in order to help him out of the hole if  he is still 
alive, or bury him if  he is dead. He drives around in his car looking for that one 
person. Death in Taste o f  Cherry, therefore, becomes an act sought by an individual, 
rather than a tragic incident inflicted upon masses as in the last two instalments of 
the Koker Trilogy. The conflicts of death and life are also reversed such that Badii’s 
actions become an attempt to claim death, rather than death claiming life.
As in the Koker Trilogy, in Taste o f  Cherry (Ta ‘m-e gilas) we are presented with 
various theological arguments. However, this time they are not employed to justify 
death and misery, but rather to preserve the sanctity of life itself. Badii gives lifts to 
the people he thinks may be potential helpers. One of them is an Afghan seminarian 
who listens attentively to Badii, then quotes from the Qur’an and hadith and employs 
the religious vocabulary of God, sin and punishment in order to dissuade Badii from 
wanting to kill himself. Badii, however, dismissively responds to him by stating: 
‘You can understand me, you can pity me, but you can’t feel my pain ... the only 
thing I need from you right now is a pair o f hands.’
Badii finally comes across Baqeri, a middle-aged taxidermist working at the natural 
history museum. Baqeri takes Badii on a new route, different from the desolate 
landscape in which he was driving thus far. This route, Baqeri states, is longer, but 
more beautiful. He agrees to help Badii not only because of the money he needs for 
his sick child, but also as an act of friendship. Baqeri states that he would have 
preferred to save a life rather than help to take it away, but that he also wants to be a 
friend to Badii. As a friend, therefore, he would be there for him even during 
difficult times.
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In discussing the ending of Taste o f Cherry, Elena finds it to bear ‘some 
extraordinarily rich connotations. The storm that breaks just as Badii is getting into 
the grave and the specific image of the cloud crossing the moon refer to the imagery 
o f the Day of Judgement in Islamic tradition’ (Elena, 2005: 141), quoting the Qur’an 
25: 25 and 18: 19 in support of this reading. Elena also goes on to say that 
Kiarostami’s use of Louis Armstrong’s trumpet in St James Infirmary reminds one 
of the trumpet of the angel of resurrection, Israfil, of the Persian Islamic tradition. 
Kiarostami himself, however, has another explanation for his use o f this music in the 
film:
This music, funeral music played over a dead body, interested me because of the 
sensuality of Louis Armstrong’s trumpet-playing, particularly cheerful and optimistic 
in spite of everything, which expresses very well that idea of life that the film tries to 
convey. A piece of music that in this sense is I think very close to the poetry of 
Khayyam, where joy finally emerges from sorrow (quoted in Elena, 2005: 142).
Optimism and cheerfulness in the face of death and despair? Kiarostami certainly 
does not endorse a nihilistic approach to life, celebrating nothingness. However, 
Badii’s encounter with the taxidermist, Baqeri, might well be the reason for this 
hopefulness. Baqeri offers him a different route—both literally and metaphorically— 
a longer but more beautiful route, a reference to a life which might be longer and 
perhaps, therefore, entail more difficulties, but nonetheless worth the beauty that one 
experiences along the way. More importantly, the hopefulness may also be the result 
o f Baqeri’s friendship. Instead of warning Badii o f punishment and a God who 
despises the sinner, Baqeri empathises with him and agrees to carry out his wishes as 
a final act o f friendship.
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All along, perhaps, Badii’s quest was not for someone to help him in his death, but 
instead a search for a friend, and for meaning. Thus, Badii’s encounter with Baqeri is 
not significant only because the latter invites him to appreciate the beauties of nature 
and the joys of life despite its concomitant difficulties, which, to expand upon 
Kiarostami’s point above, would constitute only half o f a typical Khayyam quatrain. 
It is also significant because having a friend on this journey, painful and difficult as 
it might be, is what makes life bearable and meaningful. This theme—that the 
temporality and struggle of life is balanced by the good fortune o f having a friend to 
share in this journey— is an enduring trope in Persian poetry. Badii’s success in 
finding a friend, knowing that he would be there the following morning, can be seen 
as the ‘joy ’ that ‘finally emerges from sorrow’.
This may be the reason why Kiarostami decides to leave the outcome of Badii’s 
suicide attempt ambiguous. For Badii’s achievement is not dependent on the success 
or failure of his suicide, but rather on the journey he had begun. His very method of 
choice in committing suicide leaves him with two possibilities— death or life— as 
opposed to a definitive method of death. In other words, if  the sleeping pills are 
ineffective, Badii wants to be able to come out of the hole, instead of, for example, 
taking more pills. He is even worried that Baqeri might bury him alive, mistaking 
him to be dead when he might have only fallen asleep. This leads one to believe that 
Badii does not intend to take complete control over ending his life, thus leaving 
room for an unseen power or grace to intervene. He gambles with fate like the 
knight in Bergman’s The Seventh Seal (1957) who plays chess with Death. Both 
protagonists are in search of the meaning of life. Thus, if some form of divine
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intervention were to take place, a friend would pull Badii out. He would then be 
redeemed through the act o f suicide and his life would have meaning and purpose.
Kiarostami also delves into the semiotics of Islamic theology in naming his 
protagonist. ‘Badii’ means ‘unprecendented’, ‘unique’, from the Arabic root 
‘bada‘a \  which is also the root for ‘bida‘a ’, meaning ‘heretical doctrine’ or heresy or 
(undesirable) innovation. Historically in Islam, the term has been used to refer to 
Muslims who deviate from ‘orthodox’ practices. The semiotics of this name could be 
read in two different ways: the fact that Badii wants to commit suicide in this 
specific manner is likely to be without precedent. Moreover, the very specific 
manner in which he intends to be buried implies a doing-away with Islamic burial 
rites. Thus, he is not only a sinner for taking his life but also a heretic for creating 
new rituals that go against normative practice.
Suicide, one of the cardinal sins in Islam, becomes the protagonist’s goal and desire 
in Taste o f  Cherry. The religious discourse of the Afghan seminarian clearly fails to 
respond meaningfully to certain life situations. The seminarian understands what 
Badii wants from him, but is bound by his belief system and instead employs his 
own trope of religious vocabulary to try to change Badii’s mind. In discussing the 
character of the seminarian, Kiarostami remarks that ‘the man of religion is the 
embodiment of a certain discourse and philosophy that imposes a priori the 
boundaries between Good and Evil. With this character I wanted to show, beyond 
religious dogmatism as such, all those social conventions that are imposed on us 
without any real justification’ (quoted in Elena, 2005: 135).
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As Wittgenstein states, however, notions of faith cannot be stated as fact, but rather 
only spoken of poetically. Baqeri, the very man who has agreed to be an accomplice 
to Badii’s suicide, is the one who talks about life poetically. He invites Badii to view 
the intricate beauties of nature and appreciate the pleasures they convey. He does not 
engage in a religious discussion by referring to sin and punishment. In fact, he 
invokes God only once, and that, too, not as the One Who despises the sinner, but 
Whose compassion exceeds that of any mother. In Baqeri’s view, the compassion is 
evident from all the beauty that He has offered man. He then asks Badii if  he would 
no longer want to see the sunrise, the red and yellow of the sunset, the stars, the full 
moon in the sky and, more importantly, to experience the taste of a cherry. 
Kiarostami’s use o f this last experience as the title of the film emphasises the 
significance of this conversation and the message it implies. Baqeri poetically talks 
about the notions of life, death, and God and conveys the unutterable by showing 
these to him when he takes Badii on a different route. Kiarostami communicates 
without trying to restrict the inexpressible to words, in as much as ‘Wittgenstein’s 
ideal is to communicate the inexpressible by not attempting to express i f  (Monk, 
2005: 25).
Death as an object o f  scientific study
So far, Kiarostami’s dialogical films examined the various approaches to death. In 
all of these films, death was a matter of emotional import. In The Wind Will Carry 
Us, Behzad, the educated Tehrani, comes to the village with the sole purpose of 
documenting the rites and ceremonies surrounding death, an act that is devoid of any 
emotional involvement for him. His interest in death arises not out of passion or a
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quest for meaning. Instead, he eagerly awaits the old woman’s death, only because it 
will provide him with footage for his documentary. Her death would, therefore, be 
simply an object of scientific study.
This time, Kiarostami takes on the challenge of questioning the scientific approach 
to death and life. To all intents and purposes, Behzad is an anthropologist, albeit with 
a cold and unconcerned approach, interested in studying the rites and rituals o f death, 
in a social group different from his own. In fact, so reluctant is he to miss this 
opportunity that, to his mother’s extreme displeasure, he refuses to leave the village 
and attend the funeral of a close relative. For him, death is solely a dispassionate 
object of study and nothing more. His obsession with death is symbolised by the 
leg-bone he keeps on top o f his car dashboard. His impatient wait for the old 
woman’s death is not a passionate pursuit o f meaning or understanding. Instead, 
death is a commodity to be sought after, a scientific assignment to be completed.
Behzad’s limited engagement with the local adults includes the schoolteacher and 
the doctor. Both, by virtue of their jobs, would have been trained in a modem 
educational system, thus presuming a closer affinity with Behzad. However, as 
Behzad finds out, their scientific training does not appear to have shaped their 
outlook on life in the way that it has formed his. The formal training of the doctor 
appears to be incidental to what he does, and unlike Behzad, he does not seem to be 
defined by it. When Behzad asks the doctor about the old woman’s illness, he says it 
is very painful and that she is suffering a lot. However, death, he asserts, is worse 
than illness. ‘It is the worst of everything’. In what seems to be an echo of Baqeri in 
Taste o f Cherry, the doctor states that death is being deprived of the wonders of
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nature, its beauty and God’s blessing and generosity. Once you have left this world, 
he states, there is no coming back and that is a great loss.
Both the doctor and Behzad are constantly on the move, Behzad looking for a 
subject to film or study and the doctor looking for patients wanting to undergo 
circumcision or ear-piercing. Behzad, however, moves in the enclosed space of his 
car, with its grimy windscreen, where he cannot see the world clearly. Behzad thus 
seems blind to all the life around him, focusing instead on death and impatiently 
awaiting its arrival, while the doctor travels on a motorbike, which allows him to 
take in all the visual beauty around him.
As Kiarostami reminds us, knowing poetry is different from having a poetic outlook. 
Both the doctor and Behzad are men of verse. We have already heard Behzad recite 
poetry to Farzad, the young boy who acts as his guide at the beginning of the film, 
and to Zaynab, the lover of the telecommunications digger. It is Behzad who recites 
Forugh Farrokhzad’s famous poem on death and despair, and from which Kiarostami 
borrows the title of the film. This latter scene has been the subject o f much analysis 
and criticism, which I will not, however, enter into here. What is important to note 
for the purposes of this chapter, is that Behzad’s use o f poetry betrays his sense of 
superiority over the locals. This is evident in his surprise at Farzad’s knowledge of 
poetry, and the patronising tone with which he addresses Zaynab when asking her if 
she knows who Forugh is. For the doctor, however, Khayyam’s poetry has 
something to say about life and death that equips him with a different understanding 
of the world. Behzad appears to be one of those people that Wittgenstein refers to in 
Culture and Value (1980) as those who ‘think that scientists exist to instruct them,
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poets, musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to 
teach them -  that does not occur to them.’ (quoted in Monk, 2005: 102).
If indeed Kiarostami’s films pose philosophical questions that resonate strikingly 
with those of Wittgenstein, his poetic discourse is deliberately and consciously 
rooted in Persian tradition. He speaks of taking refuge in poetry at times of conflict 
and anxiety, asserting that ‘poetry is much more helpful in times o f difficulty than in 
times o f calm; it enables us to find a certain stability, an internal energy. When 
religion cannot fill this void, poetry can do so’ (quoted in Elena, 2005: 189). Thus, 
we hear Sepehry’s poetry echoing in Kiarostami’s films: ‘Let’s not fear death.... 
Let’s not close the door on the living.’ Kiarostami certainly invites us to ‘float on the 
spell of the red rose’ as Sepehry asks us to do, for ‘It’s not our job to know the 
mystery of the red rose’ (Sepehry, 1988: 163-181)
Like many of Kiarostami’s other films, The Wind Will Carry Us did not follow a
strictly written script, but developed on location. Kiarostami’s initial plan was to
document the death of the old woman. However, the film turns into a questioning of
such an approach itself. Once again, Kiarostami’s film questions our pre-determined
notions, and this time it is the superiority of science over arts. One of the foci of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy was also the impotency of science in addressing certain
aspects of life. In his view,
the subject matter, questions, problems and solutions of philosophy are fundamentally 
different from those of the natural sciences because they are not empirical in 
character. While the natural sciences aim to explain empirical phenomena, philosophy 
is concerned exclusively with something that antecedes and is separable from 
empirical inquiry: namely, questions of sense and meaning (Allen and Turvey, 2001:
4).
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Behzad’s experience in the village, however, transforms him and he is no longer
interested in documenting the death ceremonies. Alain Bergala reads the ending of
the film, where Behzad throws the leg-bone into the river and washes his
windscreen, as a shot that
elegantly and brilliantly, brings to a close the most important discourse in this 
enigmatic film, which is the re-education of the gaze.... Now [Behzad] has found a 
new way of looking at the world, one that is free of all impure motivations and from 
any utilitarian mentality, open to whatever might happen unexpectedly on the 
uncontrollable fringes of vision, ready to accept the enigma of ‘otherness’. The grimy 
windscreen, through which Kiarostami has refused to let his own vision as a film­
maker focus, is now perfectly clean, (quoted in Elena, 2005: 158-159).
Kiarostami leads us to look at the world in a different way. For this, his films take us
on a journey that questions our convictions—whether religiously or scientifically
biased—whilst gently offering an alternative way of looking. One of the main
themes in Wittgenstein’s later works is the ‘importance of preserving the integrity of
non-scientific forms of understanding, the kind of understanding characteristic of the
arts’ (Monk, 2005: 101). Behzad epitomises this scientific understanding, one that
engulfs his perception of life in The Wind Will Carry Us. Moreover, Kiarostami
leads us to look at the world in a different way. The ‘re-education’ of the gaze subtly
alluded to in the film is where Kiarostami, Wittgenstein and Sepehry converge.
Wittgenstein emphasises not only ‘on showing the reader things that cannot be said,
but on getting the reader to see things afresh’ (Monk, 2005: 65). And just as Sepehry
(1995) first asks:
I don’t know why the good nature of horses 
and the beauty of the pigeons have won repute, 
why no vulture is kept as a pet.
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And only then proceeds to propose that
We need to rinse our eyes and view 
Everything in a different light.
We should cleanse our words 
To be both wind and rain.
Conclusions
Depicting the sacred through the profane in a medium such as film is a challenge for 
any director wishing to address the metaphysical without falling into the trap of the 
dogmatic. Kiarostami is no exception and he counters this challenge with a unique 
approach. His films are poetic philosophies that contemplate man’s existence and its 
meaning. They are, as Wittgenstein states, one of those ‘artistic creations which can 
mediate what is higher’ (Clack, 1999: 37). Even though his films demonstrate 
certain theological or philosophical ideas, he does not attempt to prove the truth or 
untruth of any of these claims. Instead, his references to the mystical go beyond that 
of any religious or scientific debate. As Wittgenstein states, human language is 
incapable o f explaining the mystical. The religious, however, are often tempted to 
make the mistake of explaining it. The moment an explanation is offered, the 
mystery and wonder o f the mystical is destroyed. Kiarostami does not offer an 
explanation; he just points to another way of looking, allowing his audience to arrive 
at a certain understanding themselves. Both Kiarostami and Wittgenstein emphasise 
showing the viewer/reader a way to see things afresh. To quote his own words, when 
asked if serious art creates a desire in the spectator for some other reality, Kiarostami 
says:
Yes, I believe so, because otherwise art would have no purpose. Should religion not 
prove successful at accomplishing that mission, art always can attempt it. They both
249
point in the same direction. Religion points to another world, whereas art points to a 
better existence. One is an invitation, an offering to a faraway place, the other to a 
place that is close (Walsh, 2000).
The question of life and death is certainly one of Kiarostami’s main philosophical 
deliberations, evident in his numerous films that deal with this issue. It, therefore, 
provides us with an interesting study of how his films are ‘philosophy in action’ and 
how they deliberate about religion. In all these films {And Life Goes On, Through the 
Olive Trees, Taste o f  Cherry and The Wind Will Carry Us) not a single dead body or 
dying person is actually shown. There are long shots of burial scenes but no close- 
ups. Like many of Kiarostami’s hidden characters whom we never see but get to 
know, death is also present but not staring us in the face. Instead, Kiarostami 
poetically thinks about the question of life, death and suffering.
This approach is not argued to the exclusion of any other understanding o f death and
suffering; rather, it finds significance through its contrasts. Many of the religious
discourses articulated in relation to life and death seem to fail in responding
meaningfully to those facing it. It becomes evident that articulations of death as
God’s wrath and punishment, or as a necessity of the existence o f evil for a better
appreciation of good, or as a law of nature, lack, as Wittgenstein would argue, the
pictorial relation to the world that is essential for the possession of meaning. In a
culture that lays great emphasis on mourning rituals and ceremonies, Kiarostami
invites us to rethink our approach to death and life. Like Wittgenstein’s silence to
‘that of which many are babbling today’, Kiarostami, too, refuses to comment on any
of the views that he introduces within the film. Instead, after he has presented us
with the authoritarian accounts of the religious, the positivist, as well as the sceptic,
he arrives at a poetic account of death and life. In line with Wittgenstein’s thought,
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Kiarostami’s references to the mystical are different from scientific and common- 
sense statements. His films, therefore, as seen through the example o f the theme of 
life and death, demonstrate a poetic philosophy, an approach that clearly stands out 
in comparison to the other approaches to religion and spirituality in Iranian films.
Having explored the philosophical approach to religion in this chapter, as well as the 
formalistic and mystical approaches in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, the final 
chapter will study how cinema gives new life to a Shi‘i expression that is communal 
and public, but unpopular within the formalistic approach.
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Chapter 8: Cinema as a Reservoir for Cultural Memory
In February 2007, BBC Persian Radio reported on the latest trends of music and 
mobile ringtones in Iran during the month of Muharram, particularly those heard 
during the ninth and tenth day of Muharram (Tasu‘a and ‘Ashura). These did not fall 
into any o f the two broad music categories popular in Iran—pop music, including 
Western and Iranian pop, or classical Iranian music. Rather, they were nowheh khani 
(singing nowheh). Nowheh are lyrics mourning Imam Husayn, the third Shi‘i Imam, 
martyred at Karbala in the seventh century. One young man played the two different 
nowheh ringtones he had on his mobile phone for the interviewer. He explained that 
one nowheh was set as his general ringtone and the other was assigned to his ‘chick’ 
(girlfriend). Other interviewees also said that they changed over their mobile 
ringtones and their car CDs to nowheh to keep with the mood o f this period.
Most interesting, however, was the interview with Hossein Tohi, an Iranian rapper, 
whose music is part of the Iranian underground music scene. Tohi (Hossein’s self- 
styled name meaning ‘empty’ in Persian) was bom in 1986 and is a computer 
student. Even though a number of rappers have emerged in Iran, only a few have 
gained official authorisation. The majority of the Rap-Farsi (Persian rap) singers 
remain part of the underground scene and disseminate their work mainly through the 
internet. Hossein Tohi relates how he woke up one morning in the early days of 
Muharram 2007 and felt like writing about Imam Husayn. He asked his composer 
friend, Mahdiyar, who was familiar with Eastern music, to compose music for his 
rap. The end result could be called rap-nowheh, with its lyrics praising the Imam and 
mourning his death, sung in rap-Farsi to music that also employed the traditional
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percussions used in nowheh. Tohi, however, refuses to refer to it as nowheh and
instead prefers to call it simply a rap about Imam Husayn and his companions (Tohi,
2007). Here is an extract of his rap about Imam Husayn, the first Muharram Rap30:
The minute your name is mentioned, oh Master! [Imam Husayn],
I do not know why my tears start running and the love in my heart increases.
You are the greatest of martyrs and noblemen,
It has been years since your death
But your name still remains alive, oh Master!
I pray I will have the opportunity 
Barefoot to come and visit your shrine.
Or for you to come at night to my land,
And visit me in my dreams.
You know that I carry your name,
And would never want to stay away from you.
Let me be your servant at your shrine,
Or maybe you still do not find it deserving and, therefore, that is for the best.
We beat our chests for you during Muharram,
And in one voice say ‘Oh, Husayn!’ when we are with one another.
Oh Master! Do have a look at us and put your hand on our shoulders,
Take some of the burden from our shoulders.
The tmth is that I’m terrified,
That you will leave me alone on the first night of my death...
The programme continued its report on the many different kinds of music produced 
over that past year for Muharram. These employ various music genres -  some a 
fusion o f the traditional nowheh music and others just pure pop music. Is this, as the 
interviewer asked, an updating of the Muharram mourning? However we define this 
music, this new form of lamenting for Imam Husayn has certainly attracted a large 
number of the youth, making quite untenable the claim that listening to nowheh is an 
outdated practice of the older, or more traditional, generation. In fact, the amalgam
30 Unless otherwise stated, all translations of Persian material in this chapter are 
mine.
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of Shi‘i religious concepts and modern musical genres has enabled a new medium of 
expression through which Iranian youth can more easily explore their Shi‘i identity. 
However, trying to attract the youth to nowheh is not always considered a good 
enough excuse for ‘reinventing’ or ‘modernising’ traditional religious practices. 
Daneshmand is just one adherent of this latter school of thought.
Hujjatul-Islam Mehdi Daneshmand is an Iranian cleric and author of a number of 
books on religion. He is a frequent public speaker and delivers sermons in different 
parts of Iran. Daneshmand is highly entertaining, with a great talent for doing 
impressions and, unusually for a cleric, has no compunction about swearing during 
his speeches. The reach of his sermons now extends beyond the mosques and other 
public sessions, thanks to the virtual world of the internet and particularly YouTube. 
Some of his clips on YouTube have received hundreds of thousands of hits. Given 
the fact that the clips are in Persian and not subtitled, one can safely assume that 
most of his virtual audience are also Iranian. Not all of these audiences, however, 
can be classified as enthusiastic viewers, as some of obscenities left in the comments 
section testify. My main interest in Daneshmand’s speeches, however, revolve 
around his references to the commemorative practices of Muharram, for they reflect 
an important sample of the current official religious attitudes towards them.
Daneshmand is critical of many aspects of these commemorative practices of 
Muharram. He particularly takes issue with the mciddahs. Maddahs, literally 
eulogists, like the rowzeh-khan narrate stories of the Prophet, imams and saints. 
Maddahs are not necessarily trained in the madrasas and draw their material from a 
broad spectrum of literature, including their own compositions. Daneshmand
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criticises the ways in which many of the current maddahs praise the Shi‘i imams and
the family of the Prophet. He holds these ‘ignorant and uneducated’ maddahs
responsible for providing the Sunnis with the ammunition to condemn Shi‘i rituals
and practices. The internet, he states, is rife with Sunni sites that are anti-Shi‘a and
they use extracts from these maddahs to prove that Shi‘as are heretics. His own
selective extracts from the maddahs provides him with the perfect foil for
condemning those religious ceremonies that are held independently of the ulama.
Not only are the maddahs, therefore, framed as uneducated, uninformed and bereft
o f any religious knowledge, but more dangerously, their ignorance offers the
enemies o f Shi‘ism an excuse to revile it! The audiences of these maddahs are not
spared either. They are held equally responsible for attending these sessions and
keeping quiet during such disgrace, which brings untold shame upon religion:
A bunch of uneducated no-goods get together and chant ‘Husayn, Husayn!’ ........
You beating your chest for three hours, how many sermons of Imam Husayn have you 
studied? How many books have you studied on Imam Husayn?
.. .1 was in one of the provinces and I actually disrupted the session. The maddah there 
was singing: ‘Hasan [Husayn’s elder brother and preceding imam] has one dot [a 
reference to the dots in the Arabic/Persian alphabet], Husayn has three dots, Fatima 
[Husayn’s mother, the Prophet’s daughter] has one dot, Zaynab [Husayn’s sister] has 
five dots, Wah! Wah!...’ I said, ‘Shut it, and why are you [the audience] wailing?’ ... 
CDs of these sessions are made and then put on the internet and the Sunnis come and 
show it around and say: ‘See! This is the share of the Shi'as [their contribution to 
Islam]....’ What is this you [the maddahs] are saying? Don’t you have brains?...Didn’t 
Zaynab have sermons? Didn’t she have speeches? ...What kind of a rowzeh is this 
that you are feeding people in the name of religion?
In another speech, he further criticises mourning sessions set up independently of the 
ulama which, therefore, result in heretical and blasphemous talk. The extract below, 
taken from his sermons, is yet another example of the tension between the laity and
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the clergy discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Religion, Daneshmand implies, should
remain within the domain of the clergy whose prerogative it is to authorise religious
rituals and practices. It is certainly not for the maddahs to bring in music as an
accompaniment to their singing. For Daneshmand, the entire practice, whether it is
the lyrics, the maddahs or the audience clapping their hands together, is problematic.
It should be noted however, that the very fact that the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance broadcasts nowhehs with music, if not necessarily the exact ones
that Daneshmand points to, on national radio and television, gives them some degree
of legitimacy, if not outright endorsement. At the very least, it points to the plurality
of practice sanctioned by the state even as it attempts to strike a delicate balance
between filling in a gap ‘demanded’ by the laity, and being cognisant of the concerns
of more conservative elements within the state who fear the erosion of their power
and influence. As we shall see below, Daneshmand is conscious of this perceived
sanction and addresses it squarely:
A few maddahs, who have studied under only God knows which master, string 
together some rubbish so that they can supposedly attract the youth to them.
When not even one ‘alim [singular of ulama] is present [in organising and guiding] 
your gathering, it is no surprise that the result is this kind of catastrophe.
Daneshmand then goes on to provide an example of lyric he had heard a maddah 
sing:
‘I who hold on to the love of Husayn,
Am only the dog of Husayn’
For God’s sake, what kind of a lyric is this?
...They say Ta ilaha ilia Husayn’ [There is no God but Husayn]... They’ve no clue 
what they’re saying. This is blasphemy!!!...
Tapes of this group of uncouth maddahs, who have distanced themselves from the 
ulama, are being distributed in Zahidan [a province bordering Pakistan], in the Arab
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countries, in Saudi Arabia. This has closed the mouths of [i.e. silenced] the [Shi‘i] 
ulama. They [the anti-Shi‘a Sunnis] say you are heretics! You consider Fatima and 
Husayn as God!!!...The reputation of religion is not in the hands of these few 
maddahs.
They sing their maddahis with the keyboard, with santoor [a traditional string 
instrument].
You’ve taken the bloody music into the pulpit, into the mihrab and into rowzeh as 
well!!!
The Ministry of [Culture and] Islamic Guidance that has spent millions and trillions of 
tomans on daf and tonbak [both traditional percussion instruments]. What does it want 
from mihrab and religion? Leave Husayn alone...leave religion alone...leave the 
keyboard for the television and radio, and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance. Wherever there are tonbaks, all the cameras are ready and present, but they 
don’t want to have anything to do with a session of such grandeur [pointing to his 
own session],..
I have to say that religion has a master .. .Husayn’s head did not go on top of the spear 
so that I and you could get together now in his sessions and clap our hands and 
whistle, play the santoor, take the santoor inside the mihrab. Whoever has heard of 
maddahi with flute?! They justify that the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
shows it [these maddahis]; the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting shows a lot of 
things, like the struggle of the fittest in the jungle, should you imitate?... The Islamic 
Republic of Iran Broadcasting is not a source of emulation (marja ‘-e taqlid), the radio 
is not a source of emulation, they cannot be the source of emulation, they cannot show 
jurisprudence.
Many Shi‘i practices such as pilgrimage to the shrines of the imams and saints, and 
visual representations of the imams and the prophets, have been condemned by 
mainstream Sunnis.31 Shi‘as, however, have not necessarily thus shied away from 
rituals that may be perceived as ‘unlslamic’ by the Sunnis. Daneshmand’s concerns 
about the ‘malpractices’ do not appear to stem solely from anxiety about believers
31 This is not to say that these practices did not exist amongst Sunnis. For example, 
there are numerous Ottoman manuscripts that include depictions of the prophets.
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losing salvation, but also about the disrepute that they can bring Shi‘ism. This 
constant awareness of the ‘Other’s’ perception and condemnation o f ‘Self appears 
to precipitate attempts to comply and reconcile with what is acceptable to that 
‘normative’ view, and, in turn, to shape local practices. One could even question if 
Sunni normativity is replacing Shi‘i sensibilities. It is, therefore, pertinent to ask if 
the recent banning (in the Muharram of 2007) of certain practices, some of which 
had been observed for centuries in Iran, is a reaction to anti-Shi‘a propaganda or a 
political discourse used to strategically condemn rival factions.
The official bans in 2007 included public displays of the images o f the imams, the 
use of alams (standards) during the mourning processions and the playing of 
instruments as part of the commemorative ceremonies. It is, however, debatable 
whether as individuals the Shi‘as themselves will remove the pictures of the imams 
from their homes, shops or cafes. But for now, another video clip on YouTube very 
tellingly streams a maddah beating his chest and singing passionately in a very 
crowded mourning session: ‘They can say whatever they want, I  am the dog o f  
Husayn/’ and the congregation beat their chests and repeat this refrain after him. 
Interestingly, a fragment of a silk and gold carpet dating from 1600-1625, and on 
display at the British Museum’s Shah ‘Abbas: The Remaking o f  Iran, bears w aqf 
inscriptions referring to the Shah as ‘the dog of this shrine’. Indeed, the exhibition 
catalogue cites additional references where Shah Abbas is referred to as ‘the dog of 
‘Ali ibn Abi Talib’ or ‘the dog of the shrine’ (Canby, 2009: 245). One can, therefore, 
safely assume that the phrase ‘dog of Husayn’ has been in currency for a long time 
within the Shi‘i Iranian vocabulary and is not a recent innovation as Daneshmand 
would have it. The question posed above is obviously far more complex and requires
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further research which lies outside the scope of this study. However, it is clear that 
the current commemorative events o f Muharram are not just about Husayn and his 
message. Even though ta ‘ziyeh (the passion play) traditionally offered an opportunity 
to criticise the injustices o f the privileged, a theme that will be discussed later in this 
chapter, recent events suggest new developments of the Muharram sessions. 
Interestingly, the Muharram commemorations have themselves turned into a battle 
for authority in defining what these commemorations do and do not entail. It is the 
official versus the popular discourse on Husayn, a battle that is not so easily won on 
either side.
Aside from the general populace, the events of Karbala and the martyrdom of 
Husayn have also inspired many filmmakers. The notion o f martyrdom in its specific 
Shi‘i tradition has been heavily employed in the war films made about the Iran-Iraq 
war, referred to as Sacred Defence Cinema (Sinama-ye defa'-e moqqadas). Other 
than a few exceptions, these are usually propagandist films, a genre that has already 
been extensively studied. In this chapter I will explore the ways in which film 
provides a new medium of expression for one of the oldest Shi'i narratives, 
highlighting the continuing impact o f Husayn’s story on Shi‘i believers. I will first 
discuss the origins and development as well as the characteristics of ta'ziyeh, the 
oldest and until the modem period the ‘only’ Islamic drama, which re-enacts the 
events o f Karbala. Next, I will examine how various filmmakers employ elements 
from ta ‘ziyeh in their filmic narratives. Like ta ‘ziyeh, many of these films include the 
historical and mythological in their narratives. In the final section, I will study how 
Kiarostami captures the continuing relevance of the martyrdom of Husayn in the 
Iranian Shi‘i context.
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Ta(ziyeh, the only Islamic drama
Ta'ziyeh is a re-enactment of the events that led to the death of Husayn b. ‘Ali. 
Husayn was the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Shi‘i imam after 
his brother Hasan b. ‘Ali.
As described in Chapter 3, Husayn refused to submit to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph 
and was forced to camp at Karbala. Denied access to water and parched from thirst, 
Husayn and his companions were attacked on ‘Ashura, the 10th day o f the month of 
Muharram. By afternoon, Husayn and his men, including many children, were 
brutally slain.
Origins and development o f ta‘ziyeh
As discussed in Chapter 3, a few years after the death of Husayn, a group of the 
Kufan Shia gathered at Karbala to atone for betraying him. Calling themselves 
tawwabun or ‘Penitents’, their actions marked the beginnings of a new religious 
ritual. The first public commemoration of the mourning rituals for Husayn, however, 
is recorded to have occurred in 963 in Baghdad during the reign of the Shi‘i Buyid 
M u‘izz al-Dawla. With the fall of the dynasty in 1055, the practice did not survive 
much longer.
The events of Karbala have been commemorated extensively in Iran, particularly 
with the advent of the Safavids in 1501 and the establishment of Shia Islam as the 
official religion of the state. The practice of rowzeh-khani, participation in the 
delivery of sermons about the tragedy of Karbala, also comes to the fore around this
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time. As discussed earlier, Kashefi’s Rowzat al-shuhada’ {Paradise o f  Martyrs) 
became a popular text for rowzeh-khani. Mourning processions during the 10 days of 
Muharram, complete with standards, horses and drums, also become significant at 
this time. Even though theatrical elements were present in these rituals, the re­
enactment itself of the events of Karbala, referred to as ta ‘ziyeh or passion play, are 
not found until the Zand period (1735-1787).
A few scholars have, however, traced the roots of ta ‘ziyeh to earlier, pre-Islamic 
Iranian rituals, such as Siyawush-khani. According to Iranian cultural tradition, 
Siyawush, the son o f Kaykawus, the Persian emperor, was falsely accused by his 
step-mother, Sudabeh, of raping her. To prove his innocence, Siyawush had to 
undergo a trial by fire. He emerged unharmed out o f this trial and was thus cleared of 
any wrongdoing. Later, he commanded his father’s army against the invading forces 
of Afrasiyab, the king of Timur. Nevertheless, when Siyawush accepted the peace 
proposal offered by Afrasiyab, his father Kaykawus dismissed him and the peace 
treaty. Consequently, Siyawush joined Afrasiyab, who accepted him with open arms 
and even gave his own daughter to him in marriage. Siyawush’s popularity and 
rising power displeased Afrasiyab’s brother, who went on to instigate Siyawush’s 
death.
Siyawush’s innocent death some few thousand years ago was lamented by men and 
women and marked by many elegies. Minstrels would sing and recite these elegies, 
commemorating Siyawush’s death. An archaeological discovery in the ruins of the 
city of Panjikent, 68km from Samarqand, provided further evidence of the 
connection between Siyawush-khani and the mourning rituals of Husayn. The
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discovery was of a wall painting dating back to around 3000 BC. It depicts Siyawush 
in a large coffin, with a number of men and women surrounding the coffin, beating 
their faces, heads and chests. The resemblance of this depiction to the Shi‘i Iranian 
mourning rites for Husayn is striking (Beyzaie, 2001: 31-32), rites that are also 
present in the ta ‘ziyeh performances.
Ta ‘ziyeh also appears to have evolved from a number of earlier pre-Islamic visual 
and performing arts such as pardeh khani (story-chanting) and naqqali (storytelling). 
In pardeh khani, the narrator uses a pardeh or painted screen that usually illustrates 
the various episodes of his narration. Screens used for the mourning of Husayn 
usually have depictions of the battle of Karbala, with some Qur’anic references and 
at times even stories from the national epic of Shahnameh. The pardeh khan then 
sings and recites the story pointing to the illustrations on the screen to elucidate the 
scene. Later, ta ‘ziyeh drew heavily from these depictions, as well as from the elegies 
of pardeh khani, naqqali and rowzeh khani themselves and the techniques of naqqali 
recitation.
Despite its religious motifs, ta ‘ziyeh did not at first meet with the approval of all the 
ulama. They objected to it on various theological grounds that condemned human 
representation in art, and the contentious issue of music (Homayuni, 2001: 61). 
Moreover, it allowed women to watch the play, providing a new space for their 
public appearance and participation. Most importantly, however, its great popularity 
became a threat to rowzeh khani, a ceremony that was customarily organised by the 
ulama, and from which they earned an income. However, others such as Mirza Abul 
Qasim Qommi (d. 1815/1816), a prominent religious authority living during the
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reign of Fath ‘Ali Shah (r. 1797-1834), supported ta ‘ziyeh. In a religious decision 
(fatwa), he ‘unequivocally expressed the opinion that not only were religious plays 
lawful and not prohibited but that they were among the greatest of religious works’ 
(Baktash, 1979: 107). This is comparable to the decision Khomeini was forced to 
make about cinema. With the Islamic Republic’s victory in 1979, the ulama chose to 
endorse cinema by appropriating it for their own political purposes. While Khomeini 
opposed cinema’s ‘misuse’, its adoption ‘became an ideological tool to combat 
Pahlavi culture’ (Tapper, 2002: 6).
Characteristics o f ta*ziyeh
Ta 'ziyeh started out as an outdoor performance, with simplicity of dialogue, props 
and mise-en-scene. With its growing popularity, however, the need for a permanent 
place was all too evident, and resulted in the building of the tekiyehs. These were 
modelled after the local caravanserais, which were square or rectangular buildings 
with rooms on the perimeter overlooking a vast yard in the middle. The pond 
traditionally located at the centre of the yard was covered or replaced by a raised 
stage on which the actors would perform, surrounded on all sides by the audience.
Audience participation is one of the main features of ta ‘ziyeh. As Pelly states in his 
preface, ‘If the success of a drama is to be measured by the effects which it 
produces upon the people for whom it is composed, or upon the audience before 
whom it is represented, no play has ever surpassed the tragedy known in the 
Mussulman world as that of Hasan and Husain’ (1879). People cry and sympathise 
with the sufferings of the Imam and curse his enemies in the play. The actors are
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called shabih or dramatisers. Each of the actors have the suffix khan’ or ‘reader’ 
(of the manuscript) attached to their titles. Thus, each follower o f Husayn is referred 
to as mazlum-khan (the reader of the oppressed), each of his enemies as mukhalif- 
khan (the reader o f the opposition), the actor playing Husayn as Hiisayn-khan (the 
reader of Husayn) and Shimr, Husayn’s slayer, Shimr-khan (the reader o f Shimr). 
This serves to remind the audience that these individuals are, in fact, actors playing 
out the roles and not actually Shimr or Husayn. Thus, during the performance, the 
actor playing Shimr would himself cry, inviting the audience to join in his sobs, as 
he prepared to behead Husayn (Beyzaie, 2001: 137-141).
Music and poetry were an integral part o f the ta ‘ziyeh performance. Ta 'ziyeh scripts 
took the form o f poetry. Unlike the poetry o f the great Persian masters, ta ‘ziyeh was 
written in a language accessible to ordinary people. As Beyzaie emphasises, it was 
not a performance of poetry, but rather a performance employing poetry as its 
language (2001: 128). The poetic framework of ta'ziyeh drew from mar sly eh (poetry 
composed to lament the passing away of a beloved person) and the content of its 
constituent stories drew heavily from the various kinds of naqqali. In fact, the two 
distinct styles of naqqali are evident in ta ‘ziyeh dialogue. The melancholic words 
sung in a particular Iranian metre by the mazlum-khans (the readers of the oppressed) 
are remnants of the religious naqqali, and the exaggerated recitation of mukhalif- 
khans (readers of the opposition), replete with gesticulation and grandeur, is a 
remnant of epic naqqali (Beyzaie, 2001: 121). There were thus rules according to 
which the actors would recite the poetry. Those playing the followers of Husayn, the 
mazlitm-khans, were usually required to have a good voice and read or sing their
264
parts beautifully. The enemies of Husayn, on the other hand, were not required to 
sing, and instead shouted out their parts.
Ta ‘ziyeh made its way into the court and in the upper echelons of society. It reached 
its peak under Qajar patronage, a period referred to as the golden age of ta'ziyeh. 
Moreover, the emerging new social class of merchants and politicians also supported 
ta'ziyeh. In his travels to Europe, Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848-1896) developed 
a taste for European theatre. He wanted a playhouse similar in architectural style to 
the Royal Albert Hall in London. Subsequently, in 1869, he ordered the building of 
the magnificent Tekiyeh-Dowlat in Tehran, located on the south-eastern side of 
Golestan Palace. But even before it was completed, there were protests from the 
religious strata about the types of performances it might hold. The Shah, ultimately 
designated the building for ta'ziyeh performances (Homayuni, 2001: 82-3).
The Tekiyeh-Dowlat, the greatest playhouse ever to have been built in Iran, 
accommodated approximately 20,000 people. During the Qajar period when ta 'ziyeh 
enjoyed royal patronage, many of the court scene props were provided by the palace. 
This transformed the traditionally simple performance into one with extravagant 
costumes and mise-en-scene. The dialogues correspondingly evolved along more 
elaborate lines. Jewels from the king’s treasury would be used for the actors’ 
costumes in order to give the performance a more real feel. Camels and various other 
animals were also brought onto the stage. The court women would personally sew 
and knit the costumes of actors (all men) playing the female roles of Yazid’s court 
(Homayuni, 2001: 94). During the 10 days of Muharram, there were two daily 
ta'ziyeh performances— one in the afternoon, the other in the evening. There are
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records of the attendance of foreign dignitaries and their families, who were invited 
to watch ta ‘ziyeh every day except ‘Ashura (the 10th day o f Muharram when Husayn 
was martyred). Non-Muslims were prohibited from watching ta ‘ziyeh or indeed the 
martyrdom of Husayn on ‘Ashura (Homayuni, 2001: 92).
Whilst ta ‘ziyeh was performed in great grandeur and pomp in the courts, it retained 
its simpler forms in smaller towns and villages. By the time of Muhammad Shah 
Qajar (r. 1907-1909) and Ahmad Shah Qajar (r. 1909-1925), who were increasingly 
becoming Westernised, ta'ziyeh gradually came to lose its royal patronage (Beyzaie, 
2001: 143). Many years later, Tekiyeh-Dowlat fell by the wayside under Reza 
Shah’s modernisation project, which included a ban on ta'ziyeh performances. After 
the demolition of Tekiyeh-Dowlat, ta'ziyeh was pushed out of the bigger cities and 
into the suburbs and villages, where performers went in the hope of finding an 
audience. It is important to note that the decline of theatre was not limited to Iran, 
but extended throughout the world. According to Chelkowski, this worldwide crisis 
in theatre was the result of the ‘advancement of film and television in the post-World 
War II period, together with a decline of religious ritual’ (Chelkowski, 1979: 10).
Several Iranian filmmakers, however, have engaged with ta'ziyeh in their films. 
Through their re-interpretation of this older form of performing art, they have— even 
if  inadvertently— reintroduced ta 'ziyeh to their audiences. One can, therefore, argue 
that despite the destruction of Tekiyeh-Dowlat, the symbol o f ta'ziyeh's glorious 
period, the cinema screens revived some of the recognition and significance that 
ta 'ziyeh once enjoyed. In the following sections, I will discuss the works of two very
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different filmmakers, Beyzaie and Kiarostami, and their employment o f ta 'ziyeh in 
film.
Beyzaie, a filmmaker rooted in ‘historical genealogy’
Bahram Beyzaie was bom in Tehran in 1938. He is a distinguished playwright, 
screenwriter, film and theatre director, film editor as well as a scholar of the Iranian 
performing arts. He left his studies at the University of Tehran incomplete, and 
began his own independent research on Iranian theatre, epic literature, including 
Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, and the traditional plays of ta'ziyeh. His research also 
encompassed a study of pre-Islamic Persian history and Persian painting. Later, he 
extended his studies to Eastern art and spent a decade writing about it, as well as 
Iranian theatre and cinema. He made his first short film, Uncle Moustache {Amu 
Sibilu), in 1969 and in 1971 he produced and directed his first feature film 
Downpour (Ragbar).
Beyzaie is one of the Iranian auteur directors, whose works have been extensively
studied both inside and outside Iran. He states that his fascination for the traditional
Iranian arts -  which is reflected in his cinematic works -  stems from an interest in
the lesser-studied field of understanding the lives of ordinary people (2001: 84). He
clearly deems the familiarity of the filmmaker with historical genealogy to be a
necessary component:
...many people still do not know why it is necessary to be rooted in a historical 
genealogy of one sort or another... In fact, when we look at some of the greatest films 
ever made, we note that the filmmaker has a literary, or visual, or theatrical history 
which is instrumental in his cinema. In Japanese cinema, in particular, you see the 
strong presence of Japanese theatre. It seems that in many instances, if one were to
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show a person walking in the street or any other daily activity, one need not have 
historical documentation to validate that act. Yet in other circumstances we need a 
more contemporary and philosophical expression of the history and culture of the past 
(Beyzaie, 2001: 81-82).
An unknown ‘modernist* filmmaker
Beyzaie’s deep knowledge of the Iranian performing arts, history and culture as well 
as his numerous contributions to the literary and art scene of the country over four 
decades have not, however, earned him an easy place within the field. A number of 
his films and plays have been banned by the government. These include Ballad o f  
Tara (Cherike-ye Tara, 1979) and Death o f  Yazdgerd {Marg-e Yazdgerd, 1982), 
which have not yet received screening permits in Iran. His outspoken philosophical 
views cost him his tenure at the University of Tehran, shortly after the Islamic 
Revolution. Despite creating some of the masterpieces o f Iranian cinema, he has not 
gained his due recognition outside Iran. Whilst Western scholarship in Iranian 
cinema has increased over the last two decades, very few scholars—mostly those 
with an Iranian background studying Iranian cinema—have paid attention to his 
work.
A simple search on Amazon.com and the Internet Movie Database IMDb is enough 
to indicate the meagre international recognition of his films. A search of Iranian 
DVDs on Amazon.com returned 46 films.32 Whilst many Makhmalbaf, Kiarostami, 
Mehrjui and Majidi titles were listed, there was no trace of Beyzaie’s films. The 
Internet Movie Database (IMDb) -  self-styled the Earth’s Biggest Movie Database -
32 The results are based on a search made on www.amazon.com and 
www.IMDb.com on 20 June 2007.
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catalogues all 13 short and feature films directed by Beyzaie. However, the paucity 
of user comments hints at the limited international scope o f his audiences and 
distribution of his films. Only four of his 13 films have received comments; Rabid 
Killing (Sagkoshi, 2001) has five comments, but the other three have received only 
one comment each. By comparison, Majidi’s The Colour o f  Paradise (1999) alone 
had received 67 comments on IMDb. One commentator, Lalit Rao, reviewing 
Beyzaie’s Maybe Another Time {Shayad vaqti digar, 1988), complains about the 
difficulty of finding his films, stating, ‘I would like to explicitly remark that it is a 
great shame that almost all the films by Bahram Beyzaie have not been distributed 
widely on DVD. What are the DVD labels like Artificial Eye, Criterion Collection, 
Kino, New Yorker Films or Facets doing?’ (19 April 2007 on IMDb).
Another commentator, Mehdi, liked Rabid Killing, but did not recommend it to non- 
Iranians:
This film points to some kind of customs and cultures in Iran needs you to be an 
Iranian if you want to realize it. for whom they are outside of Iran and they've heard 
about Iranian cinema this could not be an interesting movie, because they will not get 
what is going on (IMDb, 23December 2003).
Many critics also regularly referr to this inaccessibility of Beyzaie’s work, 
particularly for those who are unfamiliar with Persian history and culture. Beyzaie, 
in turn, has expressed his frustration with those who have labelled his films abstruse 
(Mahani, 2003). Whilst some critics regard Beyzaie’s work as too specific to Persian 
culture, Maddadpur, the Iranian film critic whose work was analysed extensively in 
Chapter 4, regards his works as the best example of a ‘Westoxicated’ art, where 
myth and truth are mixed together. According to him, Beyzaie is incomprehensible 
to both his audience and the intellectuals who sing his praise (Maddadpur, 1995,
269
143). On the other hand, Dabashi, another critic also studied in Chapter 4, believes 
that Beyzaie manages to channel his attraction to Persian mysticism in a constructive 
direction (2002: 135). Even as critics and scholars disagree on whether or not 
Beyzaie is Western or exclusively Iranian, a mythologist or a neo-realist, accessible 
or indecipherable, one cannot deny the significance of his work in any serious study 
of Iranian cinema.
Beyzaie’s obscurity on the international scene and his interest and use of traditional 
performing arts in cinema can be compared to the Japanese filmmaker Yasujiro Ozu 
(1903-1963). Burch argues that with the revival of the modernist movements in 
cinema in the 50s and 60s, modernist filmmakers looked eastwards for models of 
filmmaking (in Bordwell, 1997: 107). This included Japanese cinema and the 
introduction of directors such as Akira Kurosawa to the West in the early 1950s. 
Japanese cinema was rooted in its earlier traditional performing arts and ‘derived 
from the aesthetic which emerged from the court culture of the Heian era (794-118) 
and which became the basis of Japan’s traditional arts’ (Bordwell, 1997: 108). Ozu 
was one of the directors, posthumously referred to as ‘the greatest director of his 
generation in Japan’. His works, however, were considered ‘too Japanese’ to be 
included in international film festivals during his own time and were only 
reintroduced later in the 1970s (Bordwell, 1997: 107). Indeed, as with Ozu, one can 
argue that some of Beyzaie’s works have not made it to the international festivals 
because they also are considered to be ‘too Iranian’ for recent festival tastes. It is, 
therefore, possible that whilst pre- and post-Revolutionary governments might have 
been less tolerant of his critical views, the international scene might have snubbed
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him for his heavy use of Iranian mythology and/or unfamiliar traditional theatrical 
forms.
As mentioned, Beyzaie’s use of theatre in cinema is not unprecedented. In fact, in its 
earliest forms, cinema was used to ‘capture theatrical performances, such as pageants 
representing the life of Christ’ (Bordwell, 1997: 13). Moreover, as early as the 1920s 
Brecht proposed the use of Verfremdungseffekt, translated as ‘ a distancing effect’, or 
‘alienation effect’ in film. He achieved this in his own films and they ‘became a 
model of “presentational theatre”, showing how to incorporate such antinaturalistic 
effects as direct address, impersonal recitation of lines and frank displays of the 
mechanics of lighting and staging’ (Bordwell, 1997: 86). Interestingly, ta'ziyeh also 
employs various distancing techniques, such as speaking to the audience and 
referring to the actors as ‘readers o f  the characters they play. As mentioned earlier, 
in ta ‘ziyeh the ‘reader o f  the murderer of Imam Husayn {Shimr-khan), who is a Shia 
in real life, cries when he kills Imam Husayn and recites elegies to that effect, 
reminding the audience that what they see is just a performance. Beyzaie uses many 
o f the theatrical forms o f ta ‘ziyeh in his films, which distance the audience through 
the ‘alienation effects’ discussed above.
Like film history generally, Iranian cinema has experienced various movements, 
which have oscillated between coming close to theatrical forms and moving away 
from them. Beyzaie’s cinema is towards the former extreme. While works o f other 
filmmakers whether national or international who have broken away from 
conventional styles of filmmaking such as Kiarostami, Makhmalbaf, Majidi, 
Resnais, Antonioni, Godard and Ozu might have received international recognition
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and exhibition (whether posthumously or in their own lifetimes) Beyzaie’s works 
still remain largely unknown and undefined. There is evidence hinting that he faces 
greater challenges than others in obtaining the necessary local authorisation for the 
production, exhibition and distribution of his films and their international 
participation. Farhmand lists a series of incidents in which Beyzaie’s films and his 
attendance at international festivals were cancelled by Iranian authorities. These 
include Beyzaie’s jury membership at the 16th Turin International Film Festival in 
November 1999 as well as a film retrospective in his honour at the same festival, and 
the omission of his episode from the version o f the Tales o f  Kish (Makhmalbaf, 
Jalili, Taqavi 1999) screened in Cannes (2002: 97-98). This marginalisation clearly 
cannot simply be due to his filmmaking techniques, which break away from the 
conventional Hollywood style. In fact, Iranian cinema has been recognised and 
lauded on the international scene for its distinctly different style of filmmaking. 
Beyzaie’s reliance on the cultural and historical context of his subjects does not 
render his films incomprehensible any more than Majidi’s reliance on Persian 
mysticism does, and audiences of his many-layered films might well draw different 
levels of meaning from them. The term ‘modernist filmmaker’ that I assign to 
Beyzaie in the section heading is more to challenge the usual preconceived 
assumptions about him than to categorise him as such. It is also to challenge the idea 
that Beyzaie is ‘too local’ and ‘culturally porochial’ to comprehend. Here, I will 
examine two o f Beyzaie’s works that draw from both the form and the content of 
ta 'ziyeh in their narratives.
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A retelling o f Karbala through ta(ziyeh and film
Beyzaie has consistently maintained that it is his passion for understanding ordinary 
people and their cultural and historical roots that has driven his work and research. 
His screenplay The Day o f  Incident (Ruz-e vaqe'eh), which he wrote in 1984, 
recounts one o f the most important Shi‘i Iranian narratives, the story of Karbala. The 
Day o f  Incident was not just an attempt to put ta 'ziyeh on screen or to document a 
dying tradition. Instead, Beyzaie successfully brings the two elements of film and 
ta'ziyeh together and employs both the Western-secular medium and an Iranian 
religious tradition to retell the martyrdom of Husayn and his companions. Even 
though it is based on the historical incident of Karbala, it makes no claims to be a 
historical film. Instead, like ta ‘ziyeh, it encompasses in its narrative the larger 
Islamic historical and mythological elements as well as those that are specifically 
Iranian. Despite Beyzaie’s numerous attempts to make the film, he failed to obtain 
the necessary permits. Finally, in 1994, the film was given to Shahram Asadi to 
direct. Beyzaie’s solid script, however, did much to turn it into one of the best 
narratives on the events of Karbala, a narrative that is remarkably influenced by the 
elements of ta ‘ziyeh.
The Day o f Incident won four awards, including best film in the 13th Fajr 
International Film Festival in 1994. Even though nominated, Beyzaie, did not win 
the best screenplay. Ten years later, in 2004, during the opening ceremony of the 
22nd FIFF and on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, the 
achievements of those Iranians ‘who have been the source of pride for Iranian 
cinema’ (Rezadad, 2004: 16) were celebrated under three categories: Sacred Defence
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Cinema {Sinama-ye defa ‘-e moqqadas), The Cinema o f Revolutionary Ideals 
{Sinama-ye armanha-ye enqelab) and Religious Cinema {Sinama-ye dini). The first 
two categories have arguably been exhausted of their topics from the early days of 
post-Revolution cinema, with various events held to recognise and celebrate them. 
The third category o f religious cinema, however, had not received serious attention 
before. This was evident from the fact that, unlike the other two categories, one film, 
The Day o f  Incident (Asadi, 1994) swept away all the commendations for Religious 
Cinema, with no other films in the running. It was also thought provoking to note 
that only The Day o f  Incident seemed to fit this newly created category (this was a 
year before the introduction of the ‘Spiritual Cinema’ category in 2005). Beyzaie 
was also commended— albeit ten years late— for his screenplay. He was not present 
at the ceremony to collect his award.
The Day o f  Incident is set in the 7th century, in an unidentified Arab land. Through 
the love of Rahila, a Muslim girl, a Christian referred to only as Abd Allah converts 
to Islam. Rahila’s father, having rejected Abd Allah 37 times, finally agrees to give 
him his daughter’s hand in marriage. This, however, is met with strong tribal 
opposition. Despite their reproaches, preparations are made for an elaborate wedding 
on the ninth of Muharram. The big day arrives but during the celebrations Abd Allah 
hears a voice asking for help. He asks the guests if anyone had called out for help, 
but no one else seems to have heard the voice. He keeps on hearing these words: ‘Is 
there anyone who will come to my aid? Tomorrow Christ will be crucified in 
Naynawa.’ Just before the marriage rites are performed, he abruptly leaves the 
gathering, mounts his horse and gallops towards the desert. This causes a huge stir
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amongst the guests -  this is clearly an unforgivable insult and a stain on Arab honour 
and reputation.
On his journey to find Karbala and Husayn, he encounters various people and has to 
surmount many life-threatening challenges. He finally arrives at the scene of Karbala 
at noon of the tenth of Muharram. The enemy, however, have already entered 
Husayn’s camp, looting and burning everything, and rejoicing over their victim’s 
dead bodies. They hold spears atop which rest the heads of those they have slain. 
The place is filled with smoke, dust and shrieks of women and children. Suddenly, 
two suns appear in the sky and Abd Allah, blinded by the light, cries out that if  he 
were not meant to arrive in time, why was he summoned in the first place? He then 
blacks out. When he wakes up later, he sees a woman’s figure -  bound but wrapped 
in light. She addresses him as javanmard, and asks him to return with their message. 
Abd Allah returns to Rahila’s village/town to tell everyone what he saw.
In his book on the performing arts of Iran, Beyzaie states that during Nasir al-Din 
Shah’s reign (1848-1896), when ta'ziyeh reached its peak in terms of its artistic and 
entertainment values, it was divided into two parts: the pish-vaqe ‘eh, or ‘before the 
incident’ and the vaqe ‘eh or ‘incident’ itself. The pish-vaqe 'eh usually consisted of 
lighter performances and varied from love stories to satire. It was usually an 
opportunity to criticise those in positions o f power,33 or to enact stories with titles 
such as ‘Queen Sheba’s meeting with Solomon’, ‘Fatima’s attendance at a Quraysh
33 This in itself has been argued to have derived from older forms of performing art 
(Kuseh-bar neshin and Mir-e Nowroozi ) in which people would have an
opportunity to criticise the landlords or those under whom they were generally 
suffering.
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wedding’, and so on. This was then followed by the vaqe‘eh, which was three times 
as long and focused on the events of Karbala (Beyzaie, 2001: 132-133). Thus the 
ta ‘ziyeh performance would make people laugh and cry at the same time. It was both 
a joyous and sad occasion.
The title of the film, Ruz-e vaqe ‘eh, can be read as paying homage to these earlier 
forms of ta ‘ziyeh. The film draws from pish vaqe‘eh and vaqe‘eh in ta ‘ziyeh, by 
starting with a love story. Interestingly the wedding scenes comprise roughly one 
third of the entire film (27 out of 95 minutes). More importantly, the wedding dances 
and music with which the film begins are in sharp contrast to the current more 
sombre forms of commemorating Muharram in modern-day Iran under the Islamic 
Republic. Like pish vaqe‘eh in ta'ziyeh, the first part of the film provides an 
opportunity to criticise those who use their privileged social status to inflict injustice 
on the dispossessed. The pish vaqe ‘eh in ta ‘ziyeh provided the space to criticise the 
feudal landlords. In The Day o f  Incident, the opponents of Abd Allah’s marriage to 
Rahila are sceptical of his true intentions in converting from Christianity to Islam. 
They claim that since they have been Muslims for three generations it is beneath 
them to intermarry with new converts or for that matter with one whose very 
conversion is under question. The film, therefore, provides a critical look at the 
Islamic elite of the time. In early Islam, sabiqa (priority in Islam) became one of the 
most important signs of distinction that resulted in the formation of a new Islamic 
elite within the emerging umma (community) (Kennedy, 1986: 48). Those in 
Rahila’s tribe who consistently question Abd Allah’s faith in Islam and regard their 
three generations of Muslim-ness as a privilege and a licence to marginalise those 
outside this circle might be seen as subtly satirizing the current Muslim leaders of
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Iran who use their position as holders o f the ‘true interpretation’ o f Islam as a device 
to silence all others.
Abd Allah’s character also raises interesting issues about Iranian Shi‘i identity. His 
origin and ethnicity remain vague throughout the film, but certain references suggest 
to the viewer -  particularly an Iranian one -  that Abd Allah is most likely Iranian. 
The fact that he is not an Arab is mentioned at several junctures of the film. Even 
though his conversion is regarded with suspicion by many, he refuses to deny Christ 
or his own history and identity. This has clear parallels to the Persian conversions 
after the Arab invasion of Iran in 663. The early Islamic conquests resulted in the 
political and administrative union of vast regions extending from North Africa to the 
Persian Empire. Like many other conquered regions during this period, Iran was 
Islamicised. However, it remained the only territory to resist Arabisation. Similarly, 
Abd Allah embraces Islam without repudiating everything about his previous 
identity. Instead, he employs his own vocabulary and existing framework to interpret 
and understand the new faith.
In the specific context o f the rationale for conversion, the Arabs’ suspicions about 
Abd Allah can be compared to the reactions of the early Muslims when faced with 
early Iranian conversions. Although non-Muslims were not required to convert to 
Islam after the Muslim conquests, they were nonetheless ‘obliged to pay the jizya, or 
poll-tax and so adopt an inferior but secure role in the new order of things’ 
(Kennedy, 1986: 45). Thus, the subsequent conversions of Persians were sometimes 
interpreted as a tax-evading strategy rather than sincere declarations of faith. A non- 
Muslim wishing to profess the faith of Islam was only required to pronounce the
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shahada three times. Indeed, no other formal procedure was necessary to become 
Muslim. This simple oral ritual roused the suspicion of many -  both Muslims and 
non-Muslims -  about the sincerity of the converts. The Arab tribe alleges that Abd 
Allah’s conversion was just out of his love for Rahila rather than a true profession of 
faith, but scepticism about his conversion is not limited to his fiance’s Arab tribe, but 
is shared amongst his own people. Moreover, in the opening scene of the film, a 
Christian monk asks Abd Allah if indeed he has become an apostate because ‘the 
Arabs are now the conquerors of all conquerors’.
Abd Allah displays all the characteristics of a javanmard, a Persian term for a man 
o f integrity who is also brave, noble and chivalrous. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
5, javanmard  refers to a man possessing the qualities of courage, honour, modesty, 
humility and rectitude’ (Adelkhah, 1999: 30). It has been argued that the idea of 
javanmard  is linked with ‘a number of rebellions throughout Iran’s history’ 
(Adelkhah, 1999: 33). In this context, Adelkhah goes so far as to ask whether the 
concept of javanmard  was indeed ‘a case of a movement to assert identity, a national 
resistance movement against Arab occupation?’ (1999: 33). If it is, the term 
javanmard  stands in stark contrast to the term ‘ahl-e Kufeh’, ‘the Kufans’. In 
Persian, this is a metaphor for unfaithful people, derived from specific reference to 
the Kufans who had invited Imam Husayn to Kufa to liberate them from the 
oppressive Umayyad caliphate, but then spectacularly failed to stand by their oath of 
allegiance. The allegory of ‘the Kufans’ has also been consistently used in the 
Islamic Republic’s propagandist slogans since the early days of the Revolution: ‘We
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are not the Kufans, for ‘Ali to remain alone’.34 This is yet again another example of 
how the story of Husayn is used for political agendas.
Abd Allah’s response to the call for help is an act of javanmardi. Once summoned, 
regardless of the consequences, he selflessly stands by his oath o f allegiance. When 
he meets the woman enveloped in light -  most probably Zaynab, Husayn’s sister -  
she refers to him as javanmard. It is she who elucidates Abd Allah’s mission. He 
was summoned not to fight with Husayn, but to bear witness to the tragedy and 
become the carrier of Husayn’s message. Remembering the story of Husayn so that 
history will not forget his message and sacrifice is an important Shi‘i practice. In this 
context, as we have already discussed in Chapter 3, the martyrdom of Husayn, is a 
narrative that is deeply rooted within the Shi‘i Iranian tradition.
Beyzaie employs the techniques of an older performing art to depict an important 
religious event. Ta ‘ziyeh informs the narrative structure o f The Day o f  Incident. The 
two distinct parts of the film can be compared to pish vaqe‘eh and vaqe‘eh in 
ta'ziyeh. Like ta'ziyeh, the film is not just about the martyrdom of Husayn but 
includes the lighter story of Abd Allah and Rahila’s love. This also provides the 
opportunity to criticise the biases of the privileged just as ta ‘ziyeh would those in 
positions of power. The film also makes references to Iranian ideals such as 
javanmardi, a value that was incorporated in their religious traditions. It also 
emphasises the Shi‘a obligation of upholding Husayn’s message. Thus, Beyzaie does 
not just enact the events of Karbala on screen. In fact, very little is dedicated to the
34 Imam ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i Imam, who is also Imam Husayn’s father, was murdered 
in the mosque of Kufa by a dissident. ‘Ali in the above slogan is also a rhetorical 
reference to the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, currently Ali Khamenei.
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events of Karbala itself. Instead, he emphasises the impact o f Husayn’s martyrdom 
in the lives of the Shi‘a and in the formation of their religious identity.
The ta'ziyeh motifs are, however, restricted in The Day o f  Incident. The overall 
dramatic aspects of the film would have certainly looked different had Beyzaie 
himself directed it. Nonetheless, The Travellers (Mosaferan, 1992) provided him 
with the opportunity to write and direct a film that employed many ta ‘ziyeh motifs, 
even though it was a story set in modem times and not that of the martydom of 
Husayn.
Narrating a modern tragedy through ta ‘ziyeh
The Travellers (1992) won six awards in the 10th FIFF in 1992 including the Special 
Jury Award, the Best Actress in a Leading Role, Best Actress in a Supporting Role, 
Best Actor in a Supporting Role, Best Cinematography and Best Sound. Beyzaie was 
nominated for Best Directing and Best Editing but did not win. The simple story of 
The Travellers provides various levels of meaning. It is about a wedding celebration 
that is tragically turned into a mourning ceremony. Mahtab (the bride’s sister), her 
husband and two sons set out from a city in the north of Iran to attend the wedding in 
Tehran. They are also carrying the wedding mirror that the family traditionally 
places on the wedding spread. They are all, however, killed in a road accident. 
While the news comes as a devastating blow to everyone, the grandmother alone 
refuses to acknowledge their death. She adamantly awaits their arrival and the mirror 
they had promised to bring for the wedding. At the grandmother’s insistence, the 
bride finally agrees to change from her mourning clothes into her wedding gown. To
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the utter astonishment of the guests, the deceased family enters the house surrounded 
in an aura o f light, with Mahtab carrying the promised mirror.
One of the most striking elements of ta ‘ziyeh is the complete lack of suspense in the 
story and performance. Both the spectators and the actors know the tragic ending. 
They know that Imam Husayn and his companions will be killed and his family 
taken captive. It is, therefore, unimportant to keep this a secret to retain the story’s 
suspense. Similarly, at the beginning of Travellers, Mahtab faces the camera and 
tells the audience that she and her family are on their way to Tehran to attend her 
sister’s wedding. She then goes on to say that none of them will make it, that they 
will all die, thus giving away the ending of the story right at the beginning of the 
film. Moreover, like the performance of ta'ziyeh and unlike the commonly used 
shot/reverse camera angle, Mahtab faces the audience and speaks to them directly.35 
The dramatic acting in the film is also a departure from the preferred realist or neo­
realist styles in filmmaking. Instead, the acting of the various actors is a tribute to the 
different traditional performing arts o f Iran including pardeh khani, naqqali and 
ta'ziyeh. The constant circular movements of the camera throughout the film 
simulate the ta'ziyeh arena, which is traditionally a round stage with spectators 
gathered all around it.
35 Some Western productions have used similar modes such as the BBC drama series 
of Trollope’s He Knew He was Right, broadcast between mid April and early May 
2004. In this drama too, some actors would look at the camera and speak about their 
innermost feelings and thoughts as well as the courses of actions they were about to 
take. However, they did not give away the whole story and thus maintained its 
suspense amongst viewers.
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In his literature on the Iranian performing arts, Beyzaie provides a detailed 
description o f how deaths are staged in ta ‘ziyeh. The method of depicting the tragic 
deaths in The Travellers can be compared to the conventions in ta'ziyeh. Beyzaie 
states that in ta ‘ziyeh, the injured actor leaves on horseback, usually followed by a 
few men. Soon after, the horse returns without its rider but pierced by numerous 
arrows. The return o f the riderless horse is an old metaphor in Persian literature that 
indicates the rider’s death. The actual moment of Imam Husayn’s martyrdom is also 
hidden from the spectators’ eyes, even though it occurs on stage. Traditionally, ten 
people from the opposing army surround the Imam, gradually tightening the circle 
around him. Suddenly, they throw themselves upon him and freeze in this position. 
Then the Shimr-reader, who is weeping loudly and inviting the audience too to cry 
(since he is a Shi‘i believer in real life), storms into the middle of the circle and 
murders the Imam. At this moment, because the Imam cannot be seen even though 
he is on stage, pigeons are released into the sky. They symbolise both the ascent of 
the Imam’s soul into the heavens and the messengers who carry the news of the 
Imam’s death (Beyzaie, 2001: 140-141).
In The Travellers, the exact moment of the tragic deaths is also hidden from the 
audience. The viewer is aware from very early on in the film that the family will not 
make it to Tehran. The numerous warning signals are a constant reminder of the 
unpleasant incident that is about to take place. The car’s navigation along the 
dangerous and twisted roads through mountains that seem to close in on them, the 
dark tunnel they pass through, the musical cues that constantly change from merry 
beats to suspenseful tones and, finally, the tanker that approaches the camera 
threatening a crash but then calmly steers back onto the road, all suggest the
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imminence of the incident. It is only after the tanker passes that the audience sees the 
leak from behind it. The fire and smoke in the next sequence and the traffic 
lieutenant reporting on the incident all combine to inform the viewer that the fatal 
accident has indeed occurred. No gory details are shown, nor is there any emphasis 
on the bodies. Indeed, there is only one quick shot of a draped body. Instead, the 
tragedy is depicted through the body of the smashed car, empty but with broken and 
bloodstained windows, just like the riderless horse full o f arrows on the ta ‘ziyeh 
stage.
The audience is also shielded from hearing the news of death, a pattern that is 
repeated throughout the film. Even when the family is informed of the death of their 
loved ones, the audience sees only their reaction to the devastating news rather than 
hearing the news itself. Even though various people give/hear the news o f death, 
these accounts are inaudible to the viewer. Instead, only the dramatic reactions to the 
news are shown. The men are usually quietly but clearly grief-stricken, the women 
scream, throw mud on their heads, break mirrors and crystals and tear the curtains in 
their displays of grief. Only the grandmother calmly refuses to accept the deaths and 
does not go into mourning.
One of the sequences that best alludes to the ta'ziyeh stage is the mourning 
ceremony held in the family’s house. The camera constantly makes circular 
movements around the guests, suggesting a round stage in the centre of the room. 
This then becomes the centre stage for various family members, just like the ta \ziyeh 
actors, to make their speeches. When the brothers of the deceased couple give their 
speeches on death, they define it according to their respective professions -  business
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and academia. The husband of Zarinkolah, the village woman who had also been in 
the same taxi, then enters the stage. The performative and melancholic narration of 
his wife’s story is reminiscent of the religious naqqali. He narrates his wife’s long 
desire for a child and her constant search for a cure, which ultimately led to her 
death, for she had been on her way to Tehran to visit yet another fertility clinic. 
Similarly, when the taxi-driver’s wife enters, like the naqqal (story-teller), she also 
gives an emotional account of her husband’s story and the misery that had befallen 
her. In contrast, the traffic lieutenant confidently provides a technical account of the 
accident, analysing the various logical reasons that might have led to the collision.
Indeed, the family of the deceased can be compared to the mazlum khans (readers of 
the oppressed) and the truck driver and his assistant to mukhalif-khans (readers of the 
opposing army) in ta'ziyeh. The latter, too, attend the mourning ceremony to pay 
their respects and beg for forgiveness. Initially, their appearance causes a stir 
amongst the guests, with the sons of the deceased taxi-driver attacking them. When 
everyone is finally calmed down, the truck driver and his assistants sit on the 
floor/stage. They then begin to vociferate how despite their desperate efforts to avoid 
the accident, the truck had slid on the slippery road and crashed into the taxi. The 
loud, crude and rough voices of the driver and his assistant and their frequent use of 
slang and colloquial terms is very similar to the way the mukhalif khans speak in 
ta'ziyeh.
Ta ‘ziyeh also provides a cathartic release for its spectators, just like the family in The 
Travellers, who do not just grieve the loss of their loved ones, but also lament about 
their old inner pains. Thus, when mourning the loss of his brother and nephews,
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Hekmat sobs to his wife that no more male descendants are left to carry their family 
name, which will subsequently vanish without a trace. What surfaces, however, is 
Hekmat’s own unhappiness at not being able to have a male child. His wife has 
borne him two daughters and doctors have advised against another pregnancy as it 
would put his wife’s life at risk. Similarly, the loving relationship between Mastan 
and Mahu, the bride’s brother, is not as perfect as it had appeared. During the 
mourning ceremony, Mastan faces the camera and announces that they have a 
disabled child who lives far away from them, and whom they can visit only once a 
month. The mourning ceremony, just like the ta ‘ziyeh stage, therefore, allows the 
open— and safe— expression o f these strong emotions. The family grieve for their 
loss, just as ta ‘ziyeh allows spectators to openly grieve not only for Husayn’s fate but 
also their own misfortunes.
The Travellers employs many ta ‘ziyeh forms in narrating its story. The elements of 
lack of suspense, veiled moments of death, its impact on the bereaved, the circular 
movements of camera, the delivery of the dialogues and the cathartic nature of the 
mourning rituals are all comparable to ta ‘ziyeh. Beyzaie employs all these features of 
ta'ziyeh to narrate a modem tragedy. The Travellers also allows Beyzaie, who 
laments the loss of older Iranian forms of performing arts, to employ the medium of 
film to reintroduce and reinterpret these older traditions to his audience.
In the next section I will explore how Kiarostami, whose style and approach differ 
dramatically from Beyzaie, engages with ta ‘ziyeh in film. It is not necessarily only 
the martyrdom of Husayn, but the story of Karbala and the rituals of ta ‘ziyeh that 
have informed Iranian Shi'i identity and its expressions.
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Ta‘ ziyeh and its Spectators
In early May 2005, Abbas Kiarostami staged an installation o f the ta ‘ziyeh called *A 
Look to Tazieh’ at the London’s Victoria and Albert Museum, followed by an ‘in- 
conversation’ between him, Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, and Geoff Andrew.36 The 
installation consisted of three screens— two large screens on the side and a relatively 
smaller television screen in the middle. The television screen played scenes of 
ta ‘ziyeh performed in a remote rural area. The two large screens on the side showed 
spectators watching ta ‘ziyeh. These were images of men, women and children and 
they were edited in such a way that their reactions corresponded precisely to the 
ta ‘ziyeh that was screened on the television screen. The spectators initially begin to 
watch the play distractedly, talking to each other, having tea, and giggling away. But 
gradually the drama captivates them, and as the tragedy reaches its climax, many are 
in tears, some sobbing or beating their chests.
This installation was a departure from Kiarostami’s usual filmmaking topics as 
evident from the analysis in the previous chapter. During the post-screening 
discussion, he explained his attraction to a topic that would normally not have 
interested him. The idea was first conceived in 1997 when he was awarded the 
prestigious Palme d’Or award at the Cannes International Film Festival for his Taste 
o f  Cherry. When an interviewer at Cannes asked him if the distancing at the end of 
the film was a Brechtian influence, Kiarostami responded that it was the influence of 
ta'ziyeh rather than Brecht. The director of the Rome Theatre present at that
36 Karimi-Hakkak is a Persian studies scholar based in the United States and Geoff 
Andrew a film critic in Britain.
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interview was keen to know more about ta 'ziyeh and so Kiarostami sent him a tape 
on his return to Tehran, which ultimately resulted in the installation at the Rome 
Theatre in 2003.
Kiarostami believes that the primitive ta'ziyeh of older times was a much better
performance. One could legitimately ask if  this arises simply out of his fascination
with the older, more primitive, and therefore, exotic aspects of culture and society.
He has, in fact, been frequently criticised for his choice of subjects and locations,
particularly by some in the Iranian diaspora who read his films as an attempt to win
foreign audiences and awards by depicting Iran as ‘backward’. This is a view that
has time and again been argued about—but it is a discussion that I shall not enter
into here. At the very least, the problem with this criticism is that it dismisses the
films on the basis of very superficial readings indeed. Instead, I will first look at
Kiarostami’s discussion of both his experiences of ta'ziyeh as a child and his later
filmmaking experience, which will allow me to analyse his work better. Kiarostami
is a great orator and knows how to engage with his audience. His talk during the
discussion was frequently punctuated with outbursts o f laughter, particularly from
the Iranian audience. Sadly, much of the humour was lost in translation. Here I have
noted down excerpts from his talk,37 which will shed light not only on Kiarostami’s
interpretation of ta ‘ziyeh, but also on its evolution in modem Iran.
My earliest memory of ta'ziyeh was watching it when I was four or five on my 
father’s shoulders. Much has changed in the last 50 years. Like all other things, when 
there are better facilities the results are far worse. Ta'ziyeh has become far more 
performative and far worse. It was much better when it was performed with the 
minimum of equipment. I found the ta'ziyeh that you just watched in one of the
37 In my own translations here, I have tried to retain the original humour as much as 
possible.
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remote areas of Iran. Everything in ta ‘ziyeh has become so modem that it has lost the 
newness, honesty and sincerity which was once present in ta 'ziyeh.
One of my childhood memories of ta ‘ziyeh is a battle scene between Imam Husayn 
and [sic]Yazid.38 The swords they were using must have been made of tinplate, 
because they were very primitive and flimsy. During the battle, one of the swords got 
bent. The other one took it from him and straightened it with a stone and handed it 
back. I was astonished to see that even though they were enemies and fighting with 
each other, they also enjoyed a friendly relationship. This is an important theme that 
runs through all ta'ziyehs...The dialogues, for example, bear this interesting duality, 
something that I picked up through my repetitious viewings of the rushes. In a verse 
such as manam ke ba lagad mizanam be sanduq-e ‘elm-e ladoni (It is me who kicks 
your chest, the chest of divine knowledge) the character acts both as friend and 
enemy. That is, even though I am kicking you, I also acknowledge that you are the 
bearer of the divine knowledge.
Kiarostami’s later experience of making the ta ‘ziyeh installation was equally if not 
more fascinating. He stated that he was more interested in the audience watching 
ta ‘ziyeh than the performance itself. He wanted to know who they were, where they 
came from, and more importantly, to watch a people that one does not usually get to 
observe. The main challenge however, was not the presence of the camera in front of 
the spectators. In fact, he said, they would get so engrossed in the ta ‘ziyeh that they 
would rarely notice the camera and those behind it would even stretch and position 
themselves to look over it for a better view of the stage. Instead, it was filming the 
segregated audience that proved very challenging for Kiarostami. The women who 
were sitting on the top-floor balcony did not allow the male cameramen to go 
upstairs. As a result, the only female cameraperson did not record enough footage of 
the women watching ta ‘ziyeh. When it came to editing, Kiarostami was 40 minutes
38 Kiarostami must have meant Shimr, for Yazid the caliph was not present in 
Karbala, and the battle scenes of ta ‘ziya depict Shimr as the commander of the 
opposing forces.
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short of footage of the female audience. He thought creatively o f a resolution to the 
problem:
We had to wait for another Muharram, next year. I thought of a solution but wasn’t 
sure if it would work. I transferred all my footage of ta ‘ziyeh onto VHS tape and put 
my television in the backyard garden and covered the walls with black cloth. Then I 
asked one of the cleaners that worked in our neighbourhood to bring me some extras 
who would sit and watch the film, and I could then intersperse their images with my 
previous footage. I set up the scene and put out the chairs and some 16 of them arrived 
by minibus. They entered in silence and sat on the chairs and without giving any 
explanations, I started the VHS player. They began watching the film in my backyard 
and by minute 40 they started to cry. All the good shots that you just saw of women 
crying are the ones from my garden!
However, the fact that they were watching it on TV and not ‘live’ did not take away 
anything from the reality of the meaning of the process itself. In fact one could see it 
as an extension of the distancing that occurs in ta 'ziyeh. It [the mediated form] was no 
longer important for them. In fact, at some points the sun was so bright that you could 
barely see anything, but they still continued to cry by just hearing the words. 
Interestingly, once everything was finished I was embarrassed to pay them. I thought, 
they’ve come and cried and I have to say, here is this much for your crying. I had the 
money in my hand inside my pocket, but not knowing what to do I went to the driver 
and thanked him and said goodbye to each of them. The woman who was their 
organiser came up to me and said ‘it has come to this much.’ I was perplexed, not 
knowing what was genuine; the crying..., the money...?! Then she also asked for her 
husband’s fees. I said, ‘But he wasn’t there crying in the garden to which she 
responded, ‘No but he’s been waiting here in the minibus!’ So he was paid without 
even crying and I was completely confused!
Then again we were short of footage, so I asked for another 15 new faces. This time 
the organiser brought 30 women with her, 15 of whom were the old faces. I told her 
that I had already shot their faces, to which she responded: ‘Well, they’ve come along 
anyway! ’ So we sat the old crowd on the side and the new ones in front of the camera. 
We served them tea and sweets and then got started. After a while I noticed the old 
ones who didn’t have the camera on them were much more emotional and weeping far 
more than the new batch! [Audience is laughing heartily by now] Whatever I’m 
saying is the truth! Once they were finished, their organiser came to me and charged
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even for the old group saying that they had done their share of crying anyway! 
Despite all of this, it is very difficult and complex to find out what is happening in 
their heads... I didn’t say all of this just to make you laugh! I wanted to demonstrate 
how people are far more complex than it appears...there is so much contradiction in 
Iran.
Kiarostami’s ta'ziyeh was produced as a response to Western curiosity about this 
performing art. His installation is an invitation to look beyond the stage 
performances, and directs our gaze to the spectators. In fact, Kiarostami’s approach 
to introducing ta'ziyeh is a clear departure from the traditional emphasis on the 
characteristics of script and performance. The larger-than-life images of the 
spectator, and the relatively smaller screen of the performance itself, make it very 
clear that he is more interested in the spectators watching ta ‘ziyeh and its effect on 
them than ta ‘ziyeh itself. It is a statement that defines ta ‘ziyeh as an ensemble, of 
which the spectators are an integral part. In his own words, ‘Ta'ziyeh is strictly 
linked to its audience - the event is actually created by the rapport between actors 
and spectators’ (quoted in Iran Heritage Foundation, 2005). Kiarostami thus 
demonstrates that it is this link between the performance and the spectator that 
makes ta ‘ziyeh very different from any other drama or performance. The men and 
women who begin watching the play passively— some whispering, talking, giggling 
or even dozing off—become increasingly active and engaged, sobbing and beating 
their chests as they approach the epilogue.
Kiarostami’s deployment of ta'ziyeh in film is not an attempt to preserve or revive 
this old ‘dying’ performing art. In fact, he is not interested in a newer, more 
performative and technically advanced form of ta ‘ziyeh. Rather, he maintains that it 
is the newness, honesty and sincerity of the old that is lost with the modem
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interventions. However, it would be a disservice not to acknowledge the very 
modem interventions which allow him to capture what he classifies as ‘the best 
female shots of the film’ from the paid spectators. The video screening enables him 
to ‘re-enact’ a performance outside its usual time and space to achieve the desired 
reactions. Nevertheless, Kiarostami’s search for a location in which the ta'ziyeh is 
closer to the ‘primitive ta 'ziyeh o f the older times’ points to the fact that he, too, 
even if subconsciously/inadvertently, is trying to capture and hold on to a glimpse of 
an older tradition that is swiftly evolving and developing into newer forms. In this 
sense, his installation could be seen as preserving the older performing art. More 
importantly, however, what Kiarostami captures through his images o f the spectators 
is the continuing impact of the story o f Husayn’s martyrdom on his Shi'i believers. 
One of the most powerful narratives in Iran, the story still manages to capture the 
imagination of its audience, whether present at the performance itself or paid to 
watch a televised version.
Conclusions
The complexity of the modem Iranian Shi‘a points to the problem of dichotomising 
religious traditions and modernity. Whether it is a rowzeh that turns into a mobile 
ringtone or an underground rap singer who ‘updates’ the traditional rowzeh khani 
into a rap about Muharram, the boundaries of tradition and modernity, religious and 
secular are no longer clear-cut. It is no longer possible to define the space for 
religious traditions as restricted to the mosques and the clergy. Nor are the secular 
and modem totally separate from religion. Religion finds a new medium of 
expression through modem secular inventions such as the internet, which allows a
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cleric such as Daneshmand to expand his sermons to include a virtual audience. The 
internet has also enabled Sunni-Shi‘a conflict discourse to occupy and engage with a 
new medium, with each group posting evidence to the heretical character of the 
other. As shown in this chapter, it is no longer possible to ignore this growing 
interaction between religious traditions and modernity.
It is within this evolving context of religious traditions that ta'ziyeh, which 
originated in much older pre-Islamic forms of performance, has survived its many 
centuries of eventful history. It has been condemned by some ulama as unlslamic, 
endorsed by others, flourished under royal patronage, and been banned and ignored 
for being ‘backward’ during the rule of the Pahlavis. It has moved from the greatest 
performance halls in cities to remote rural plateaus. Thus, the lifeblood of ta'ziyeh 
has historically been held largely in the hands of the religious and ruling authorities 
and more recently continues to cause concern amongst them for the reputation of 
religion.
Films provided ta'ziyeh with a new space controlled by the artist rather than those in 
positions of power. The filmmaker Beyzaie employs many ta'ziyeh elements, in 
terms of both form and content, in writing and making his films. In Beyzaie’s 
reinterpretation, ta'ziyeh is employed to narrate one of the most powerful Shi‘i 
Iranian narratives. Ta ‘ziyeh informs the narrative structure of The Day o f  Incident, 
and its motifs are applied to narrate a modern-day tragedy in The Travellers. In this 
way, Beyzaie not only revives the old performing art but also demonstrates its 
relevance to the modem Iranian imagination. Like ta ’ziyeh, his films encompass the 
historical, the mythological, the national and the religious as they relate to Iranian
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society and culture. For his part, Kiarostami illustrates in his installation that the 
idiosyncrasies o f ta ‘ziyeh are not limited to its performative aspects but, more 
importantly, He in the effect it has on its spectators. What Kiarostami captures 
through his images of the spectators is the continuing impact o f the story of 
Husayn’s martyrdom on his Shi‘i believers. One of the most powerful narratives in 
Iran, the story still manages to capture the imagination of its audience, whether 
present at the performance or paid to watch a televised version. Both Beyzaie’s films 
and Kiarostami’s installation are particularly important in the face of the evolving 
traditions of the Muharram ceremonies discussed above. They act as a reservoir of a 
tradition within a context where there is a growing concern about the ‘Other’s’ 
perception of ‘Islamic’ practices, which includes the omission o f some of these older 
traditions.
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Conclusions
In a gathering on 13th June 2006, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the Supreme
Leader of the Islamic Republic, received 16 of the country’s cinema directors as well
as the Minister o f Culture and Islamic Guidance, Hossein Saffar-Harandi, and
advised them on the crucial role they play in society. He said:
The key to the country’s progress lies to a considerable extent in the hands of 
cinematic artists. The reason is that, considering the influential role of this art, those 
who are involved in the lofty art of cinema are able to foster noble aspirations, 
eagerness to make progress, motivation, dynamism, self-confidence and adherence to 
Islamic and national values in society through their cinematic productions and thus 
play a great role in the country’s progress and in the promotion of sublime values in 
society (quoted in Awareness Times, 2006)
Ayatollah Khamenei’s address, just like Ayatollah Khomeini’s reference to cinema 
as an educational tool in the early years of the Revolution, as discussed in chapter 4, 
signifies the continuity of the regime’s acknowledgment of the medium’s power and 
significance.
In the context of the socio-political power of media, where images and 
representation play a significant role in perpetuating or reconstructing various social 
and political agendas, it is also important to examine the medium’s inherent ability 
to allow for a polyvocality of discourses including those that challenge or debate 
views. As I discussed in the Introduction, depictions of Muslims and constructions of 
their ‘otherness’ within the Western media have stirred vehement debate and resulted 
in numerous studies. However, it is equally important to study the various
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articulations and constructions from within the Muslim context. But what are these 
Muslim discourses in religion?
During the in-conversation between Abbas Kiarostami, Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak and
Geoff Andrew that followed Kiarostami’s ta ‘ziyeh installation at the V&A,39 Karimi-
Hakkak asked Kiarostami whether, as an Iranian, as an artist, he personally found the
ta ‘ziyeh narrative a little too unsettling, or was it the likes of him, now living in the
West, who had grown squeamish. He asked:
Would you moderate the drama if you had the power to, if it were your choice, to 
spare the blood and gore or do you think there is something inherently dramatic about 
the explicit nature of this narrative that moves the crowd to tears? Is it the sight of the 
blood and the shroud and all that? I ask this because I’d like this genre to continue but 
I can’t think [it appealing] to the new generation; and the reason this has been 
ghetto ised in Iran in the villages and in the lower classes is that the more urban classes 
are finding it too explicit and not to their tastes.
Kiarostami responded:
There is so much contradiction in Iran. It is difficult for me to speak here in front of 
the microphones; it usually causes misunderstanding. We live in a religious society 
and people often misunderstand me and accuse me of being in favour of religion, 
which is not at all the case...there are so many contradictions in our country, complex 
issues. If I say that religion is just superficial and an imposition on the youth, that isn’t 
the case either. Some of my own son’s friends, who are very young, are very serious 
about religion. They fast during Ramazan and observe the religious rituals. It is 
surprising and difficult to completely understand. It cannot be easily judged. Even if 
Shajarian [one of the most elite classical singers in Iran] had sung these [folkloric] 
verses it would have brought tears to people’s eyes.
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If I turn the same question to Hakkak it would be a difficult question for him to 
answer. I noticed him tearing during the screening [of the ta ‘ziyeh installation]. Does 
that mean he is religious?
Karimi-Hakkak ignores this and turns to the audience to take further questions.
The exchange above is a brief reminder of the difficulties surrounding a definitive 
explanation of what constitutes religion, who is religious, which members of the 
social strata endorse a specific religious practice in Iran, and how much one is 
allowed, or even allows oneself, to publicly express one’s views on these topics. As I 
have explored in the previous chapters, there are different modalities of Shi‘i 
interpretation in Iran, which make it a rich and complex context. These vary from 
legalistic and formalistic approaches to religion, to more popular discourses and 
personal interpretations. Each of these modalities are themselves not fixed but have, 
in fact, evolved over time and been expressed in various forms. Iranian films have 
engaged with these various interpretations and approaches.
The discussions around what exactly constitutes religion and spirituality in film have
been varied and diverse. As discussed, some such as Baugh (1995) and Tatum
(1997) have approached the study of film and religion through films with explicit
religious references, such as depictions of Jesus and Christ-figures. Others, like May
(1982) and Deacy (2001), have emphasised the autonomy of film as an art form,
which they argue is inherently open to a religious interpretation. Lyden (2003), on
the other hand, suggests that the reception of film, independent of its content, turns it
into a religious experience and proposes audience study as the method to study
religion in film. Yet others such as Martin (1995), Estess (1995) and Ostwalt (1995)
study the medium’s engagement with religion by drawing parallels between film and
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the arguments of a certain theology. Similarly, Gordon (1995) and Nathanson (2003) 
argue that parallels can be drawn between the functions of film and mythology. Still 
another approach (Miles, 1996; Martin, 1995) has been to examine how films 
perpetuate social and political hegemonies. Bird (1982) studies film as hierophany, 
suggesting that film styles enable the explorations of the sacred. Finally, there are 
those who are interested in studying philosophy through film (Falzon, 2002; Litch, 
2002) and film itself as philosophy that thinks (Goodenough, 2005).
By synthesising and categorising these approaches within Western academia I not 
only examined how each o f these methods have attempted to study film’s 
engagement with religion and spirituality, but also, and more importantly, how the 
intersections between them make it impossible to define a distinct and independent 
approach. Aside from the fluidity o f boundaries between these approaches, it also 
became clear that no single approach can be identified as the one best suited to the 
study of religion and spirituality in film. Rather, it is the nature of the particular film 
under study and the angle from which the scholar approaches it, that determines the 
most appropriate method or methods. This has allowed me to be flexible in my own 
approach, rather than restrict it to films that could be fitted within a particular 
method or approach.
Within the Iranian context, too, there are a range of views on what constitutes film’s 
engagement with religion and spirituality. Authorities, academics, religious leaders 
and critics have all struggled to define the relationship of film with religion and 
spirituality. Ayatollah Moravveji’s treatise (1999) on Islamic jurisprudence and 
cinema was an exercise in aligning traditional theocratic positions with state laws
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and contemporary social practices. Critics such as Maddadpur argued that the very 
medium of film is incompatible with Islamic religious values. The category of 
ma'nagara cinema introduced in 2005 resulted in heated debates encompassing a 
wide range of interpretations. As in the case of Western film studies, no one 
approach can do justice to the numerous possibilities o f studying religion and 
spirituality in Iranian film. What is significant in the Iranian case, however, is that 
these debates reflect a general recognition of cinema’s legitimate participation in 
discourses on religion and spirituality and, more importantly, film’s ability to 
articulate its own discourse on these topics.
Therefore, in studying how Iranian films have participated and engaged with Shi‘i 
expressions of Islam, I selected three broad themes within Shi‘ism and examined 
how film engaged with them. However, to provide a better understanding of these 
themes as well as the appeal and development of Shi'ism in Iran, it was important to 
first locate them within the much larger socio-historical context of Iran. In this way, 
my analysis of the films in the chapters allocated to each theme also demonstrated an 
important point: it established how film is a serious medium in the understanding 
and analyses of current Shi‘i religious expressions within Iran that could be placed as 
part of a much longer conventional discourse on religion and spirituality in this 
region.
One of the themes that I examined in my study of film’s engagement with religion 
and spirituality was the legalistic approach within Shi‘ism. For this, I focused on the 
role of the Shi‘i clergy in Iranian society. My analysis in Chapter 5 revealed a highly 
complex picture of the Shi‘i Iranian clergy, whose political and religious authority
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have been historically contested. Indeed, criticisms of clerical power and legitimacy 
were expressed not only by a small group of secular intellectuals but also, more 
strikingly, by elements among the clergy. Recently, the Islamic Republic has not 
only produced some o f the most nuanced arguments questioning the legitimacy of 
velayat-e faqih  and clerical power over laity, it has also unwittingly produced some 
of the finest secular intellectual criticism of the doctrine. Many o f this latter group 
originated as allies of the clerical regime.
In examining the current role o f the clergy, I demonstrated how the two films that I 
had selected functioned as parables. Both The Lizard  (2004) and Under the 
Moonlight (2001) not only depict the world o f the clergy in its current form within 
Iranian society but also include a moral vision of how it ought to be. These filmic 
discourses evoke the debates of intellectuals who have critically engaged with the 
doctrines that empower the clergy. I argued that even though the films are critical of 
the clerics’ current position within society, they do not deny their relevance to the 
believer. In fact, they remain affirmative of the role of religion in one’s life. What 
the films do, however, is to question the legitimacy of the roles that some clergy 
have taken for themselves in society. As I demonstrated, the films propose an 
alternative relationship between clergy and laity, suggesting that the formalistic and 
institutional facets of religion should aim towards fulfilling their ideal role within 
society. Both these films propose a more fluid relationship between people, the 
clergy and the Divine, one that is not restricted to the rigid boundaries of seminary 
debates.
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In contrast to the formalistic approach within Shi‘ism, the more personal mystical 
approach was the second theme of my studies of Shi'i expressions. This provided an 
alternative to the official discourses o f the Islamic Republic, which are based 
primarily in the theological debates o f jurisprudents. The allusive language of poetry 
plays a key role in the way that the mystical approach is able to convey and share 
some of its perspectives. As discussed in Chapter 3, Sufis argue that reason and 
intellect alone remain inadequate tools for understanding the Ultimate Reality in its 
highest form. Instead, notions of the Divine spark, going beyond self, and love, are 
the guides and inspiration of the soul in its ascent to God. Despite the differences 
amongst the various Sufi groups, the primary goal o f attaining closeness or union 
with God remains constant throughout Sufism.
In Chapter 6 ,1 studied how Majidi’s films reflect some of these core Sufi teachings, 
such as man’s spiritual attainment and his proximity to God. His films provide an 
alternative view of Iranian Shi‘i expressions, which are inspired by the works of 
great masters such as Rumi, Attar and Jami. Studying Majidi’s films also reveals 
how these literary and poetic forms inform Iranian Shi‘i expressions of Islam. In 
contrast to the theological and legalistic approach, this form o f Sufism does not 
deem formalistic learning and institutions essential to man’s spiritual attainment. 
Eschewing the debate on the legalistic approach, Majidi instead employs the medium 
of film to explore a few key mystical concepts such as love, suffering and 
annihilation, and their relevance to the modern-day lives of ordinary people. In all 
these films, spiritual attainment requires no special rank, distinction or an 
understanding or study o f the traditional sources. The Sufi concepts embedded in the 
film allow viewers to share in the spiritual experiences of the characters. As I
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demonstrated, these films succeed in producing a modem discourse that offers an 
alternative way of understanding religion and spirituality, but one that is rooted in 
medieval Iranian mystical interpretations of Islam.
In Chapter 7, I examined how Kiarostami’s films are poetic philosophies that 
contemplate man’s existence and its meaning. His approach to religion and 
spirituality is, in fact, a departure from the conventional approaches discussed above. 
Even though his films present us with authoritarian accounts of the religious, 
positivist and sceptic, Kiarostami does not set out to prove the truth or untruth of any 
of these accounts. Instead, he remains silent to these various articulations and arrives 
at a poetic way o f understanding the mystical. Using the framework of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, I demonstrated how Kiarostami’s films allude to the 
mystical by pointing to another way of looking, allowing his audience to arrive at a 
certain understanding themselves. Therefore, by focusing on the question of life and 
death in his films, I argued how his films are ‘thinking texts’ that employ the lyrical 
language of Iranian poets but do not aim to demonstrate existing philosophies. 
Rather, they invite us to rethink our preconceptions and look afresh at life. 
Kiarostami’s ‘thinking’ films are important in that they not only contemplate all 
these various approaches, but also go beyond them to provide a vision of an 
alternative discourse on religion and spirituality in Iran today.
Having examined film’s engagement with the formalistic and mystical approaches, 
Chapter 8 was a study of films’ engagement with popular discourses. This became 
the third theme of my study of Shi‘i expressions of Islam in Iran. I selected the 
narrative o f Husayn with a focus on ta'ziyeh. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the
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narrative of Hus ay n has historically played a pivotal role in the formation of Shi‘i 
identity. Husayn’s martyrdom has turned him into one of the greatest mythical 
figures o f Iranian narratives, a narrative that has been variously appropriated by 
different factions at different times. These have ranged from commemorative 
processions and the religious ceremonies of rowzeh khani to Khomeini’s anti-Shah 
slogans.
Examining ta'ziyeh 's  eventful history shows that this performing art has at various 
times been faced with resistance from different factions including the Iranian clergy 
and the monarchy as well as intellectuals. As I demonstrated through an analysis of 
Beyzaie’s and Kiarostami’s respective engagement with ta ‘ziyeh in their films, their 
reinterpretation of this older form of performing art has, even if  inadvertently, 
reintroduced this dying art form to their audiences through a new medium. Thus, in 
the face of the increasing pressures on ta ‘ziyeh as well as the evolving traditions of 
Muharram more generally, these films act not only as a cultural reservoir for a 
threatened tradition, but also more importantly, endow it with new life.
Overall, I have employed an array of source materials in my research, all o f which 
have enriched my findings. These include religious treatises, music, speeches and 
videos. I have studied the different articulations of what constitutes religion and 
spirituality in film within Western scholarship as well as Iranian discourses. Having 
highlighted the problems of constraining oneself to a particular approach or listing 
conventional criteria that would qualify a film as ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’, I went on 
to explore how films have engaged with different Shi‘i expressions in Islam. For 
this, I focused on official and formalistic religious discourses, the more Sufi and
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mystical approaches, a philosophical approach as well as popular discourses within 
Shi‘i Islam in Iran. In short, I aimed to understand the recent articulations of Iranian 
Shi‘a Islam through the medium o f film as articulated by these Muslims themselves. 
In this regard, I believe that this study presents a creative approach to understanding 
contemporary articulations on religion and spirituality in Iran.
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